DANIEL S. FORREST

SUPRAHUMANISM

European Man and the Regeneration of History



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European Man and the Regeneration of History

Daniel S. Forrest

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Prelude

The Revolt of the Slaves

Chronospheres

Interlude

The Third Man

Original Origin

Areté

History and Genes

The Artist-Tyrant

Promethean Fire

Europe, the Land of Our Sons

Wagner, Nietzsche, and the New Suprahumanist Myth

Postlude

Bibliography

Links

Acknowledgements

My greatest debt is to Giorgio Locchi, the main suprahumanist thinker since 1945. He has been the inspiration for the present work, which intends to be both a personal synthesis of his ideas, and an inquiry into current trends — applying his analytical method.

Above all, my deepest gratitude is to Richard Wagner and Friedrich Nietzsche. May their work conjointly serve as a powerful beacon on our way forward and upward.

Prelude

We may therefore hope that one day even Europe will be purified of all Jewish mythology. Perhaps the century has come in which the peoples of the Indo-European group of languages will again receive the sacred religions of their native countries; for they have again become ripe for these after having long gone astray.

— Arthur Schopenhauer

Richard Wagner (Munich, ca. 1870).

Suprahumanism rests on two pillars: Wagner and Nietzsche. Contemporaries who were friends, notwithstanding their difference in age — friends who then parted company and became intellectual enemies: with the young philosopher attacking the composer ferociously, but falling in love with his wife, Cosima.

It is easy to see an intimate relation between the work of Wagner and of Nietzsche. They constitute the two poles of the *mythical field* of suprahumanism.

After they parted company, Nietzsche suffered greatly in distancing himself from the only man he had ever loved. However, this suffering arose from a kind of metaphysical jealousy. Nietzsche would have wished for the place in history accorded to Wagner.

Nietzsche, the philosopher of perpetual becoming, could not endure Wagner's expression of the philosophy in music. Nietzsche established the philosophical myth of the superman (*Übermensch*). He explained its logic and created a language for it. However, the myth existed already in the form of Wagnerian opera. Nietzsche merely gave a name to what already existed in music — but this he could never admit. Nietzsche deliberately concealed the Wagnerian origin of his Zarathustrian vision.

Having started with an assault on Wagner's music — decadent art *par excellence* — Nietzsche concluded by criticising almost all German music — for leading inevitably to Wagner. He sets 'pure melody' — described as 'Mediterranean' — against 'harmony' — described as 'Nordic.'

Music and Philosophy

Richard Wagner may be considered the most magnetic and powerful artistic voice of the nineteenth century and a profound influence on modernity. From Wagner's death until the First World War, composers, painters, philosophers, novelists, dramatists, and poets strove mightily to come to terms with his strangely vibrant and living legacy. No composer before or since has left such an enduring mark on the course of cultural history. Few artists have embraced public life so assiduously, and inspired so much controversy — in politics as well as in art.

In Wagner, music, drama (i.e., tragedy), and myth are closely related. *Music*, according to him, is an *idea of the world*. The image of the ring of the Nibelung — the ring which gives its name to the tetralogy — is the living symbol of the *spherical* conception of history: the music of eternal recurrence. The return to a *mythical* past associated with a leap into the future. A new present of human consciousness, a deeper past: that of a reconquest of origins and the promise of a longer future. A return to our deepest origins, and a zeal to thrust forward into the furthest future.

Wagner and Nietzsche belong in the same mythical camp. However, this does not imply that in this myth, they manifest the same ideological identity. In *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* (1876), Wagner was still, for Nietzsche, a universal genius: simultaneously philosopher, historian, and artist, master of diction and mythology, and mythic poet. In fact, Wagner the philosopher never succeeded in drawing philosophy from the myth created by Wagner, the poet and musician. Nietzsche realised this and became conscious of his superiority as a philosopher, a superiority Wagner was happy to acknowledge.

Suprahumanism, as historical tendency born from the European soul in the mid-nineteenth century, became a sort of magnetic field in expansion with two poles: the artistic work of Richard Wagner, and the poetic-philosophical work of Friedrich Nietzsche.

The Choice

The *egalitarian ideology* of primitive Judeo-Christianity is the preponderant value system today. The *masses*, devoid of real *masters*: true models with whom to identify — reject the pagan residue inhabiting the collective unconscious of Europe for centuries (*the Indo-European heritage*). They aspire instead to a humble and mediocre happiness through *regression into a pre-human past*.

What, then, is the alternative offered to the men of our age? Nietzsche said that the choice was between *the last man*: the man of the end of history — and the leap towards *the superman*: the regeneration of history. Ultimately, the outcome will depend on us — on European men and women — on the choice we make between these options. For us, the historical decision is always and at the same time a *wake-up call* addressed to the

past, to a forgotten or lost origin; a *decision* to surpass a decaying present; and the undertaking of a *future project* that has hitherto never taken place — because it is suprahumanist.

Modern man, the very image of declining paganism: accepting the fate of the Christian mask. However, his most intimate will is not destroyed: it lies dormant. Its presence invokes the person who will come to awaken it; and this is the end for which the god is waiting — the beginning of a new history: regeneration.

Postmodernity may be defined as an *interregnum*. A period of waiting during which destiny hangs between two options: either to complete the triumph of the egalitarian conception of the world, *the end of history*, or to promote a *historical regeneration*.

Imperium

Regarding our future, all we know for certain is that it lies before us. We also know it is never possible to turn back the clock. Every invention contains the need for further inventions. Any fulfilled wish gives rise to a thousand others. Any triumph over nature stimulates still greater triumphs.

There may only be return to what formerly allowed us to confront new challenges, and to affirm ourselves. Our restless exploring of the world, and the technologies derived from so doing, condemn us to making choices: they offer us power, but cannot direct us as to its use. Such decisions lie not with engineers, scientists, or lawyers, but with *founding heroes*, poets — and with a new *aristocracy* that knows how to activate the obscure collective will of the community from which they arise.

The one great goal toward which European foreign policy should strive is the development of a worldwide community — transcending present geographical nationalism — in which all men and women of European blood and culture will be part. The replacement of a parochial outlook with European world solidarity and a final elimination of fratricidal war, would count among the enormous benefits of such a development.

In a perceptive essay, the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk observed that to be European means always to participate in (yet another) ‘translation of empire.’ The notion of *Imperium* would be Europe’s mythopoetic idea. Europe would begin to march and keep in motion as long as it managed to

re-claim, re-enact, and transform the empire that existed before her: the Roman. The European empire has lain dormant since its last replicas were destroyed — on the continent — as a consequence of the Great War. We would be currently witnessing the next translation, which would inevitably take place on a *symbolic* level. The empire, having existed in numerous vestiges, would be undergoing resurrection.

After the Second World War, the primary aim of uniting Europe into a single political entity has been common among suprahumanist thinkers. Apart from Sloterdijk, one might mention Francis Parker Yockey, José Ortega y Gasset, Jean Thiriart, Giorgio Locchi, Oswald Mosley, Alain de Benoist, Julius Evola, and Guillaume Faye. Today, undoubtedly the most comprehensive formulation may be found in Norman Lowell's *Imperium Europa*: 'An Imperium on a planetary basis, uniting all Europids, everywhere: two white rings north and south of the Equator will girdle the Earth, bringing together Slavs, Teutons, Anglo-Saxons and Latins.'

The solution is to modify the 'frame of reference': the creation of self-sustained 'economic spaces.' *Imperium Europa* might be one such space. In this case, a new organic economy would pursue the creation of a semi-autarkic space; develop alternative sources of energy; and make an orderly withdrawal from globalisation.

The notion of *Imperium* reflects a will to cosmic order, and it is this order that organises hierarchically the various *gentes* living under the protection of Rome. In theory and in practice, *Imperium* is at the antipodes of any sort of 'universalism.'

The future belongs to those who will express *the strongest will and the deepest consciousness*.

As Meister Eckhart observed: 'This address is only for those who have already found its message in their own lives, or at least long for it in their hearts.'

Today's alternative is between globalisation, entropy, and narcissistic consumerism, in a scenario of ever more dehumanising effects — and the possibility of a community deciding to take charge of its own destiny and to regenerate humankind, reaching ever higher forms of life. We hope — and we believe — this community will be *Europe*: *Imperium Europa*.

Norman Lowell

The Sacred Island of Melita
Year 1 of the Golden Dawn

The Theme of Our Time

Nietzsche is the first thinker who, in view of a world-history emerging for the first time, asks the decisive question and thinks through its metaphysical implications. The question is: Is man, as man in his nature till now, prepared to assume dominion over the whole earth? If not, what must happen to man as he is, so that he may be able to 'subject' the earth and thereby reclaim an old legacy? Must man as he is then not be brought beyond himself if he is to fulfill this task? One thing, however, we ought soon to notice: This thinking which aims at the figure of a teacher who will teach the superman, concerns us, concerns Europe, concerns the whole earth not just today but tomorrow even more. It does so whether we accept it or oppose it, ignore it or imitate it in false accents.

— Martin Heidegger

An image from Hans-Jürgen Syberberg's *Parsifal* (1982).

I

We are at a crucial point in time: a moment of transition as important as the emergence of *Homo sapiens*, or the beginning of civilisation after *the Neolithic Revolution*.

Around the middle of the nineteenth century, but from then on ever more pressingly — owing to the *acceleration of history* — man began to realise he had to interact in a radically new environment. He was being forced to *transform* both himself and his new surroundings — in fact, the whole planet and, recently, outer space too — if he sought to control the forces he had unchained and to continue on his vital journey. As with any voyage into uncharted waters, this would involve unfamiliar situations, increased risks, and new responsibilities.

Crossing the threshold requires the development of a new awareness; increased powers of foresight and decision-making; a wider scope of action; and the ability to generate and harness an extraordinary amount of power. Furthermore, all this on a scale substantially different from what had been used until then to solve the problems of post-Neolithic civilisation, when agriculture, sedentariness, urban life, division of labour, and modern war and law were invented.

Our modern Western civilisation, deprived of *vitality*, has decided to close its eyes and continue as if nothing new had happened. Not so long ago, a liberal thinker, Francis Fukuyama, triumphantly proclaimed *the end of history*.[1] According to him, thanks to the general hegemony of the *American-Western model*, we are at the point of attaining a peaceful solution to all our problems. The advent of *liberal democracy* might signal the end-point of humanity's sociocultural *evolution* and the arrival of the final form of human government.

On the contrary, it is rather the case that our culture and societies have been decaying for some time and seem lately to be blundering into unsuspected catastrophe. The reason for the *decline* — manifested every day in the way such crises as the global demographic explosion, the depletion of natural resources, mass migrations, genetic deterioration, ecological disasters, nuclear threats, and financial turmoil are mishandled

— is the absence of a response to the distressing new set of circumstances and challenges identified above.

Man — an inadequate animal whose instincts do not furnish him with univocal behavioural responses to meet the tests he continuously has to face — is today required, in wanting a new and brighter *dawn*, to expand and refine his abilities and *consciousness*, and hence to determine what he wants to be and how he wants to continue being. No one or nothing else will do it in his place.

II

Mankind is at a crossroads, *a point of passage* marked by a swift and radical transformation of the human environment. The complexity and demanding character of the situation is frightening; hence, it is understandable that the psychological mechanism of flight is triggered, and that our senile society, unwilling to accept the tragic dimension of life, refuses to ‘take up the gauntlet.’

As Spengler observed in *Man and Technics*: ‘Truly the tempo of history is working up tragically. Hitherto thousands of years have scarcely mattered at all, but now every century becomes important. With tearing leaps, the rolling stone is approaching the abyss.’[2]

With the Industrial Revolution humankind entered into a phase of *planetarisation*. No one can avoid this planetary perspective or dream about an impossible isolation. Besides, due to our restless exploring of the world and the development of the techniques that derive from it, at the beginning of the third millennium of our era there is no corner of the Earth’s biosphere that is beyond the hand of man. Today, humankind exerts its influence on the entire surface of the planet, either by directly transforming it or by modifying its biochemical and physical equilibria. We are far from mastering its processes, but there is no longer any part that is immune to man’s influence.

Stefano Vaj, suprahumanist extraordinaire, remarks: ‘Once the effects of the geographical exploration of all land above sea level and the first industrial revolution have essentially been exhausted, the new step in the process of transformation arises from the convergence of the so-called *Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno (NBIC) technologies* and their interactions. It will represent the final point of rupture with the *old* lifestyle.’[3]

In order to witness something comparable, one has to go back as far as the Neolithic Revolution when, thanks to their superior *magic*, the *Indo-Europeans* became masters of that time and gave birth to *the Second Man*.

Arnold Gehlen remarked many years ago, before bioengineering, nanotechnology, or artificial intelligence existed even hypothetically: ‘The Industrial Revolution which today is drawing to a close marks in fact the

end of the so-called *advanced cultures*, that prevailed between 3500 BCE until after 1800 CE, and fosters the emergence of a new kind of culture, as yet not well defined. Along these lines of thinking, one could indeed come to believe that the *civilised age* as historical period is about to pass away, if one understands the word civilisation in the sense that has been exemplified by the history of the advanced cultures of humanity until today.'[4]

We are at the end of a process. What was founded during the Neolithic Revolution has perhaps arrived at its term. Under these circumstances, the alternative is both simple and frightening. Will man go forward and beyond? Will he take up the challenge? Or will he revert to a less than human condition? In other terms, the choice must be made between progress or regress: the *superman* or the *underman*.

Are we ready for this epoch-making passage? Are we capable of a kind of thinking to match this decisive moment? Heidegger notices: 'What is really worrying is not that the world is being transformed into something entirely controlled by technology. Much more worrying is that man is not at all prepared for this radical mutation of the world. Much more worrying is that our speculative thinking does not enable us to adequately cope with the events of our time.'[5]

Man transforms his environment radically, but at the same time refuses to become fully conscious of the implications of this change. He refuses to change himself. That is the reason why he experiences the transformations of the contemporary world as a sort of external constriction that overwhelms and alienates him.

Topics that are pregnant of potentiality such as genetic engineering, cloning, eugenics, space exploration, cybernetics, nuclear power, environmental issues, the origin of life and the different species, heredity, anthropology, human reproduction technologies, health issues, and demographics are usually viewed with fascination by the public, only to be confronted either with a moral condemnation of biblical flavour or with an uncritical abandonment to self-regulated market mechanisms. Presiding always over both attitudes is the mediocre narcissism of sacrosanct 'individual rights,' a horizon beyond which the dominating mental paradigm understands or sees nothing else.

The new situation invariably clashes with the limitations of *our world view*, and it requires *a new norm* — capable of transforming present

inconsistencies into a higher perspective. *What is the purpose of human existence?* The refusal to properly respond to this question, which ultimately boils down to a meditation on human evolution — to be more precise, on the *meaning of history* — is what characterises the system that has been ruling the West since 1945, and that has now become globalised.

This *system* has no significance other than its own motionless reiteration, its continuous *mechanical* operation.[6] There is nothing it wants to realise except its own cancerous expansion, the mechanical self-regulation of its techno-economic machinery. The system is dominated by *oligarchies* — the only type of sovereignty still possible today — but it is not directed, if 'direction' is taken to imply 'a path to follow' or 'the will to go somewhere.' The consequences of this progressive human inability to use its own powers regarding conscious goals are visible everywhere: alienation, reification, degradation of the living environment in general — not only the ecological sphere, resource depletion, decay of the quality of life, demographic decline, genetic deterioration, frustration of the most fundamental ethological needs, dissolution of organic social bonds, cultural sterility — a lifeless engine that just keeps on turning.

One cannot physically go back in time, and any form of life that remains inert for a while begins to suffer from *entropy* and decay. Man's *increasing power* over himself and his environment cannot easily be renounced. The repression of such a power is impractical in the long term because of the constant pressure and the measure of total social control it would require. Moreover, relying on the impersonal and 'rational' mechanisms governing the system to administer it is proving to be potentially *catastrophic*.

The Earth and the future will belong to those who, becoming historically conscious of the new situation and drawing the necessary conclusions, manage to create a new way of living. 'They will incarnate *the Third Man*, called to fully take charge of his own destiny through *a new and radical beginning*.'[7]

III

Thus far we have spoken of man in general — an abstraction that is legitimate when dealing with matters affecting the entire human species. In specific terms, we know, however, that *humanity* does not exist: only individuals and the societies in which they gather. When one considers the future of humankind, in practical terms what is being discussed is *the future of European man* and his place in the world. Creator and inheritor of this 'sick' global West, it is mostly for him to take up the sword and cut the Gordian knot — a knot that exists only in the limited perspective of today's hegemonic world view.

Western civilisation is in disarray, and its decline becomes more acute daily — with the possibility of its death becoming all too real.

Blindness is the characteristic condition of this social illness — namely, *decadence*. The sicker the patient, the more energetically he declares himself to be in good health. Thus, a decadent society is more 'progressive' the more it approaches the fatal outcome. One may observe daily all the social phenomena that have usually accompanied the agony of different peoples and cultures: from emasculation to the unstoppable social ascent of the entertainment industry; from the disintegration of traditional social units to the renewed, but ephemeral, attempts to substitute for them a range of communal associations; from masochistic universalism to the collapse of any social norm restraining the individual. But no one seems to be capable of learning from the lessons of history. It is well said that history has no sense.

Another characteristic trait of advanced social decomposition is *mediocrity of feelings*. Everybody and everything is tolerated. War is made — but always in the name of love, or to 'liberate' the other. Decadent societies no longer know how to love or hate — they have become *lukewarm*, because life is abandoning them. Their *vital force* is already almost dissipated.

This force may acquire different names. Dostoyevsky called it 'God' and asserted that when a culture loses its God it can but agonise and die. The term 'God' is too restrictive — too "Western" to properly define what

constitutes a society's life force. The divine is but an element, an aspect of something which would be preferable to name — in all its complexity — *Myth*.[8]

Myth is the *historical force* that brings a community to life, organises it, and propels it forward towards its destiny.

To begin with, a myth is an *intuitive feeling* about the world, but a feeling which is shared. Hence, it is a social bond. One might speak of *religion*, from the Latin *religare* — to tie fast. As *social tie*, a myth organises society itself, ensures its coherence in space and through time. It also structures the individual personalities that belong to that community.

This intuition about the world lies also at the origin of a proper world outlook or *Weltanschauung* — an expression of coherent thought, operating measurement, and norm of valuation.

A myth has also a distinct *view of history*. The community it organises is an organism situated — at the same time — in past, present, and future. Such a community can then be called *a people*. A myth, in this case, may be also described as *an image* a people has of its own past according to the future chosen as destiny.

In a community, *human value* — which is always social personality — is measured by the degree of correspondence to the *ideal types* proposed by the myth and which every member of the community understands as a sort of superego.

When the myth disintegrates these ideal archetypes are felt as such no longer: no communitarian bond remains and every individual is considered an ideal in himself.[9] The people lose memory of their common origin and cease to be moved by *pathos* — a common sympathy, a common suffering. They cease to be a people and turn into *a mass*. All that remains to keep society together is the ever more precarious and conditional bond created by the alliance of groups of individuals, classes, parties, or sects based on mutual defence of their selfish interests. The real human dimension, history, is lost. Mass society is no longer concerned with the past or the future: it lives only in the present and for the present. Hence, it does not occupy itself with politics, only with economics — which ends up conditioning all the other social responses.[10]

History teaches us that every people, every civilisation has its own myth. Western society, into which we were born and now live, had its origin in the

great ecumene of Christianity: was formed and moulded by the *Jewish-Christian myth*. This myth — and its God — has long been dead.

However, the issue is not merely that ‘God is dead’: as will be seen in the following chapters, the Jewish-Christian myth and the set of ideologies that replaced it — the *Western ethos* — could not but lead ultimately to nihilism and spiritual alienation.

The fundamental values of the West are conducive to our social entropy and biological decay. In fact, the more the paradigm informing our civilisation is consistently applied, the more the problems tend to grow. Paradoxically, the *triumph of the West* — also called ‘globalisation’ — means the *death of Europe* and of European man.

Nevertheless, Western civilisation — while created by European man — is not coterminous with European civilisation. In fact, either the West or Europe may be saved. If the West is saved, then Europe will be destroyed.

Everyone is more or less conscious of the fact that European nations are condemned either to exit from history and be melted down into a shapeless and faceless global mass, or to turn into the substance of a future nation and people. That is why the *creation of Europe* has been a dominant theme since 1945. However, today’s Europe — the European Union — has been conceived as but an extension of our present social realities: as a last resort to save what is already under a death sentence — i.e., Western egalitarian civilisation.

If a new Europe is ever to come to pass in the more or less near future — if it is ever to devise a response that may solve the present challenge and offer prospect of reaching the next stage of human evolution — it will be only if it is ruled and organised by *a new foundation myth*: one radically strange to everything in fashion today.

This new myth already exists. Together with the new historical consciousness that established it, it emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century and has continued to manifest itself — through a range of artistic, cultural, and political representations — into our present age.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical work, and Richard Wagner’s artistic and metapolitical production, inaugurated this new current of thought — which we have chosen to call *suprahumanism*: the only one that can be defined as authentically *revolutionary*, since it represents a return to a primeval *origin* that was completely forgotten and, at the same time, the

opening of a new, exulting, and unknown destiny — *the regeneration of history*.

The Revolt of the Slaves

Of all books, from a historical point of view, the most perilous is, indisputably, the Bible, if the public peril is to be in any way considered.
— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

Tahrir Square in Cairo during the ‘Arab Spring’ (2011).
The population of Egypt nearly tripled from over 30 million in 1966 to over 85 million in 2013.

I

A particular animating force, the Jewish-Christian spirit, has been travelling and ever moulding the outlook, the discourse, and values that today inform Western consciousness. The defining character of this spirit is *egalitarianism*. It has expressed an egalitarian will, an egalitarian mentality — instinctive at the beginning, but increasingly conscious of itself until, in our own times, it has become fully aware of its aspirations and final goals.

Western civilisation is condemned because the egalitarian utopia that has inspired it for the last two thousand years is in contradiction with the demands of modern society. Enthralled by this utopia, European man can no longer assume control of the world's destiny, or be the *creator* of a new future.

Ashamed of a past which over time has given it undisputed superiority, the egalitarian West now wants the 'end of history.' It desires a return to the static stage of mammalian happiness: to an Edenic pre-human past.[11]

Egalitarianism has passed through different phases: mythical, ideological, and synthetic.[12] It entered history (*Phase One*) in the garments of the Christian myth — 'There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus' (Galatians 3:28) — and, as with any other myth, without explaining itself in either its discourse or in its actions, sensing its internal dialectics still as unity and harmony. Then (*Phase Two*) the 'contradictions' began to be felt and rationalised: first on a religious level, when the theologies of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation became 'ideologies' and the dialectical contraries took social and political shape — becoming 'parties.' In this second phase, egalitarian consciousness becomes deeper, re-conceiving the idea of 'equality of souls before God' as 'equality of men as citizens before their institutions.' This has come to be called 'the revolutionary era,' since its manifestations were sometimes, though not always, violent. Liberalism — in its Anglo-Saxon and French modalities — started here.

Goethe was wont to say that ideas, taken to their ultimate consequences, become absurd. Egalitarianism was indeed pursued to its ultimate

consequences: the aspiration and will of attaining ‘equality of men before Nature itself.’ This *Third Phase* may be characterised as ‘theoretical,’ since it claimed to merge — ‘rationally’ and ‘ecumenically’ in a superior synthesis — the ideologies that derived from the myth. It started in an embryonic manner with Hegelianism; then came a first political-philosophical manifestation: Marxism.

In the synthetic phase in which we currently find ourselves, the dialectics of egalitarianism are felt as an obstacle to achieving a global ecumene. Hence the constant presence of terms like ‘internationalism,’ ‘cosmopolitism,’ and ‘multiculturalism’ — and the establishment of ‘political correctness’ as the only legitimate discourse.

With hindsight, Marxism-Leninism may be considered a ‘deviation’ from the main current of the egalitarian tendency, since it tried to ‘force’ or ‘anticipate’ the natural evolution of egalitarianism towards a final synthesis. It was not until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the peaceful ending of the Cold War — when Communism became reabsorbed into the common egalitarian matrix (partly because the objectives pursued by Marxism in the Eastern bloc had already been attained in the West) — that the final and true ‘recovered unity’ of the egalitarian tendency took shape.

Its consecration may be observed today in the unanimous acceptance of *the doctrine of human rights* and its expansion through liberal-capitalistic or socialist-Third Worldist *globalisation* — a project of planetary homogenisation which seeks to progress till the conclusive exit of humankind from history.

Political parties no longer represent contrary ideologies. Rather, they reduce their role to the selection of a ruling class, and a practical programme characterised by uncontested adherence, not only to the same set of values — which was always the case in respect of liberals, Christian democrats, and communists — but also to the same political choices: to institutionalised mechanisms of representation, to the economic structure, and to international alliances. This new *humanist*[13] post-ideological synthesis might be described as ‘democratic’ if that term did not almost exclusively refer to a form of government that may be cancelled when the system and ‘the defence of human rights’ so demand.

Stefano Vaj argues that the ideology of human rights is based on a dogma which stipulates in a Kantian way the universality of a ‘practical

reason' — given once and for all, and capable of being rationally ascertained and valid in every time and for the whole of humankind.[14] This ideology, that claims to guarantee the 'natural' vital needs of every human being, typically comes to deny each people freedom to exercise that primordial act of popular sovereignty which is to determine one's own legal system. It prejudices the enjoyment of specific civil liberties that only positive and specific sovereignty and legal systems can guarantee; and it imposes the duty of killing one's neighbour in order to save him from himself. More prosaically, it offers such pretexts to serve vested interests.[15]

Generic man — 'universal,' abstract man — does not exist. For a generic man to exist, there needs to be a common and specifically human referent capable of qualifying all men paradigmatically. Such a referent would necessarily be cultural; for what distinguishes man in the world we know is his capacity to create cultures. There is no such thing as a unique human culture; there are only cultures. The diversity of cultures stems precisely from the diversity of men. What does exist on the other hand is a zoological unity of the human species; strictly speaking, 'humanity' is the human species. But such a notion is of a purely biological order.[16]

Spengler reminds us:

> It is *not* within our power to choose whether we would like to be sons of an Egyptian peasant of 3000 B.C., of a Persian king, or of a present-day tramp. This destiny is something to which we have to adapt ourselves. It *dooms* us to certain situations, views, and actions. There are no 'men-in-themselves' such as the philosophers talk about, but only men of a time, of a locality, of a race, of a personal cast, who contend in battle with a *given* world and win through or fail, while the universe around them moves slowly on with a godlike unconcern.[17]

Similarly, there exists no theoretical natural law to which all should conform. There exist specific legal systems — each one translating a particular ethno-cultural world view or *Volksgeist* — and the corresponding will to power of the community that creates them.

The world is complex and diverse — and any diversity necessarily generates inequalities. That is the distinctive mark of living systems. The evolution of life is evolution towards more differentiation, more inequality, more distinction between subject and object. The great law of life renders evolution into heterogeneity. In this sense, living systems oppose macrophysical systems which evolve towards more homogeneity, more

identity — due to a gradual loss of energy: what physicists call *entropy*. On the one hand, we have organic processes; on the other, mechanical. Any doctrine that pursues the progressive equalisation of life is materialistic and — explicitly or not — mechanicist. It reduces life to a macrophysical level. The logical outcome of this tendency is decline and disappearance: the absolute homogeneity which represents death.

Christianity and its secular derivatives — the liberal, parliamentarian, socialist, communist, or anarcho-communist ideologies — are successive manifestations of the same egalitarian principle. They appeared in sequence historically, but they remain present in one way or another — all of them tending, with different degrees of awareness — to the same end. All of them contribute to the spiritual and material decadence of Europe, to the progressive degradation of European man, and the disaggregation of Western societies. This has given rise to the more or less conscious nihilism that today permeates our culture, and the creation of a gigantic ‘mass of slaves’ alienated and devoid of any purpose: *the last man*.

II

The virus of egalitarianism entered Europe surreptitiously with *Christianity*; it has taken two thousand years for all its effects to be felt.

Today there are two prevalent ways of studying moral values. One posits that these can be rationally verified and established: values will be universally valid, and once errors are cleared away it will be a matter merely of distinguishing between right and wrong, good and evil. The alternative way considers that since all values are relative and therefore equivalent, nothing sensible or interesting may be said about them.

There is, however, a third approach. This is *genealogical* and shows the human, social, philosophical, and religious breeding ground of a certain doctrine: inquires as to *the origin* of certain ideas; of which *type of man* they are expression; what it is they reflect — and to *where they lead*. Any world view is inescapably linked to a particular outlook on man, the world, and history; and, in its turn, it depends on the mental constitution — itself anchored at a biological level — of the particular people by whom it was created.

Christianity has been defined as a ‘morality of slaves.’ What genealogy and psychology lay behind this new *forma mentis*?

Nietzsche believed the Jews, as a historically oppressed group, were responsible for the spread and triumph of ‘slave morality’ over the ‘master morality’ of noble, culture-creating aristocracies:

> All the world’s efforts against the *aristocrats*, the *mighty*, the *masters*, the *holders of power* are negligible by comparison with what has been accomplished against those classes by the Jews — the Jews, that priestly nation which eventually realized that the one method of effecting satisfaction on its enemies and tyrants was by means of a radical transvaluation of values, which was at the same time an act of the cleverest revenge. Yet the method was only appropriate to a nation of priests, to a nation of the most jealously nursed priestly revengefulness.[18] It was the Jews who, in opposition to the aristocratic equation (good = aristocratic = beautiful = happy = loved by the gods), dared with terrifying logic to suggest the contrary equation, and indeed to maintain with the teeth of the most profound hatred — the hatred of weakness — this contrary equation, namely, the wretched are alone the good; the poor, the weak, the lowly, are alone the good; the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, are the only ones who are pious, the only ones who are blessed, for them alone is salvation — but you, on the other hand, you aristocrats, you men of power, you are to all eternity the evil,

> the horrible, the covetous, the insatiate, the godless; eternally also shall you be the unblessed, the cursed, the damned![19]

Judaism was the soil out of which grew Christianity — the flower of slave morality. Though a single unified system, it carried different emphases for the two groups. For the Jews, the foci were self-pity, ethnic solidarity, thirst for revenge, obsession with freedom, hatred of the strong and powerful, and desire to recover lost wealth. The Christians — through the figure of Jesus — preferred to emphasise the value of the downtrodden ('blessed are the meek'); faith in God to bring justice ('the meek shall inherit the Earth'); salvation in the afterlife — and a fixation with love as means for ameliorating suffering.

Nietzsche considered that the struggle between these competing moralities was the single most important event in all of history, symbolised as a conflict between Judea, representing slave morality, and Rome, representing master morality:

> The symbol of this fight — between the two means of valuations — written in a writing which has remained worthy of perusal throughout the course of history up to the present time — is called, *Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome*. Hitherto there has been no greater event than *that* fight, the putting of *that* question, *that* deadly antagonism. Rome found in the Jew the incarnation of the unnatural, as though it were its diametrically opposed monstrosity, and in Rome the Jew was held convicted of hatred of the entire human race; and rightly so, insofar as it is right to link the well-being and the future of the human race to the unconditional mastery of the aristocratic values, of the Roman values . . . The Romans were the strong and aristocratic; a nation stronger and more aristocratic has never existed in the world, has never even been dreamed of . . . The Jews, conversely, were that priestly nation of *ressentiment* par excellence, possessed by a unique genius for popular morals . . . Which of them has been provisionally victorious, Rome or Judea? . . . Rome is undoubtedly defeated.[20]

It was Nietzsche's belief that the conversion of Europe to Christianity — and the more or less complete integration of the European mind with the Christian mentality — was among the most catastrophic events of world history.

In Judeo-Christian monotheism, life is not valued according to its own imperatives, but is instead subjected to another. No longer will man be judged according to his law and his measure, but according to those of the Completely Other. This is why the progression of Christian morality in history can also be read as a *decline in energy*.

Christian morality is burdened by *ressentiment*. The believer accepts his own debasement in the hope that others will be debased. He adheres to a morality that suppresses diversity in the name of 'equality,' that belittles greatness in the name of 'justice,' that homogenises differences in the name of 'love.' Such a morality is a system to dissipate energy, chip away at health, and destroy potency. It culminates in fusion and confusion, in entropy and death. It reveals itself, once identified, to be purely negative — like the death instinct. Here Eros is merely the mask of Thanatos. 'For confronted with morality — especially Christian or unconditional morality — life must continually and inevitably be in the wrong.'[21]

Christianity was carried by a Jew — Saul of Tarsus, later known as Paul the Apostle — from the Levant to the Greco-Roman world. Its doctrines — e.g., that 'the meek shall inherit the Earth' and that 'the last shall be the first' — found fertile soil among the populous slave class in Rome. Max Weber, like Nietzsche, was to read in the *Sermon on the Mount* the sketch of a slave revolt.[22]

Eventually, after playing a far from negligible role in the *collapse of the Roman Empire*,[23] the revolutionary spirit which stood in opposition to all authority was firmly organised by the Church of Rome. Once in power, the Church readily compromised with pre-Christian values and social forms, and condemned as heretics those who demanded that it live by the values of the gospels. The Church was so successful that its creed was even adopted by an ambitious emperor, Constantine, as the state religion.

Legions of Roman conscripts also imposed the imported religion on the Celtic and Germanic tribes to the north. It was through its exposure to the vigorous peoples of Germania that Christianity was additionally transformed into a heroic faith: a faith which upheld pagan martial virtues in the spiritualised form of chivalry, and that was capable of launching crusades against Islam. It was this Germanised Christianity[24] that gave birth to such figures as St. George, and whose spirit was captured so beautifully by Albrecht Dürer in his masterly artworks.

Thus, Catholic Christianity, in both Northern and Southern Europe, turned during medieval times into a different, syncretic religion as a result of encountering Greco-Roman and Celto-Germanic culture. The pagan component of this religion, though usually unacknowledged, remained strong for a long time, and it is this syncretic religion that people think of

when they speak of ‘traditional Christianity.’ However, the seed that would bear a bitter fruit was already implanted in the European psyche. From that moment European man began to suffer from a cultural malady, a sort of collective schizophrenia. Historically constituted Christianity — *Christendom* — might thus be construed as an unconscious attempt to reunite the dispersed Indo-European peoples when they were no longer aware of their common origin — and one which was to be made at the price of *spiritual alienation*, insofar as European Christianity assumed the biblical Semitic myth of the unique filiation of humankind.

Scientific and technological developments undermined belief in the existence of God. Already in the eighteenth century the idea of intellectually proving the existence of God was abandoned, and Rousseau and Kant may be found positing a belief in God based instead on emotions or values. In a culture in which God had died owing to the development of science and rationalism, the values of Judeo-Christian slave morality were duly taken up by the causes of democracy, socialism, equal rights — and other movements of the weak and ‘oppressed.’

Yet, *God’s death* came as no surprise. He deliberately put himself in a position to be killed. Christianity is in itself his own failing. Far from being the antithesis of nihilism, nihilism is, on the contrary, its logical consequence. The death of God results inevitably from the death of the real — for which the Judeo-Christian discourse is responsible. *Nihilism* results from the gradual unveiling of a doctrine that places the centre of life’s gravity outside real life, and which is gradually and precisely unmasked as such. ‘If one shifts the centre of gravity of life out of life into *the Beyond* — into nothingness — one has deprived life as such of its centre of gravity.’[25]

Nietzsche argued that Christianity is responsible for the trajectory of its secularisation, because secular liberalism — or socialism — represent a triumph of Christian values over Christianity itself. The Christian valorisation of truth as something worth dying for was turned against the supernatural, faith-based elements of the creed. And once the supernatural elements of Christianity are discarded, then nothing stands in the way of the progressive/utopian realisation of Christian values in this world.

We can hence better understand that contemporary decadence is not the effect of its distance from the Christian religion, but its profanation in the strict sense of the word: i.e., its generalised diffusion in profane forms, its

generalised infection. As Alain de Benoist remarks: ‘It is in this sense that one can say, without cultivating paradox, that the world has never been as Judeo-Christian as it is today. The moral God is dead, but the values he has bequeathed are more present than ever, even though their impotence is a generally noted fact, and even though they constitute merely the decor of the impasse into which our contemporaries crash time and time again like a fly on a windowpane.’[26]

Hence, the *secularisation of the Christian West* prevents any return to a sort of sociological Christianity which could be the vehicle in which to transmit a message of protest against modernity, and its concomitant alienation, and so conserve the customs and mentality of some social milieus which allegedly would have been kept intact. The *right* — understood in a counter-revolutionary sense — has ceased to exist and religious Christianity no longer plays the role of a social-religious pillar or an ideal projection of a mythical-communitarian residue which could keep the different fragments of the egalitarian ecumene together. As was mentioned above, that role is played today by the religion of human rights and political correctness.

The *Christian churches* themselves have become fully aware of the situation and no longer identify themselves — if they ever did — with the destiny and culture of Europe, but rather with their own projects and historical interests. They merely constitute a minority within the egalitarian matrix: a backward and folkloric variation on the same theme.

Christendom — as a marker of the European continent and peoples — is, in many ways, a fleeting sideshow in the world-historical development of the Christian faith. As Philip Jenkins has noted in several books, Christianity’s future lies in the ‘global South,’ where its message of ‘pauper as Pantocrator’ — and its veneration of the meek and downtrodden — will no doubt be well received.[27]

‘*Religious Christianity* will remain an active and organised force for decades. However, we already know *the end* of this story: nihilism is written in its genes, and its final outcome — even if it were possible to return to AD 1000 — would always be secularisation, materialism, individualism, cosmopolitism, miscegenation, and global homogenisation: the universalist praxis that inevitably derives from the egalitarian theory — a mass of atomised individuals completely devoid of memory or the ability

to project themselves into the future. Nihilism cannot be overcome through a return to one of the historical phases of an ongoing process, no matter how less radical it might have been.'[28]

According to Daniel C. Dennett, the real difference between the ethnocentric religions of antiquity and the Abrahamic ones is that the former ones did not know, at least until they were confronted by the latter, that they were practising a religion.[29] They lived it and that was enough for them.

The original meaning of the Latin word *religio* — from *religare*, to tie fast — was never used until Constantinian times to describe the '*superstitio nova ac malefica*' represented by Christianity and has nothing to do with the metaphysical or fideistic concepts introduced by monotheism. It is simply what binds together the members of a political and ethno-cultural community. As such, religion has two aspects: *the myth* — the representation that we choose to have of our own past, and more generally of the universe, in relation to the future, the destiny that we want to create; and *the rite* — the evocation and celebration of our being together with the intention of provoking a general mobilisation of spirits, the nationalisation of the masses: a necessary condition for the new European nation to have a destiny worthy of its own past, worthy of what we once were and could be again.

This is *the real religious question*.

III

An ideological system — a particular view of the world — from the outset gives meaning to all its components. From this perspective, it could be said that man ‘creates’ the world through the way he looks at it: that a collective view of the world ‘forms’ a society by informing it. It is for this reason that the contemporary Western global world in all its defining characteristics — the reign of quantity against quality, unbridled consumerism, mass culture, a society of depersonalised atomised individuals, and Jewish predominance, especially among the production of ideological discourse[30] — may be considered the final manifestation and logical outcome of egalitarianism.

Nowhere are the effects caused by the pursuit of the tenets of Jewish-Christian egalitarianism more existentially dramatic — because it threatens the very survival of the communities concerned — than in *the demographic suicide* now being committed by the West.

It is a common platitude, when referring to problems caused by global mass society and world overpopulation, to invoke the spectre of a convergence of catastrophes that threaten to annihilate humanity.[31] To be more specific: it is not ‘humanity’ that risks disappearing, but rather European man,[32] secularised Christian man.

The West faces *massive Third World immigration*, and high fertility rates combined with below-replacement white birth rates. As Lothrop Stoddard feared, a rising tide of colour is swamping the West;[33] and it is *guilt* about the Third World which is the primary cause of mass immigration into Western lands. Comparison with Japan repays attention, for this Far Eastern country experiences the same economic conditioning as Europe or the United States, but has managed to control migratory fluxes remarkably well.

Christian ethics, weak and meek, protects ‘the other’ and opposes the powerful. It is a morality of self-sacrifice, rooted in the idea that we ourselves are the first sinners. Religious as well as secular Christians walk through life mired in feelings of guilt. Religious Christians have Christ. He made the ultimate self-sacrifice for all mankind in dying on the cross, and he forgives us for being unable to live up to his example. Secular

Christians, however, have no option other than to perform a Christ-like self-sacrifice themselves. Western civilisation's theology stipulates that the more pity you show the holier you are. 'Pity the weak (non-whites) and fight the powerful (whites) because they are evil.' The white man's evil consists in exploiting poor Third Worlders: slavery, colonisation, etc. To atone for our sins we must deny ourselves: European nationalism is wrong; European ethnic pride is evil. Hence, we sacrifice ourselves on the cross of multiculturalism. Pitying them, we allow hordes of non-whites to flood Europe and America.

It is estimated that *the world population* reached one billion for the first time in 1800 CE. Now, after two hundred years of hyper-dynamic European technology, combined with the ideology of human rights, the world population is estimated to be 7.082 billion (1 May 2013). And the population continues to grow. Current projections are of a continued increase, with global population expected to reach 10.5 billion by 2050 CE. [34]

The year 1800 CE may be used as an historical juncture, for at that point two events — the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution — came together and produced a vertiginous acceleration of history. Industrialisation and developing technology — which multiplied exponentially the will-to-power of Western man — combined with 'democratic' egalitarianism and ushered in *mass society*.[35] With the surplus created, the West reached the point where the good deeds of Christian ethics might at last be executed, by bestowing that surplus — food, Western medicine, and much other aid — to the poor and weak of the Earth.

As far as European kind is concerned, the latest demographic projections are telling: in 1900 CE, European — or white — man represented 20 per cent of the global population; in 2000 CE, 8 per cent; in 2050, 5 per cent.[36] By way of example, although the situations in western Europe, Russia, and Australia are similar, Fox News reported on 17 May 2012: 'America hit a demographic milestone last year, with new census figures showing for the first time more than half the children born in the U.S. were minorities. That percentage just barely eked over the halfway mark, with minorities making up 50.4 percent of U.S. births in the 12-month period ending July 2011. But it marks a steady trend — minorities represented 37 percent of births in 1990.'

Even in the fact that our current paradigm accepts Jewish efforts to survive as a people, but condemns such efforts among peoples of European ancestry, we observe the same phenomenon: Europeans are condemned by their own most sacred beliefs. Christianity is a derivative, a heresy, from Judaism, but it teaches Europe precisely the opposite lesson as far as ethnocentrism is concerned. In Christianity, European peoples cannot — as a people — have a relation with God: this is for the Jewish people alone. European people can have a relation with God only as individuals. Judaism is a religion for survival in a multicultural society. It is a religion for governing the behaviour of a Jewish minority in the presence of a non-Jewish majority. Christianity, on the other hand, is a religion for governing the behaviour of Christians in a homogeneous Christian society. In a multicultural society it becomes suicidal.

The demographic facts and trends noted above are the manifestations of thoughts, of a particular narrative: that all people should be equal, and that some should not be better than others; that the historic particularity of European societies is immoral; that any form of discrimination is the worst evil; that unlimited openness and tolerance are the highest good; and that race does not matter. However, there is the white race, standing like a stone wall, dominating the world — by its very existence a reproof to the belief in equality and powerlessness, which is the source of white discomfort, white guilt.[37]

Egalitarianism insists that all people should be equal; hence, the evident backwardness of much of the non-Western part of humanity must be overcome. There are two approaches to eliminating this inequality: left-wing and right-wing. The left-wing approach to equalising the non-West is a variant of socialism with its double standards: dragging down and demonising the successful West, while giving vast unearned benefits, including unconditional moral approval, to the unsuccessful non-West; officially celebrating non-white racial identity, while destroying the reputation and livelihood of any white who says anything positive about whites as whites.

The right-wing approach to equalising the non-West with the West is to provide it with equal political procedures and economic opportunities: namely, the democratisation of non-Western countries, and the mass

immigration of non-Westerners into the West — which will be followed, they devoutly insist, by assimilation.

The problem with the right-wing approach is that while it claims to be interested only in equal procedures, rather than in equal results, it still assumes, much like left-liberalism, that all really have the same abilities and aspirations. Hence, if the same procedures apply to everyone, all should become substantively equal. When this hoped-for result fails to materialise, right-wingers become as resentful as left-wingers and become aggressive 'neoconservatives' trying to enact on the macro level a sort of global Jacobin crusade, with its goal to make all countries of the world equal. However, just as Communists promised to build a society where everyone would be equally prosperous, only to achieve a society where everyone was equally poor, so will the promise of American neoconservatives to westernise/democratise all countries of the world result in turning Western countries into Third World countries.

As long as we keep affirming or accommodating ourselves to such lines of thought, the physical transformation of our countries must continue unabated, leading to the destruction of the historic nations of the West and the genetic patrimony of Europe as a whole. Given the demographic, economic, and other realities of the contemporary world, if a European or white country does not insist it is a European country and that it wants to remain so — and if it does not have policies reflecting that view and that intention — then it will inevitably become a non-European country.

By condemning the exaltation of weakness the aim is in no way to justify the crushing of the weak by the strong, or to form an ideological alibi of any sort of established order. On the contrary, the present intention is to contribute to the formation of a spiritual framework that allows every individual, of whatever rank — and assuming only that he has the will — to cultivate what strengthens rather than weakens him.

Suprahumanism does not reproach Christianity for defending the weak who are unjustly oppressed. It reproaches Christianity for *exalting* weakness and viewing it as a sign of election and title of glory. It reproaches Christianity for not helping the weak to become strong. It is not a matter of opposing the strong against the weak, but rather of opposing a system that values strength against a system that values weakness. It is also a project of making a world that is neither a vale of tears, nor a stage upon

which emotionally unstable men attempt to act out their salvation. Rather, it is the natural field of self-expression for a man capable of asserting his autonomy and establishing his own historical project.

Chronospheres

You are caught in the current of unceasing change. Your life is a ripple in it. Every moment of your conscious life links the infinite past with the infinite future. Take part in both and you will not find the present empty.

— Oswald Spengler

Chronos Version 2 (2007) by Christopher Conte.

I

All the disputes and controversies of our age may be boiled down to a fundamental issue — the *sense of history*, the purpose and meaning of historical phenomena. Consciously or unconsciously, overtly or covertly, there always lies the question: what is history? From where does it come? Whither does it go? What is it for?

Our age makes two fundamental types of response to these questions — rigorously antagonistic and contradictory. They also reflect an implicit and *antagonistic anthropology*, in that they presuppose questions about human destiny: what is it to be human? What is the purpose of human existence?

It is necessary to clarify the meaning we attach to the term ‘history.’ Such explanation of vocabulary is important. When referring to ‘natural history,’ ‘cosmic history,’ or ‘life history,’ one is dealing with analogies. Insofar as any analogy suggests, poetically, similarity, it also implies, logically, fundamental diversity.

Within the limits of current knowledge, reality can be apprehended at four different levels: microphysical (elementary energy), macrophysical (matter), biological (organic systems), and human (self-reflecting *consciousness*). These four aspects of reality interpenetrate; however, they are far from being the same.[38]

Man participates at all four levels: he lives, singularly, at their intersection. He is energy, matter, and life — but he is also *something else*. This ‘something else’ gives man his *specificity*.

In the flux in which all things exist, the macrophysical universe — the cosmos — has no history. In the way we perceive and represent it to ourselves, the universe changes only its configuration through time. Regarding the microphysical elementary level of reality, it may be said only that it has its own structure, which is discontinuous. Not even life has history: it merely evolves. History is the particular way in which man — and man alone — becomes. Only man *becomes* historically. Hence, the question of knowing whether history has a purpose entails knowing whether man, who *is in* history and *makes* history, has purpose also.

Today, history — and therefore human specificity — is under accusation. It is, as we shall see, an old phenomenon; however, nowadays the accusation is more vehement, more explicit than ever. There is total condemnation without resort to appeal. History is said to be the consequence of the alienation of humanity. The *end of history* is evoked, proposed, projected — with preaching of *return to nature*; advocacy of *degrowth* (*décroissance*);[39] dreaming of an end to all tensions and conflicts — of serene and quiet balance, modest but safe happiness: the happiness of other animals. *Universal peace*, pacifism, pre-historical *matriarchy*, primitive communism, Edenic paradise — these are other avatars of the same view.

The idea of an end of history might seem most modern. In fact, this is not at all so.[40] To examine things more attentively is to realise that such an idea is nothing more than the logical outcome of a current of thought at least two thousand years old — a tendency that has over that time dominated and moulded what we have come to refer to as 'Western civilisation.' This current of thought — analysed in the previous chapter — is *egalitarianism*.

II

Irrespective of the forms it has adopted, the egalitarian world view has always been *eschatological*. It attributes a negative value to history, and discerns sense in historical motion only insofar as the latter tends towards its own negation and final end.

According to this view, history has a beginning and it must also have an end. It is but an episode — an incident as far as what constitutes the essence of humanity is concerned. The true nature of man would be external to history. And the end of history would restore — sublimating it — whatever existed at the beginning. Human *eternity* would be based not on *becoming* but on *being*.

This episode which is history is perceived in the *Christian perspective* as damnation. History derives from man being condemned by God — owing to original sin — to unhappiness, labour, sweat, and blood. Humanity lived in happy innocence in the Garden of Eden, and was *condemned to history* because its forefather, Adam, transgressed the divine commandment, wanting to taste the fruit of the tree of knowledge: to become like God. Adam's fault weighs, as original sin, upon every individual who comes to the world. It is, by definition, inexpiable, since God himself was offended.

However, God, in his infinite goodness, himself takes charge of the expiation. He becomes man — incarnate in the person of Jesus. The sacrifice of the Son of God introduces in historical becoming the essential event of Redemption. No doubt this concerns only those individuals touched by Grace, but it makes possible the slow march towards the end of history, for which, from then on, the 'communion of saints' must prepare humanity. Finally, there will come a day when the forces of Good and Evil will come face to face in a battle that will lead to a Last Judgement and, thence, to the instauration of the Kingdom of Heaven — which has its dialectical counterpart in the abyss of Hell.

Eden before the beginning of history; *original sin*; expulsion from the Garden of Eden; traversing the vale of tears that is the world — the place of historical becoming; *Redemption*; *communion of saints*; *apocalyptic battle* and *Last Judgement*; end of history and instauration of a Kingdom of

Heaven: these are the *mythemes* that structure the mythical vision of history proposed by Christianity. In this vision, man's historical becoming has a purely negative value, and the sense of an expiation.

The same mythemes can be found — now in a secularised and supposedly scientific form — in the *Marxist* view of history.[41] There, history is presented as the result of the class struggle: a struggle between groups defined in relation to their respective economic conditions. The prehistoric Garden of Eden has been transformed into a *primitive communism* practised by a humanity still immersed in the state of nature and of a purely predatory character. Whereas man in Eden was constrained by God's commandments, man in primitive communism lives under the pressure of misery. Such pressure has brought about the invention of the means of agricultural production, but this invention has also turned out to be a curse. It has entailed, indeed, not only the exploitation of nature by man, but also the division of labour, the exploitation of man by man, and, consequently, human *alienation*. The *class struggle* is the implicit consequence of this exploitation of man by man. Its result is history.

As we can see, for Marxists it is economic conditions that determine human behaviour. By logical concatenation, the latter leads to the creation of ever new systems of production which, in their turn, cause new economic conditions and — especially — ever greater misery for those who are exploited. Nevertheless, there comes a moment of *Redemption*. With the arrival of capitalism misery peaks — it becomes *unbearable*. Proletarians become conscious of their condition, and this redemptive realisation gives rise to the organising of *communist parties* — exactly as the redemption of Christ had caused the founding of a communion of saints. The Judeo-Christian notion of 'Grace' finds its equivalent, especially in relation to the *Sermon of the Mount*.

Communist parties carry out an apocalyptic struggle against the exploiters. This may be long and difficult, but it will ultimately and necessarily be successful: it is 'the sense of history.' This will bring about the abolition of social classes, put an end to man's alienation, and allow the instauration of a communist society — unchanging and classless. Furthermore, since history is the result of the class struggle, evidently there will be no more history. Prehistoric communism will be reinstated — like the Garden of Eden in the Kingdom of Heaven — but in a sublimated way.

While primitive communist society was afflicted by material misery, post-historic communist society will enjoy a perfectly balanced satisfaction of its needs.

Hence, in the Marxist view, history also assumes a negative value. Born originally because of human alienation, it makes sense only insofar as it increases incessantly the misery of those exploited, finally contributing to the creation of the conditions through which misery will disappear and, as it were, ‘marching’ towards its own end, its self-abolition.

Both egalitarian views — religious Christian and secular Marxist — logically imply that history is determined not by the action of man, but by something that transcends him. It is true that Christianity ascribes free will to man and so affirms that it was Adam, having freely ‘chosen’ to sin, who is responsible for his fault, for his imperfection. However, it was God who made and wanted Adam to be imperfect.

On the other hand, Marxists were sometimes wont to say that history was made by man — or rather *men*, as members of a social class. However, it is the case that social classes are determined and defined by economic conditions, and that it had been original misery that had constrained men to enter into that bloody concatenation which is the class struggle. Man is then incited to act only as a result of his economic condition. He is *a mere decoy* in a game played in nature by material forces.

Within the egalitarian vision of history, man performs a dramatic role — in a tragic, shameful, and painful farce — one that he has not written and will never write. Dignity, as an authentic human truth, is found outside history — before it and after it.

Everything contains in itself its own relative antithesis. The eschatological view of history also has its own relative egalitarian antithesis: the theory of *infinite progress*. According to this, historical motion is represented as constantly tending towards a ‘zero’ which is never attained. This ‘progress’ may go in the direction of ‘always better’ — excluding, however, the idea of a perfect and absolute good. It becomes then the liberal ideology of the *Belle Époque*, the view of a certain recycled Marxism, or that of the naive American way of life.

Americans do not want a past. They do not want to actualise the past or to give form to the future. They want the present only: a succession of presents that may be enjoyed immediately — in accordance with the text of

the U.S. Declaration of Independence, guaranteeing a right to the pursuit of happiness.[42]

Change may also proceed as ‘always worse’ without ever arriving at its lowest point — according to the yardstick used. Such is exemplified in the pessimistic vision of Freud, Marcuse, and other Freudian-Marxist thinkers who failed to see how reproduction of the unhappiness that represents civilisation could ever be stopped. Under such conditions, the sole possibility for man not to add evil to evil is to maintain reference to the notion of an end of history, even if it is known this will never occur — or precisely because of this. This messianic expectation is considered operative and fruitful. The same conception may be observed in Bernard-Henri Lévy.[43] The attitude which logically derives from such a vision of things is *hypercriticism* as a principle: opposing a perpetual ‘no’ to the dangers lurking behind any ‘yes.’ While ‘orthodox’ Marxist theory reproduced, in secular form, the Christian theory of history, neo-Marxist or Freudian-Marxist theory reproduces more closely the theory of classical Judaism.

The notion of ‘infinite progress’ — once it played the instrumental role that every relative antithesis has played since the invention of the Devil — tends nowadays to be reabsorbed into its eschatological thesis. The latest example is Francis Fukuyama:[44] ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’[45] Fukuyama himself identifies to a degree with Marx, but most strongly with the German philosopher Hegel, by way of Alexandre Kojève.[46] Kojève argued that the progress of history must lead toward the establishment of a ‘universal and homogeneous’ state, most probably incorporating elements of liberal or social democracy. As is argued below,[47] Fukuyama’s triumphalism has been short-lived.

III

It is well established that Nietzsche was the first to reduce Christianity, democratic ideology, and communism to their common denominator: egalitarianism. Since the representatives of these schools of thought have usually called themselves ‘humanists,’ the Nietzschean philosophy — in contrast to egalitarianism — may be labelled ‘suprahumanist.’ It was Nietzsche who also first proposed an alternative vision of history — one which currently opposes, sometimes in a subterranean way, but ever more tenaciously — the eschatological/egalitarian view.

Nietzsche wanted not only to analyse, but also to combat egalitarianism. He wanted to inspire and vivify a *project* opposed to egalitarianism: to animate another *will*, to give strength to a diametrically opposed *value judgement*.

Hence, his work presents two complementary aspects.[48] The first is properly critical — perhaps *scientific*. Its purpose is to stress the relativity of every value judgement, every moral — and of every truth claimed to be absolute. In this way, he exposes the relativity of the ‘absolute principles’ proclaimed by egalitarianism.

Together with criticism, there exists also an aspect that might be defined as *poetic* — in a sense derived from the Greek *poiein* (‘to make, to create’). In his poetic work, Nietzsche wants to give life to a new type of man, one who will be bound to new values and derive principles of action from an ethic other than that of *Good and Evil*.

To give an image of a society founded on the values proposed by him, Nietzsche turns to the examples of ancient Greece and Rome, or the aristocratic and conquering societies of *Indo-European antiquity*. This is well known. However, insufficient attention has been paid to Nietzsche’s simultaneous warning against the illusion that it is possible to ‘bring back the Greeks,’ i.e., resuscitate the pre-Christian world. This detail is extremely important in that it offers the necessary key to better understanding the Nietzschean vision of history.

The concept *time of history* may seem at first sight abstruse; however, it is a notion we all have, perhaps unconsciously.

The ancient world entertained a *cyclical* view of history, believing that every moment of history was destined to repeat itself.[49] Historical time was represented by a circle: it was by nature *linear*. With Christianity a new feeling about the world, man, and history is born. The new time of history will remain linear; however, it is no longer circular but rather segmentary — more precisely, *parabolic*. As described above, for Christianity history has a beginning, a climax, and an end. And it does not repeat itself. History has, furthermore, a negative value: provoked by original sin, history is the passage through a vale of tears.

The suprahumanist conception of history is no longer linear, but rather *three-dimensional*: inextricably linked to that one-dimensional space which is the consciousness of every human being. Every human consciousness is the room occupied by a present. This present is three-dimensional, and the three dimensions — bestowed at the same time as the three dimensions of physical space — are actuality, past, and future.

What, then, is human consciousness as that space of a time given to each of us? It is, on the dimension of *becomeness*, memory, presence of the past; on the dimension of *actuality*, presence of spirit ready to action; on the dimension of *becomingness*, presence of the project and goal pursued, a project that, memorised and presented to the spirit, determines the action under progress.

Man's historical becoming may then be conceived as a collection of moments, each one composing a *sphere* within a four-dimensional 'supersphere,' the centre of which may be occupied by any moment respective to any other. According to this perspective, the actuality of every moment is no longer called 'present.' On the contrary, 'present, past, and future' coexist: they are the three dimensions of every historical moment.

If the sphere of historical becoming is visualized in one-dimensional terms, history can be imagined as something that appears as a straight line to the egalitarian-minded. To the suprahumanist, this line is only that of biological evolution, above which history is manifested. Since the sphere of historical becoming is experienced differently, as a 'present' for each conscious mind, the representations of history are similarly different.

This clash between the one-dimensionality of our biological sensitivity and the three-dimensionality of our historicity — the fact that man is not only life, but something else — was in the past somehow intuited. Man has

always felt himself to be something other than ‘nature,’ has seen himself differently from the animal, affirming his own ‘consciousness’ — sometimes attributing it to an absolute devoid of any materiality — in face of the ‘non-consciousness’ of things and animals. Forever, he has felt himself living, tragically, in two space-times, and has tried to represent to himself such a duality through the opposition between body and soul, temporality and eternity, matter and spirit, this world and the kingdom of heaven, human and divine — in each of which the first member of the pair has typically held a negative connotation in relation to the second. This sort of intuition may have had justification in its own time. In our own, it is an error. Nietzsche’s dictum that ‘God is dead’ means that we must bring soul, eternity, spirit, heaven, and the divine back to their ‘place of origin’ (*Ursprungsort*): that is, to a human consciousness that, in so doing, becomes self-conscious being — *selbstbewusstes Dasein* in Heideggerian terms.[50]

In the same way that in each point (moment) of linear macrophysical time the totality of the physical being (mass-energy) is given, so in each ‘I-point’ of the linear (one-dimensional) historical space (the tradition) there is the totality of history: in memory as past; in actuality as action; and in future as project-in-progress. We might say that space at any moment is full of memory and expectation. Total space-time is the synthesis of all perspectives — each perspective being ‘historical phases’ of space-time. Perspectives are synthesised when we imagine not merely one centre of reference, but an infinity of such centres — one for every instant. Hence, the physical universe is through and through historical — the scene of motion. Total space-time is space-time in its total historicity, not a vision of eternity. Time itself is the mind of space, and space is the body of time.

This may sound abstruse, but only because after two thousand years of egalitarianism we are used to a different language. The suprahumanist discourse must force language to express, in its simplest and most coherent way, the *original and originative* concepts of a world view still going through its mythical phase — and hence constrained to use the language of an alien world in its self-reflections because it still lacks its ‘own language.’

Concepts such as ‘regress,’ ‘conservation,’ and ‘progress’ lose their meaning in the suprahumanist discourse and are sometimes confused with one another. In the one-dimensionality in which we project the historical

sphere, this one forms a circle — an *eternal recurrence* — where every ‘progress’ is also a ‘regress.’ Here lies the *enigma* proposed by Nietzsche with the mythemes of the *Eternal Return* and the *High Noontide*. The *identical* that returns is of a biological order, and the same only from a material — not an historical — point of view; historic is, on the other hand, the *diversity* — the appearance of new forms which may provoke the rupture of time (*Zeitumbruch*) — and regenerate history.

The past does not correspond to that which was, ‘once and for all,’ a frozen element that the present would leave behind for good. In the same manner, the future is no longer the obligatory effect of all the causes that have preceded it in time and have determined it, as in the linear egalitarian vision of history. At every moment of history — in every *actuality* — past and future are, so to speak, *brought into question*, reconfigured according to a new perspective: they mould *another truth*. One might say, by means of another image, that the past is but the project which man uses to shape his historical action — a project he tries to realise according to the image he has of himself and which he tries to incarnate. The past then seems like a prefiguration of the future. In its proper sense, it is the *imagination* of the future.

‘What existed in the beginning remains always in the future, remains constantly under the control of what is in the future.’ In his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger specifically examines the question of the *spherical* conception of history. A people, he says, can triumph over the ‘darkening of the world’ and its decline only if its sights are permanently set upon its destiny. Now, a people will be able ‘to gain a destiny from its vocation only when it creates in itself a resonance, a possibility of resonance for this vocation, and grasps its tradition creatively.’ In other words, it is necessary ‘to recapture the beginning of our historical-spiritual existence, in order to transform it into a new beginning.’[51]

The Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was precisely that — a rebirth. This rebirth was no journey backward, or a simple resurgence of the past: it was, on the contrary, the point of departure for a new spiritual adventure, an adventure of a European soul now triumphant, having awakened to itself: the deliberate choice of a more authentic, harmonious, and powerful future.

This three-dimensional conception of time is the only one that may affirm logically man's historical freedom. In the vision proposed by Nietzsche, man carries the whole responsibility of historical becoming. History is his work. It is equivalent to saying that he carries the whole responsibility of himself, that he is truly and fully free: *faber suae fortunae*. This freedom is an authentic freedom, not conditioned by the grace of God or the constraints of an economic, material situation.

It is also a *true* freedom — consisting in the possibility of choosing between opposed options: options that exist at every moment of history, and that always bring into question the totality of Being and of man's becoming. If these options were not *realisable*, the choice would be but fake, freedom false — and man's autonomy mere appearance.

Since man is not only an historical, but also a social animal, this choice presents itself in the form of *epochal alternatives*: the decisions taken by the groups of men involved will have political effect in world history.

What, then, is the alternative offered to the men of our age? Nietzsche said that the choice was between *the last man* — the man of the end of history — and the leap towards *the superman*: the regeneration of history. Ultimately, the outcome will depend on us — on European men and women — on the choice we make between these options. For us, the historical decision is always and at the same time a *wake-up call* addressed to the past, to a forgotten or lost origin; a *decision* to surpass a decaying present; and the undertaking of a *future project* that has hitherto never taken place — because it is suprahumanist.

Interlude

Self-Portrait (1500) by Albrecht Dürer.
Critics consider this the single most annoying, arrogant, and gorgeous portrait ever painted. For the first and last time in the history of art, an artist, Albrecht Dürer, was to portray himself as Christ and God. A suprahumanist avant la lettre?

The Last Man

Alas! There comes the time when man will no longer give birth to any star. Alas! There comes the time of the most despicable man, who can no longer despise himself.

Lo! I show you the Last Man.

'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?' So asks the Last Man, and blinks.

The earth has become small, and on it hops the Last Man, who makes everything small. His species is as ineradicable as the flea; the Last Man lives longest.

'We have discovered happiness,' say the Last Men — and they blink.

They have left the regions where it is hard to live, for they need warmth. One still loves one's neighbour and rubs against him — for one needs warmth.

Turning ill and being distrustful, they consider sinful: they walk warily. He is a fool who still stumbles over stones or men!

A little poison now and then: that makes for pleasant dreams. And much poison at the end for a pleasant death.

One still works, for work is a pastime. But one is careful lest the pastime should hurt one.

One no longer becomes poor or rich; both are too burdensome. Who still wants to rule? Who still wants to obey? Both are too burdensome.

No shepherd, and one herd! Everyone wants the same; everyone is the same: he who feels differently goes voluntarily into the madhouse.

'Formerly all the world was insane,' say the subtlest of them — and they blink.

They are clever and know all that has happened — so there is no end to their derision. People still quarrel, but are soon reconciled — otherwise it upsets their stomachs.

They have their little pleasures for the day, and their little pleasures for the night — but they have a regard for health.

'We have discovered happiness,' say the Last Men, and they blink.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

The Superman

We must have a religion if we are to do anything worth doing. If anything is to be done to get our civilization out of the horrible mess in which it now is, it must be done by men who have got a religion. People who have no religion are cowards and cads. If you allow people who are caddish and irreligious to become the governing force, the nation will be destroyed, and that is what is the matter with us.

What I mean by a religious person is one who conceives himself or herself to be the instrument of some purpose in the universe which is a high purpose, and is the native power of evolution — that is, of a continual ascent in organization and power and life, and extension of life. Any person who realizes that there is such a power, and that his business and joy in life is to do its work, and his pride and point of honour to identify himself with it, is religious, and the people who have not got that feeling are clearly irreligious, no matter what denomination they may belong to. We may give this feeling quite different names. One man may use religious terms and say that he is here to do the work of God. Another man, calling himself an atheist, may simply say that he has a sense of honour. But the two things are precisely the same. Any man of honour is a religious man. He holds there are certain things he must not do and certain things he must do, quite irrespective of the effect upon his personal fortunes. Such a man you may call a religious man, or you may call him a gentleman.

We are gradually getting rid of our idols, and in the future we shall have to put before the people religions that are practical systems, which — on the whole — we can perceive to work out in practice, instead of resulting in flagrant contradictions as they do at present. People, however, go from one extreme to the other, and when they do so they are apt to throw out the good things with the bad ones. Hence, they make little progress. The old-fashioned atheist rebelled against the idea of an omnipotent being as God of cancer, epilepsy and war — as well as of the good that happened. They were unable to believe that a God of love could allow such things. And so they seized avidly upon the idea of natural selection as put forward by Charles Darwin. Darwin was not the originator of the idea of evolution —

which long pre-dated him — but it was he that made us familiar with the particular form of evolution known as natural selection. That idea was seized upon with a feeling of relief: relief that the old idea of God was banished from the world. This feeling of relief was so great that for a time the horrible void which had been created in the universe was overlooked. Natural selection left us in a world full of horrors which were accounted for, apparently, by the fact that it as a whole had come about by accident. However, if there is no purpose or design in the universe the sooner we all cut our throats the better, for it is not much of a place to live in.

Most of the natural selection men of the nineteenth century were brilliant — but they were cowards. We want to return to men with some belief in the purpose of the universe — with determination to identify themselves with it, and with the courage that comes from that. As for my own position, I am and always have been a mystic. I believe that the universe is driven by a force that we might call the life-force. I see it as performing the miracle of creation, and that it has entered the minds of men as what they call their will. Hence, we see people who clearly are carrying out a will not exclusively their own.

To attempt to represent this particular will or power as God — in the former meaning of the word — is now entirely hopeless; nobody can believe that. What you have to understand is that somehow or other there is, behind the universe a will, a life-force. You cannot think of it as a person, you must think of it as a great purpose, a great will. Furthermore, you must think of it as engaged in a continual struggle to produce something higher and higher.

You begin with the amoeba: why did it split itself in two? It is not an intelligent thing for anybody to do. You cannot pretend there is any particular accident in that. You cannot see any case that natural selection makes. But somehow the amoeba does it. It finds that perhaps two are better than one. At any rate it does split itself in two, from which there is a continual pushing forward to a higher and higher organization. The differentiation of sex, the introduction of backbone, the invention of eyes, the invention of systems of digestion — there is a continual steady growth, an evolution of life. There are forces that may not be explained — and this particular force is ever organizing, organizing, organizing. Among other things it organizes the physical eye, in order that that mechanism can see dangers and avoid them; see food and go after it; see the cliff-edge and

avoid falling over it. And not only does it evolve that particular eye: it also evolves what Shakespeare called the mind's eye. We are not only striving in some particular way to take more and more power, to develop organs and limbs with which we may mould the universe to our liking: we are also continually striving to know, to become more conscious, to understand the meaning of all.

We must believe in the will to good; it is unthinkable to regard man as willing his own destruction. However, in the striving after good that will is liable to make mistakes, and to let loose something that is destructive. We may regard the typhoid bacillus as one of the failures of the life-force that we call God; however, that same life-force is trying, through our brains, to discover a means of destroying that malign influence. If that conception is grasped, an answer to those people who ask for an explanation of the origin of evil becomes available. Evil things are made with the object of their doing good; but they turn out wrong, and therefore must be destroyed. This is the most important conception for the religion of the future — because it gives us what we are at present, as well as courage and self-respect. It is ours to work for something better, to talk less about the religion of love — love is an improper subject — and more about the religion of life, and of work: to create a world that shall know a happiness that need not be the happiness of drunkenness — a world of which we need not be ashamed. The world must consist of people who are happy and, at the same time, sober. At present the happiness of the world is as the happiness of drunken people. We resort to factitious aids to life. We try to fight off consciousness of ourselves because we do not see the consciousness of a mission and, finally, the consciousness of a magnificent destiny.

What is to be the end of it all? There need be no end. Since it has proceeded so far there is no reason why the process should ever stop. However, it must achieve on its infinite journey the production of some being, some person strong and wise, with a mind capable of comprehending the entire universe, and with powers capable of executing its entire will.

Perhaps there is no God as yet achieved; however, there is a force at work making God, struggling through us to become an actual organized existence, enjoying what to many of us is the greatest conceivable ecstasy — of a brain, an intelligence that is actually conscious of the whole, and

with executive force capable of guiding it to a perfectly benevolent and harmonious destination.

That is what we are working to. When you are asked, 'Where is God? Who is God?' stand up and say: 'I am God. Here is God — not as yet completed, but ever advancing towards completion, in so much as I am working for the purpose of the universe, working for the good of the whole of society and the whole world, instead of merely pursuing my personal ends.'

We are all experiments in the direction of making God. What God is doing is making himself — from being a mere powerless will or force. This force has implanted into our minds the ideal of God. Thus far we are unsuccessful attempts at God. However, if we can drive into the heads of men the full consciousness of moral responsibility that comes with the knowledge that there never will be a God unless we make one — that we are the instruments through which that ideal is trying to make itself reality — we can work towards such an ideal until we get to be supermen, then super-supermen, then a world of organisms who have achieved and realized God.

— George Bernard Shaw, *A Religious Speech*[52]

The Third Man

You can lower yourselves to the level of the beast, but you can also be reborn as a divine creature by the free will of your spirit. Man can become what he likes — subhuman or superman, as he wishes.

— Giovanni Pico della Mirandola

Newton (1805) by William Blake.

I

In order to know just what our destiny is — beginning with the inquiry as to whether or not we still desire to be destined for anything — it is convenient to develop *an anthropological vision* offering a perspective on what our species is and should be; from where it comes; its purpose, development, and evolution; its specific characteristics — and whether or not we want those characteristics to persist.

It was asserted above[53] that it is possible to identify four levels of reality: macrophysical, microphysical, biological, and historical. Each level is defined in relation to the others, and each obeys its own laws. From a practical point of view — which is man's viewpoint — each of these laws appears to be a limiting case of the other: there is always the question of a *threshold*. Hence, the macrophysical and the microphysical obey *different laws that do not contradict each other*, and the biological law of the living does not contradict the physicochemical laws: it is valid only for the living, and indifferent, as limiting case, to physicochemical laws. Likewise, what is peculiar to man does not 'contradict' biological laws — through which man is the *only* limiting case — but simply *surpasses* them. And this aspect of man that surpasses the biological constitutes the fourth level of reality. It may be called *historical*.

Man is an *ambivalent* being. His dual nature is derived from this ambivalence. Man is an animal, but not just an animal. Furthermore, his *specificity* does not derive from biology or 'nature,' but rather from what in him cannot be found in any other living being.

The great merit of biological anthropology and comparative ethology has been to highlight the irreducibility of man to the biological domain alone. The best description of a living being was probably offered by Jakob von Uexküll: what characterises a living being is that it tends, on the one hand, to reproduce itself identically; and, on the other hand, that it is always in close relation to a *specific environment* created, *ipso facto*, by its own sensory apparatus.[54] This intimate relation between a species and its specific environment represents the biological phenomenon labelled *instinct*.

It may be said that *man has no specific environment*, or — which is the same — that *he tends to adapt to every environment*. Also, not having an immediate relation to a specific environment, he *has no instincts*, or — again — *he has every instinct*. Arnold Gehlen summarised these considerations with the expression *Weltoffenheit*: what characterises man is his 'being open to the world.'[55]

Man, having no specific environment, has no previous knowledge when he enters his path in life. He must forever *learn, experiment, give meaning, choose* between different options.

As with any other living being, man has organic drives and receives stimuli from the outside. And, evidently, as with any other animal, he has but his body alone to make an instant response. For reasons that are in no way scientific, some have wanted to deny that man is *naturally* subject to certain drives and stimuli — to aggression, for example. Robert Ardrey and Konrad Lorenz have ridiculed such statements and demonstrated their absurdity.[56] On the other hand, ethologists such as Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt have also firmly put in their place those who claim that man is dominated by aggressive urges and nothing else.

The fact is that man is driven by *numerous* — and contradictory — urges. In his case, however, *these urges never have a precise object*. Man has always to program himself. We are not dealing here with a basic learning process that exists already in other higher animals and that is naturally predetermined by genetic imprinting. Man must always opt between different ways of *self-programming* and, ultimately, between programmes that tend to oppose each other.[57] These programmes are well known to all of us: they are called 'cultures.' There are *different* human cultures, but *only one* human nature.

Man is only acted upon through his membership of the species insofar as the latter is the basis for pure potentialities. This means also that man is required to give purpose to his behaviour. This is a vital requirement: man needs to determine himself.

This negative and/or potential determination of man — and the authentic freedom that it establishes — these were well known to the ancient world. Myths speak about it and refer to it as *fatum* (destiny), something which does not 'constrain' man, but nevertheless requires him to make choices. Like Hercules at the crossroads, man may always refuse a heroic destiny,

opting for a more ‘humble’ one — for withdrawal back to ‘nature.’ What is characteristic of the hero — of man *par excellence* — is to choose, like Hercules, Achilles, or Ulysses, the exultant yet fatal adventure of one who wishes to be ‘like the gods.’ Man’s freedom to determine his own destiny is what compensates for his organic deficiencies.

Freedom, in this sense, is evidently relative. But that is precisely why it is an authentic freedom.[58] There is no freedom that is not relative. The problem of freedom has always been among the ultimate questions of philosophy: questions that lead to the famous *aporias* of reason: i.e., responses that are rigorously antithetical and mutually exclusive. This derives from the problem of freedom having always been cast as a metaphysical absolute. As an absolute, freedom is confused with *predestination*; in reality, there can be no freedom that is not relative: man has always responsibility for choosing among diverse options — or even opposed ones. He is free to choose, but required to make a choice. Biological law, as specific law, determines man negatively, while determining animal positively. That makes man entirely responsible for himself. This freedom is authentic in that man remains responsible for abolishing — by extreme choice — his own freedom. Man may even renounce life consciously, by committing suicide. This is true not only of individuals, but also of societies.

Man’s exercise of this authentic freedom is *history*. History restores for each human life, in an ever-renewing form, the original condition of man in relation to life: the need to choose. Man must constantly create himself, invent himself — because at all times the human equation remains the same. In this consists the ambivalence of culture. It may be said that *culture is man’s nature*. Devoid of a proper natural program fixed on its object and purpose, man must provide himself with a cultural program — a culture. Through the creation of culture he becomes man: he creates himself. However, once it is created, such a culture is established automatically as ‘nature’ — artificial, certainly, but nature nevertheless. It then becomes the constraining law that rules men from generation to generation, just as biological law rules animals. In order to preserve man’s historical condition, it is necessary that culture — as well as nature — determines the individual, but in a restrictive sense: it must continue to impose the need to make

decisions, including extending to him the freedom to make decisions that are in opposition to the interests of his own culture.

Since man is free, since he becomes and re-creates himself from generation to generation, human science (in its deepest and widest sense) cannot but define or 'forecast,' on each occasion, the alternatives offered to humankind: the two limiting and contradistinctive ideas as to how *future man* might be.

All this aids a better understanding of the movement of history; it explains the duration of cultures, their slow transformation, sudden shocks, decline — and death.

Man is a social animal. In order to realise himself, he must create both himself and his society. In relation to this self-creation, individuals incarnate and actualise different values. The 'mass man' and the 'founding hero' may be considered the extremes within the sociological parameter that measures the historical value of human beings. The former is a 'non-humanised man,' whose drives are not directed towards a culturally determined objective. Incapable of cultural self-determination, the *mass man* ends up as determined from time to time, and at random, by chance or by contact — especially human contact. He follows without knowing it. On the other hand, the *founding hero*, or self-actualised man, projects an idea about himself and the society to which he belongs — and realises it. He is a creator of cultural facts. To varying degrees, all individuals partake of both sociological categories. This allows, within a given culture, the organisation of society and the establishment of a dynamic game between poles.

The pre-existence of a given culture offers the *chance* for the individual where mass values predominate. Given social traditions and education, he may be brought up to repeat the process of human self-creation offered in the received *cultural model*: he may incarnate a *social type*, hence becoming integral to the social group, the *people*. The repetition of this process of integration, codified in each culture, corresponds in its simplest form to the rites of initiation. In modern societies this process is organised through education systems and is reinforced by the techniques of social conditioning.

It might be thought that the individual in whom the creative value prevails would, logically, be led to reject the culture and values he inherits in order to affirm his own originality. However, this occurs only in cultures

that are old, decrepit, unadapted to historical necessity. In young, vital cultures where the humanising force of the social type is maintained, *the creator takes upon himself both the preservation and improvement of this type*: he endeavours to raise it by his own example, hence affirming himself as a *person*.

Furthermore, in a young culture the model remains wide open and appears as process still in progress. It is perceived as remaining susceptible of *new interpretations* so long as there are domains of human activity in which the model is not yet incarnated. The *creative* value is the quintessentially historical value. And this is why in every age the founding heroes — the geniuses, the great artists — are venerated.[59] It is also why more value is given to an original work than to its copy, even where the latter is in every respect identical.

Personality is not the extolling of individual selfishness; on the contrary, it is the highest expression of a society, of which it represents the *consciousness* and *superior will*. Personality aspires to realise the highest idea it has of itself, and of *the other* — that is, of its own society. Hence, in a particular historical moment, personality proves itself by responding to the socio-cultural imperative of that time; it is recognised, accepted and followed precisely because it satisfies the unconscious aspirations of a community and of a people. There is constantly a component of sacrifice in personality, and in some cases this may involve extreme renunciation. That is why whoever offers himself up for the welfare of a society or of a culture becomes *heroised*. By taking on himself society as a whole the hero places himself, rightfully, at the pinnacle of the social hierarchy.

When a culture no longer fulfils this human need, a chaotic mass society is formed and its members — devoid of a cultural ‘type’ with which to identify — become a crowd, a mob. Then comes the time when a founding hero, aware of the decomposition of his own society and culture, may emerge and undertake the required *revolution*: an act of *conservation* through which human nature, mortally menaced, may be preserved.

II

The human phenomenon, to be well understood, may be described as *culture in space and history in time*. Anything that tends to reduce man to the level of his biology — an unconscious aspiration of tired societies — entails *depriving him of his humanity*, of his historicity and culture.

Man is a living being, and life consists all in all in a physical-chemical phenomenon. However, in the same way that life transcends the physical-chemical inorganic realm — of which, in a certain way, it suspends the laws — man 'transcends' life through being confronted with a *tragic destiny*.

The tragic is connected to the clear awareness man has of his weakness, of the ephemeral nature of his life — alongside a ceaselessly reasserted desire to compensate for that weakness with a creative *intensity*.[60] In other words, the tragic implies a will to measure oneself against time, while never finding a pretext for renouncing it in the certainty of its final outcome: death. Heroism thus consists of struggling against what will eventually triumph — but against a 'natural' triumph to which it is ever possible to oppose another — specifically human — triumph.

Here we return to the *historical problem*: the *creation of man by himself*, and the *creation of culture*.

Lacking a 'proper' nature, man has at his disposal a practically unlimited number of potential natures. He is potentially all animals in one. This arises from his extraordinary plasticity, from the capacity for adaptation that properly defines his intelligence. It is for this reason one may see in him a *diseased animal*.[61] Being contradictory, his instincts paralyse one another. Where another animal would at any time experience a single demand evoking a single predetermined response — as inscribed in the genetic programming of the species — man experiences a multitude of demands calling for a multitude of possible responses which, consequently, cancel one another. Hence, in order to *exist*, man is forced to *choose* one demand, one response, one nature, one instinct — among, and in opposition to, all the others. The *natures* he has chosen and brought to reality — 'selecting' and 'orienting' certain instincts and repressing others — are the different *cultures*.

A culture, then, is the ‘nature’ man selects and gives to himself. It is the human nature actualised as such, and thus realised. And this choice is the first ‘historical fact.’ The *primate* became man by entering history. In fact, anthropology would be in serious difficulty if trying to differentiate radically between man and primate, his closest ancestor, if it did not take into account the former’s *historicity*.

History begins — and each time begins again — when the pre-human, linking *gesture* to *word*, makes himself human — becomes human — and offers evidence of so doing by means of the invention and adoption of a *tool*.[62] In this sense, *hominisation* may be considered as the *first historical fact* by means of which man constitutes himself as such and, taking responsibility for his future, lurches forward into history.

Contrary to the Bible, ‘Adam and Eve’ in the Garden of Eden were not the first human couple. They were still primates. They were in no way expelled from this Eden, but left it voluntarily. Was that a sin? There is no doubt that in the Bible, and in the currents of thought flowing from it, this first ‘historical fact,’ and all the history that follows, is considered fundamentally pernicious: a ‘mistake’ which it is necessary to undo.

Hundreds of thousands of years after hominisation, it was with *the Neolithic Revolution* — some time after the end of the last Ice Age, and taking another impressive step along the path of self-domestication that identifies the adventure of our species — that the *Second Man* emerges.

Spengler wrote:

> But what in fact has happened? If one goes more deeply into this new form-world of man’s activities, one soon perceives most bizarre and complicated linkages. These techniques, one and all, presuppose one another’s existence. The keeping of tame animals demands the cultivation of forage stuffs, the sowing and reaping of food-plants require draught-animals and beasts of burden to be available, and these, again, the construction of pens. Every sort of building requires the preparation and transport of materials, and transport, again, roads and pack-animals and boats.
>
> What in all this is the *spiritual* transformation? The answer I put forward is this — *collective doing by plan*. Hitherto each man had lived his own life, made his own weapons, followed his own tactics in the daily struggle. None needed another. This is what suddenly changes now. The new processes take up long periods of time, in some cases years — consider for instance the time that elapses between the felling of the tree and the sailing of the ship that is built out of it. The story divides itself into a set of well-arranged separate ‘acts’ and a set of ‘plots’ working out in parallel with one another. And for this collective procedure the indispensable prerequisite is a medium, *language*.[63]

Having learned — with the First Man — what ‘moves’ himself, man tries now to ‘move’ animals and plants according to his wishes and needs. As far as social animals are concerned, he intends to take on a directive role, becoming the leader of the pack. Similarly, having attained a superior consciousness — thanks to the correct understanding of *magic* — he presents himself as aristocracy in relation to the rest of society and affirms his own sovereignty.[64]

From an anthropological perspective, traditional magic practices were perfectly adequate to a certain level of development. In this sense, ‘authentic’ magic aims at clarifying a psycho-technique (*self-discipline*) with a specific goal in mind; it guides man into the appropriate *form* for a given project. It either prepares man to bear without excessive anxiety the hostile pressures of a universe that he does not yet control, or it helps give free reign to certain instincts and repress others, so that he can accomplish more successfully a certain undertaking.[65]

With this type of magic, the First Man had manipulated himself. He had given himself a self-chosen nature, and had succeeded in his hominisation. Hence, authentic magic constitutes the original ‘know-how’ of *human self-domestication*, and the domestication of the psyche by consciousness, organised by a science that was born through reflection on the know-how of animal nature.

Magic degenerates as soon as it claims to find application to a relation diverse from the one instituted between consciousness and psyche: that is, between man (as living being) and the world (as event), under the wholly imaginary pretext that the human psyche participates in the cause of that event. It then leads to a cosmological theory that is entirely unfounded. On the other hand, where this reflection allows him to isolate the true terms of the ‘magic relation,’ man acquires an exact description of himself and his circumstances, and of the position he occupies within the living world. He transforms himself, from then on, into *the domesticator of the living world*.

With the Second Man, man’s taming of the living world occurred in parallel to the taming of the mass — by the elite. Hereafter, *religion* comes to be the ideological system that will serve to ‘tie fast’ society and subject the group to a certain influence.

This historical phase — initiated with the Neolithic Revolution and concluding today with the passage into the so-called ‘Biopolitical Revolution’ — is extremely important. It is not difficult to recognise in it what was called by Karl Marx ‘the end of primitive communist society,’ by Sigmund Freud ‘the killing of the primal father,’ and by Claude Lévi-Strauss ‘the separation between Nature and Culture.’

Significant testimony to this period has been preserved in Indo-European mythology, thanks to the story of the formation of the society of the gods — as related, for example, through *the Aesir-Vanir War*.[66]

The Aesir and the Vanir represent two different ways of life. During the founding war — which set at odds, in symbolic form, the lifestyles of the great hunters and the farmers that emerged out of the Neolithic era — Odin-Wotan, as the pre-eminent god of magic, ‘domesticated’ the Vanir with his magic and assigned to them an harmonious position in the organic tri-functional society, where the ‘domestication of nature’ was completed. This *myth* signifies the transition from a *generic* instinctive human subject to a *specific* conscious human subject who exercises magic power over other men, thereby engendering the conditions for social stratification that are the distinguishing feature of every post-Neolithic society.

Society is now organised into two castes, two social groups. One, which is the dominant class, assumes sovereign and warrior functions; the other assumes the economic function. This structure is reflected in the society of gods, whose genesis the myth, in its own way, reveals. The new society is constituted by the superimposition and domination of ‘*magic*’ above *religious* man, of *predator* above *producer*. The myth of the Aesir and the Vanir, like that of the Romans and the Sabines, highlights the respective characters of both social groups or families of gods. The former — ‘preying’ gods who continue the activities of the First Man as *self-domesticating* man — assert themselves by virtue of the binding magic of their chief, Odin/Wotan; the latter, ‘producing’ gods, carry on the activities of the First Man as ‘*self-domesticated*’ man. They must and do submit to the former, despite the power deriving from their ‘wealth’ (symbolised by Gullweig’s gold).

This social-divine dichotomy derives from a particular world perception that may be found again, remarkably, in the structure of the Indo-European languages, with the sharp separation between *subject* and *object*. ‘Man-

subject,' who continues to exercise 'magic' on himself (self-control), begins to exercise it now on the other type: 'man-object.' The domesticating 'magic' is exercised on man-object from without — and the *canons* are fixed by other-than-him. Liberated by this 'religious' bond from the need to domesticate man in himself, he can now dedicate himself fully to 'domesticating' nature: that is, to the *production of goods*.

The coexistence of these two social types in a harmonious society takes place by *synoecism* — contractual arrangement — following a 'war of foundation.' The sovereign god among Indo-Europeans is always both a *terrible* god — exercising a 'magic' constriction — and a beneficent guarantor of 'contracts.' From the Indo-European origins there was always a clear conception of this *social contract*, which found its most accomplished expression among the Romans.

Hence, it may be concluded from the previous example that, in the Indo-European world, primacy was given to real *creative activity* — subjectivity in relation to oneself. It cannot be said that this Second Man represents progress in respect of the First Man. There is only a *caesura*, objectively realised in the undivided, unified society of the first origins. But, at the same time, separation between types implies inevitably, almost as rebound, the need to reconstitute the *uni-totality of man* — not individually now but at the level of social collectivity. That is the reason for compromise and 'contract': from now on man cannot 'realise' himself other than socially — within a *community*. In Indo-European society, there is no 'mass' or just 'individuals.' There is one *people*, whose personality, genius, and aristocracy are the organs of expression, conception, and representation. *Mass* and *individual* are purely 'synchronic' notions that may be defined only in social space, and that lack any temporal dimension; in contrast *the people* participates fully in the latter.

Indo-European society may be defined, using Lévi-Strauss's terminology,[67] as a 'hot society,' characterised by the consciousness — or at least the *instinct* — of its own *historicity*. That is the reason why it carries within itself, at every moment, the past, the present, and the future, indissolubly bound. *Hot societies*, among which the Indo-European world would be the prime example, accept man's historical condition and, thanks to a higher degree of awareness, amplify the repercussions they exert on themselves and other societies. At the other extreme, *cold societies* react to

this ‘historical condition’ — ignoring it and attempting to make a previous stage of development as permanent as possible.

Strong due to the response they devised at that time, the societies founded by the Indo-Europeans were able to assume responsibility for the Second Man’s world. They carried the dynamics of the relation between domesticators of living nature and domesticated living nature to its ultimate consequences, before opening the gates of a *new future*.

III

My humanity is a constant self-overcoming.

— Friedrich Nietzsche[68]

Nietzsche's message was one of evolutionary change, of man's progress toward full consciousness. He taught that the whole value and meaning of a man's life lies in his participation in this progress, in his contribution to it: 'Man is a rope, fastened between animal and superman — a rope over an abyss. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal.'[69]

Man should not be merely himself and conform to his own 'nature.' He should still seek to give himself a 'super-nature,' to acquire a *superhumanity*: that superhumanity that Judeo-Christian monotheism's vocation is to prevent him acquiring.

The idea of attaining superior consciousness is one of breeding upwards to the superhuman. In his *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche wrote: 'My life task is to prepare for humanity a moment of supreme self-consciousness, a great noontide when it will gaze both backward and forward, when it will for the first time pose questions as to the *why and wherefore of humanity as a whole*.'[70]

It is furthermore the idea of the self-determined being: self-ordained to take integral charge both of the world and of himself, and to give them a new meaning, a new destiny. The discipline of philosophical anthropology has coined the term *Third Man* to denote this concept.

Seen in this light, the *First Man* would be identified with the evolutionary process leading to the development of the characteristics that distinguish hominids from other primates: hominisation.[71] His appearance would coincide with the invention of language, the development of hunter-gatherer bands and the use of magical shamanism, which would allow him to mimic the evolutionary strategies at work in the surrounding environment — and in this way to compensate for the instinctual deficiencies caused by his ethological plasticity.

Several hundred thousand years on, sometime after the last glaciation, there would emerge for the first time what can be described as the *Second*

Man. He is the inventor of the Neolithic Revolution, of agriculture, and consequently of sedentariness and the first human demographic explosion; the founder of cities and urban life, of politics, religion, the division of labour, and the development of so-called 'pyric technology.'[72] It is the world of the Spenglerian *Hochkulturen* — 'High Cultures' or civilisations. For the Second Man, the 'natural environment' has turned into a cultural environment. Not only is his environment influenced and shaped by his own presence, but the human factor properly speaking becomes inextricably interwoven with the purely biological in a combined action that exerts itself both on the individual phenotype and on the selective mechanisms that will determine genetic lineages.

Nicholas Wade writes in *Before Dawn*: 'The recent past, especially since the first settlements 15,000 years ago, is a time when human society has undergone extraordinary developments in complexity, creating many new environments and evolutionary pressures. Hitherto it has been assumed the human genome was fixed and could not respond to those pressures. It now appears the opposite is the case. The human genome has been in full flux all the time. Therefore it could and doubtless did adapt to changes in human society.'[73] From the studies Wade uses for illustration, it is shown that these changes include, among other things, the gradual spread, originating in Europe, of genetic traits that would have influenced the cognitive performance of our ancestors.

In a certain sense, history's major cultures represent grand experiments in eugenics and/or inbreeding. Not only do they begin with different populations, they also select, consciously or unconsciously, for different and — as Peter Sloterdijk remarks[74] — wholly artificial traits, in a loop that reinforces and develops their initial features in unpredictable ways.

The First Man epitomises the ability to mirror his environment and recast himself therein, and the Second Man the ability to modify and choose his own self — also biologically — by shaping his own specific environment. The Third Man then masters a process which has necessarily become self-conscious and deliberate in an environment which, at least within the Earth's biosphere, has become entirely artificial — even when intentionally designed to maintain or recreate the notion of an arbitrarily, culturally defined image of 'nature.'

To draw an analogy with computers, the Third Man will not only modify the ‘software’ of the human machinery, but will also act — self-consciously and directly — on its ‘hardware,’ its biological ‘cabling’ — paying particular attention to his own genetic identity through explicit choice in that respect.

In other words, if the cultural texture of the selective pressures and environmental influences that shape individuals and their communities is what determines the humanity of the Second Man’s phylogenesis and ontogenesis, in the case of the Third Man these processes are themselves *purely cultural artefacts*. When technologies emerge of computation, storage, and long-distance transmission of texts, data, sounds, and images, of modern medicine, and of engines running on physical and chemical energy, then our ‘extended phenotype’[75] alters both gradually and dramatically until transformed into a *cyborg* — or at least into a *fyborg*, a ‘functional cyborg’ as described by Gregory Stock in *Redesigning Humans*.[76] It is not by chance that the arrival of the Third Man opens a new perspective on eugenic self-determination, rendered possible and necessary by the new responsibilities now weighing upon us.

Our nature and identity are self-evidently shaped by our environment — biologically as well as culturally, and if anything through the varying reproductive success of our genes. Once the environment in which we grow and evolve — and the selective pressures acting on our genetic heritage — become altogether artificial, then it becomes clear that it is no longer just a matter of our being responsible for defining our environment in relation to a project. Rather, that project defines what we want to be: it allows us, in Nietzsche’s words, to ‘become what we are.’[77]

Man is clearly a borderline figure, a ‘stretched rope,’ and it is no accident that, for more than a century, the issue of going beyond man has become increasingly urgent. ‘Going beyond’ because this appears to be what ‘specifically human’ truly entails — at least for those who see such ‘going beyond’ precisely as human destiny. Elsewhere is found not only renunciation of the ‘superhuman,’ but also, as a consequence, of ‘human’ quality itself.

If this imperative has been long extant, it is now on our immediate horizon. This is both because of the new light in which we interpret man’s relation to his artificial environment, and because of the ‘quantum leap’

represented by the possible coming of the Third Man. The transition is taking place amid feelings of crisis and insecurity, experienced by everyone living today within a declining civilisation, incapable of mustering the strength needed to ‘steady the rudder’ and to monitor the process. The time in which we live is, inescapably, one of transition: an *interregnum* persisting beyond any economic or political crisis. The advent of industrial society, the control of nuclear energy, the ‘civilisation of machines,’ the invention of microscopes, the engineering of great hydraulic works, the invention of new materials, and the creation of sophisticated calculators based on electronic circuits — all these things merely represent aspects of this revolution, but they do not exhaust it. In fact, it is far more global, and it involves in the first place man himself. No single sector of culture, no single fibre of the human being will be exempt from this epochal change, which may be destined to last for centuries: no one knows what will be burnt, what will melt, and what will resist its ‘flame.’

It is not by chance that the coming of age of contemporary technology and the gradual emergence of *biopolitics* — a revolution that may see man ‘inherit the Earth’ and gain total responsibility for his physiology, psychology, identity, and composition — coincides with the expanding knowledge of our most remote history. Seen from such a perspective, the only precedent that might be compared with the paradigm change that is taking place today is, as already mentioned, that of the Neolithic Age — and, especially, how it intertwines with the response to it by Indo-European society.

Regarding this matter it might be useful to bring up once more the distinction between *hot and cold societies*, and to suggest some further anthropological subdivisions, depending on the way the Second Man reacted to the challenges of that time. One might then distinguish between:

1. *Societies that refused or ignored any sort of historical transformation*, thus heading more or less deliberately towards irrelevance and extinction. Examples might include the Australian aborigines and the non-Negroid native populations of sub-Saharan Africa (Pygmies, Khoisan).

2. *Cold societies* that tried to petrify early achievements in the form of endless repetition. As with the famous Aranda of Lévi-Strauss, ‘faithful to their tradition,’ such cold societies have become fossils of their ancestors’ history. They no longer evolve, except as result of external and contingent

‘events,’ under the pressure of external factors. They are at the mercy of any environmental variation that is not previewed in their programme. In brief, they cannot survive except under the condition of not meeting again the train of history from which they alighted. This is the case of most sub-Saharan and Amazonian cultures: they became the ‘object of history’ — of other cultures’ history — once they came into contact with them.

3. *Tepid societies* that were active but unwilling ‘preys of history,’ such as the Far Eastern, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and pre-Columbian civilisations.[78] The classic example is Japan, with a history marked by external influences which were simultaneously welcomed, rejected, and originally transfigured into what finally became Japanese culture — from the introduction of Buddhism in classical times to the Meiji Restoration after the end of the Shogunate.

And finally,

4. *Hot societies*: these became ‘subjects’ or ‘agents’ of history. Generated by *the Indo-European Revolution*, they took full charge of the historical dimension of man and have come to express its *heroic* and *tragic* character with a project of collective destiny that was consciously assumed.

In this broad picture, a final point should be made regarding the particular role played by the birth in the Middle East of an historical tendency — represented mythically by the separation of Abraham and the founding of Israel, and prolonged in a complex way by the other monotheistic religions. Jewish-Christian monotheism introduces a *split* within post-Neolithic society: while remaining immersed in history, it rejects the effects of the Neolithic Revolution, not this time from a *practical* standpoint — like cold societies — but from a *moral* standpoint. It finds driving force in the promise of an eschatological ‘end of history,’ and in constant ‘demystification’ of history’s creations — in particular through *reversal of the concept of the divine*. From instrument and projection of human creativity, and pride in the process through which the Second Man becomes master of himself and of the world, the divine turns into a ‘transcendent’ condemnation and relativisation of human adventure.

The religion of the Bible’s essential effect — if not its express intention — amounted to obstructing man’s capability to fully realise the powers of freedom and creative autonomy arising from humanisation itself, powers

that were historically reinforced by the Neolithic Revolution and the development of great cultures.

Precisely at the time the Indo-European revolution attained its maximum power and expansion, this messianic tendency — based on the moral rejection of history and civilisation — infiltrated the Roman world and reached a point of synthesis through the so-called ‘Constantinian compromise,’ giving birth to ‘the West.’ Step by step, it repressed the original European collective unconscious and corrupted the European culture of the time, transforming it into something hybrid. From the *two souls* living in Europe’s chest since that moment, the Jewish-Christian is evidently that which today, in its secular and more radical form, celebrates its global hegemony.

Against it, an opposed perspective began to take shape at the end of the nineteenth century: the idea of morphing historical consciousness into *self-consciousness*. From merely transforming the natural and cultural environment, the Third Man would assume responsibility both for the direct self-determination of his environmental framework and for human identity — environment and identity that today can only be ‘artificial.’ This means the process will take place only if underpinned by *human and political will*.

The Third Man will be, thanks to a dialectical bond, the negation and surpassing of decadent man — dejected by the egalitarian virus which a long Christian maceration had produced — and the metamorphic and suprahumanist resurgence of Indo-European pagan man. As Nietzsche said:

> All beings so far have created something beyond themselves. Do you want to be the ebb of that great tide, and revert back to the beast rather than overcome mankind? What is the ape to a man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just so shall a man be to the superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of shame. You have evolved from worm to man, but much within you is still worm. Once you were apes, yet even now man is more of an ape than any of the apes. [79]

Original Origin

Though it were proved that there never was an Aryan race in the past, yet we desire that in the future there may be one. That is the decisive standpoint for men of action.

— Houston Stewart Chamberlain

An image from Fritz Lang’s *Die Nibelungen* (1924).

I

'Indo-European'[80] is the term used to designate a language spoken at the beginning of Neolithic times and 'discovered' during the nineteenth century via the new discipline of linguistics — linguistics becoming a proper science in the process.[81] Since every language presupposes users, the discovery of the Indo-European language represented the discovery of a group of speakers — the Indo-Europeans — and consequently of a people and a civilisation whose true characteristics were brilliantly delineated by Georges Dumézil,[82] among others.

We know today, with some certainty, what was entirely unknown at the end of the eighteenth century: that an 'Indo-European' people lived in the remote past,[83] and that their language was the direct ancestor of a great number of languages spoken in both ancient and modern times. The Romance, Germanic, Celtic, Baltic, Hellenic, Slavic, and Indo-Aryan languages were and are among the most important of these languages. We also know, with no less certainty, that the Indo-European heritage has lent conformity, in a decisive way, to the cultures that gave birth to 'European civilisation.' This heritage still carries, at least through its linguistic credentials, a certain 'world outlook' which, although fragmented in its substance today, remains active as a constraining force of representation, giving structure to our mental framework.

Through the semantic roots evident in all the derivative languages, a certain way of life can be reconstructed — as well as the geographical position occupied by Indo-European speakers during the unitary phase preceding the first dispersal, probably around the third millennium BCE.[84]

Anthropology and ethnology indicate that these people manifested a precise, characteristic *racial physiognomy*.[85] Such a physiognomy anticipated the present Europid race in its varieties, concentrated today in Europe and in the countries whose populations migrated thither from Europe. It may still be detected today in particular strands of the populations settled in present Iran, and in northern parts of the Indian subcontinent.[86]

From the intersection of linguistics, archaeology, anthropology, and other related sciences, it is possible to depict this people — hunters of white skin, tall stature, and dolichocephalic crania. A people emerging from the fogs of the last glaciations, and coinciding with the beginning of the Neolithic Revolution and the introduction of agriculture into Europe, formed a *unified civilisation* which extended from the Baltic and Northern Seas, from the Danube and from the Rhine to the Königsberg-Odessa line. This civilisation was based on animal farming, fishing, and navigation, developed an advanced artisanship, cremated the dead, and used a supple, sophisticated language to express abstract thought and convey nuance. From the forests of Northern Europe, its descendants initiated the greatest of human adventures. In a succession of conquering waves they moved across the world.

From analysis of the religious, politico-social, ritual, and other generic cultural traditions extant in the historical civilisations born of this common Indo-European matrix, it is possible to form a global picture of our ancestral past — and roots.

Georges Dumézil devised the term *trifunctionality* to describe the character of Indo-European society — which comprised three main groups, corresponding to three distinct functions.[87]

The *first function* was associated with sovereignty — regal and priestly — and with everything that concept implies: power, knowledge, wisdom, magic, leadership of the people — and, consequently, politics, law, religion, and representation of the community abroad.

The *second function* may be traced back to war, struggle, effort, and physical strength in all its peaceful and bellicose aspects: defence and military requirements, sport and energy. It incarnates heroism, personal courage, spirit of sacrifice, readiness to action, and bravery.

The *third function* finds its original principle probably in the idea of fecundity — human and animal — to which the ideas of love, voluptuousness, and pleasure were later added. It is related to agriculture, herding, and the crafts; to economic production and wealth — and is identified with the idea of quantity and large numbers. This function was governed by the principles of temperance, moderation, and limitation.

Mythology was divided in the same way: each social group had its own god or family of gods to represent it, and the function of the god or gods

matched the function of the group.

Our ancestors practised not only a division of labour into three orders, or of society and the pantheon into three classes: the three functions present in man and in the cosmic order have been bound to innumerable facts and notions.[88] Those ancestors also theorised on this division and produced an 'ideology' (Dumézil's term): a global outlook on the forces creating and sustaining the world — on the balance, tension, and conflict necessary for the good functioning of the *cosmos* and the *polis*, the societies of gods and of men.

But surely every human group must experience the need to be led, defended, and fed; every individual must satisfy the needs of heart, stomach, and spirit. Dumézil responded repeatedly to those sceptics contesting the originality of the Indo-European trifunctional system. He argued, for example:

> In the ancient world, neither Egyptians, before they entered in contact with the Sea Peoples, nor Sumerians, Elamites, and Hurrians, nor Mesopotamians before the dominance of the Kassites in the area, nor in general Semites, Siberians, or Chinese have ever had a similar structure as the dorsal spine of their ideology and social life. One observes either undifferentiated organisations of nomadic tribes, where everyone is at the same time combatant and farmer; or sedentary theocratic organisations, where there is a king-priest or a divine emperor and a humble and homogeneous mass of subjects; or groups where the witch doctor, despite the fear his craft may inspire, is just one specialist among others.[89]

The structural, descriptive notion sketched above derives all its significance from the framework provided by a peculiar set of values. According to the Indo-European *ideology*, the good functioning of a society implies a situation of dynamic balance between the three classes or castes, corresponding to the three functions of the sovereign/sacral, the martial, and the economic. In contrast to our modern Western model, the economic sector was specifically subordinated — as viewed from a hierarchical rather than a functional perspective — to the other two functions. In this sense, it is legitimate to describe our present Western society as characterised by a pathological hypertrophy of the economic function, and the values and spirit that sustain it. The quantitative perception of social facts from which, along with much else, the modern idea of political democracy originates, here finds its source.

It would be easy — at least given the reductionist mentality that impregnates our culture today — to infer that the Indo-European ideology expressed a sort of contempt for the values of productive work, wealth, fecundity, or pleasure: that it practised exclusion from, and subordination to, the warrior and sovereign functions of economic activities. Nothing could be further from the truth. In the Indo-European ideology, the three functions are not reducible to each other: they are equally indispensable, and they have equal social dignity and full autonomy in their respective areas. The third function had a distinct identity and role that was as important as those of the other two: it had its own gods and participated in its own way in community life.

This predilection for differentiation was also reflected in the horizontal subdivision of society, which was structured not as a division between masses and individuals, but as a people whose genius, personality, and aristocracy were the sources of expression, conception, and representation.[90] Indo-European culture exalted such values as loyalty, sense of belonging, and distinction of roles. These values constituted the ethical, psychological, and political foundations of a system that favoured the assertion of such natural principles as hierarchy, selection, and territoriality, rather than their denial.

Hence, from remote times, political and social life manifests itself as extremely articulate — in contrast to those theocratic state organisations where the position of subject is essentially that of king's slave[91] — and based on the participation of all members of the social body, as representing the aggregate of free men. This organic participation occurred at different levels, starting with the **genos* (great exogamic families) and **wenos* (the community created by the alliance of several **genos*) and proceeding to an assembly of **pateres*, who would choose a *primus inter pares* to accomplish the function of **reg-s* (king) whenever there was need to find unitary guidance and representation for the whole people.[92]

The distinction of roles was also expected in respect of *gender*. The culture of our ancestors was indeed patriarchal, patrilineal, patronymic, and patrilocal. But as with the three functions mentioned above, this gender division sought to articulate a society which claimed to be complete. In this context, women were not only admitted as members of society but honoured in their particular domain:[93] the relationship between the sexes

was seen through a prism of complementarity, as expressed in the androgyne myth. This notion probably derives from a sense that a world view based on difference and inequality is one also based on the acknowledgement of diversity. Accordingly, the ‘other sex’ was considered an enrichment, rather than a ‘curse’ arising, allegedly, from ‘original sin.’

Women were fully integrated within the socioeconomic and cultural structures of the community and performed, among other tasks, the important one of transmitting the tradition. Similarly, *sex* was experienced as part of the dialectics of joy and sacredness — an attitude that would later be defined as quintessentially pagan. *Marriage* was founded on distinction of roles, on honour, loyalty, and reciprocal respect. Sexual freedom was not repressed or negated by the idea of sinfulness, but regulated by a natural sense of dignity, by a consciousness of the role one was expected to play in society, or by eugenic principles. The wife’s role was not perceived as inferior to the husband’s: there was no single, universalist, egalitarian, reductionist role to which everyone had to submit, regardless of sex, religion, or social position — in short, regardless of *identity*.

It is significant that Indo-European ‘patriarchy’ contemplates the active and necessary participation of women in family rites, while Judaism and the religious customs imported into Europe with Christianity forbid it: e.g., the consecration of the Eucharist. From the Jewish-Christian point of view, the mere notion of priestess is blasphemous.

Finally, to the Indo-European world applies the distinction between *shame cultures* and *guilt cultures*. While the latter are defined by a ‘morality of sin’ based on a system of revealed dogmas, the former bases its ‘ethics of honour’ on the idea of self-respect or ‘maintaining face,’ implying a direct bond between the individual and his socio-cultural environment. Shame and glory are the two main forces of social pressure and repression, as opposed to guilt cultures where that role is enacted by the notion of *sin*. While in guilt cultures, the blame is typically objectified by reference to a third supreme party — which is why they are linked to a universal and metaphysical ideological system — the Indo-European world view is inexorably bound to the notion of a plurality of gods. It expresses mythically both a radical anti-universalism and a cohabitation of men and gods: it presumes both a *oneness* and ontological autonomy of reality, and a *sacredness* of world and nature. The divine impregnates all nature,

including its human manifestations: for example, it is involved in *art*, excluding any manifestation of iconoclasm; and *politics*, rendering absurd a separation between church and state, or between civic and religious duties. Specifically, the divine is not extrinsic to man, but represents a dimension achievable through transcending the self — a concept captured in the exemplary figure of *the hero*, typically one of mixed human and divine descent, and founder of his own lineage.

This is because the Indo-European gods do not consider men to be their rivals. The great deeds of human beings aggrandise not only humans, but also the gods. Far from men being forbidden to achieve renown for themselves, such is the very thing that justifies their existence and earns them a claim to eternity. ‘My journey home is gone, but my glory never dies,’ says Achilles.[94] This is also declared in one of the more famous maxims from the Edda: ‘Men die, as do beasts, but the sole thing that does not die is the renown of a noble name.’[95] Whereas the Bible displays its intention of limiting human sovereignty by a series of prohibitions, the religions of ancient Europe bestowed a heroic dimension on the man who exceeded his abilities and thereby shared in the divine. Where the Scriptures look on life with a blend of distrust and trepidation, paganism in its beliefs hypostatises all the ardour, intensity, and pulsation of life. It is easy to understand how members of these cultural types — Indo-European and Jewish-Christian — viewed each other as atheistic.[96]

Based on the vigour and expansionistic strength conveyed by this ideological and conceptual patrimony, Indo-European culture became the matrix of all historical European civilisations. Its latest offshoots include ourselves.

II

The Indo-Europeans introduced not only practical techniques for the appropriation of the physical and biological world but also, above all, a new technique for organising socio-political and juridical relationships. It developed concepts such as '*genos*,' '*polis*,' and '*imperium*' — in their classical, medieval, or modern translations — and this constituted the *difference* that came to define Indo-European identity when confronted with other populations, cultures, and civilisations.

Such a way of organising society derived from a particular *Weltanschauung*. This world view, expressed in all fields of human activity, gave birth to a *cosmogonic myth*,[97] around which Indo-European man understood, explained, and organised the universe and history. Its unique character is better perceived when contrasted with the mentality and culture of the Book of Genesis. The latter narrative, in its religious and secularised forms, continues to obsess contemporary Western civilisation.

What is most striking when studying Indo-European cosmogony is the solemn affirmation, found everywhere, of *man's primacy*. Indo-European cosmogony places a 'cosmic man' at the 'beginning' of the current cycle of the world. It is from him that all things derive: gods, nature, living beings — and man himself as historical being. In the Indian world, the Rig Veda names him Purusha; his name is Ymir in the Edda; and, according to Tacitus, he was called Mannus among continental Germans. For the Vedic Indians, Purusha is the One through whom the universe begins (again). He is 'naught but this universe, what has passed and what is yet to come.' In the same fashion, Ymir is the *undivided* One: and by him the world is first organised. His own birth results from the meeting of fire and ice.

Kalidasa's poem *Kumarasambhava*[98] — one of the summits of Indian poetic reflection on the traditions of the Vedas — marvellously explains the *allusions* of the Indo-European cosmogonic myth. The opposition between Purusha (cosmic man) and Prakriti (which corresponds, approximately, to *natura naturans*) is revealing. Through being able to see without depending for this on Prakriti, Purusha is at the origin of the universe.

Since the universe is but indistinct chaos, devoid of any sense or significance, it is only by means of the outlook and word of cosmic man that the multitude of beings and things may emerge — including *man fully realised* as such. Purusha's sacrifice is the Apollonian moment at which is affirmed the *principium individuationis* — 'cause of all that exists and shall exist' — until that time when the world will crumble: the Dionysian end that is also the condition of new beginning.

The universe does not derive its existence from something not part of it. It proceeds from the being of cosmic man: his body, his gaze, his word — and his consciousness. There is no opposition between two worlds — between created being and uncreated being. On the contrary, there is incessant conversion and consubstantiality between beings and things, between heaven and earth, between men and gods.

In such a *Weltanschauung*, the gods are themselves a quarter of the cosmic man. They are *superior men* in the Nietzschean sense; in a certain way they perpetuate the transfigured and *transfiguring* memory of the first 'civilising heroes': those who brought humankind from its precedent stage — and truly *founded*, by ordering it into three functions, human society, Indo-European society. These gods do not represent 'Good' — neither do they represent 'Evil.' Insofar as they represent sublimated forms of the good and evil that coexist, as antagonists, within life itself, they are both good and evil. Hence, each presents an ambivalent aspect — a *human* aspect. This explains why *mythical imagination* tends to split personality: Mitra-Varuna, Jupiter-Dius Fidius, Odin/Wotan-Tyr, etc. In relation to present humankind, which they have *instituted as such*, these gods correspond indeed to their mythical 'ancestors' and ideal models. Legislators, *inventors* of social tradition, they remain present, are still active. However, they also remain subject to *fatum*: destined in a very human way to an 'end.'

In brief, we are referring not to creating *gods*, but rather to *creatures* — *human* gods who are, nevertheless, *organisers-orderers* of the world: *ancestral* gods for current humankind; gods who are great in both good and evil and who place themselves beyond such notions. On Olympus, says Heraclitus, 'the gods are immortal men, whereas men are mortal gods; our life is their death and our death their life.'[99]

What are labelled ‘Indo-European people’ correspond to a society which came to the fore at the beginning of the *Neolithic Age* and whose cosmogonic *myth* was organised by a new perspective gained at this historical juncture — a *perspective* allowing reflection on the prior belief system and its revolutionary reinterpretation.

If belief in a ‘supreme being’ — not to be mistaken for the one god of monotheism — was common to ‘primitive humankind’ — that is, to the human groups who lived at the end of the Mesolithic Age, the Indo-European cosmogony is a reformulation of that idea — or rather a *discourse* that explodes and overcomes the *language* and the ‘reason’ of the preceding period. It is legitimate to consider that, for the Mesolithic ancestors of the Indo-Europeans, the supreme being has become none other than *man* himself; has become, more precisely, a ‘cosmic projection’ of man as *holder of magic power*. Similarly, one may conclude that this particular Indo-European idea of the supreme being was not shared by the other human groups who descended from the Mesolithic Age.

The classical Middle East has ‘reflected’ — *imagined and interpreted* — the same set of Mesolithic beliefs in a manner diametrically opposed to the one taken by the Indo-Europeans. The Judeo-Christian Bible — *summa* of the religious Levantine *Weltanschauung* — stands at the antipodes of the Indo-European vision.

Yahweh has not extracted the universe by *subdivision* and ‘dismemberment’ of himself. He has created it *ex nihilo*, out of nothing. He is not the *coincidentia oppositorum*: the ‘Undivided Self,’ the place where all relative oppositions meet, melt, and surpass themselves. He is not simultaneously ‘being and non-being.’ He is being only: ‘I am that I am’ (Exodus 3:14).

Entirely alien to the world, Yahweh is the antithesis of all tangible reality. He is not an aspect, sum, level, form, or quality of the world. ‘The world is entirely distinct from God, its creator,’ the First Vatican Council of 1870 reminds us. Consequently, since the created universe cannot be identical to the creating god, the world lacks essence. It has *existence* only. More precisely, it is a being of ‘inferior degree’ — imperfect.

Indo-European polytheism is the complementary ‘reverse’ of what might be defined as mono-humanism or pan-humanism: man is the law of the world (*anthropos o nomos tou kosmou*) and the measure of all things. In

contrast, Jewish monotheism appears to be the conclusion of a process of reabsorption: reduction to unity of a multiplicity of non-human deities (personified natural forces) operated by Elohim-Yahweh. In short, it is the outcome of a mental speculation that also leads the plurality of things back to a single principle; not man, in this case, but matter and energy: 'nature.'

From being the one and only god, non-ambivalent, Yahweh evidently represents absolute Good. It is understandable that he often shows himself to be cruel, implacable, jealous. Absolute Good could only be intransigent against Evil. What is less logical is the biblical conception of evil. Not deriving from absolute good, evil should not exist in a world created from nothing by a god who is 'infinitely good.' The Bible tries to solve the problem by explaining away evil as the consequence of the revolt of certain creatures — notably Lucifer — against the authority of Yahweh. Hence, evil seems to be the refusal of a creature to play the role assigned by Yahweh. The power of evil may at times seem considerable. However, as compared to the power of good (Yahweh), it is nothing of the sort: the final outcome of the struggle between Good and Evil is never in doubt. All problems, all conflicts are already solved before they take place: history is pure decay, the effect of the blindness of impotent creatures.

In this way, from the start, *history is devoid of sense*. The First Man — the first humanity — has blundered in giving in to a suggestion from Satan. In consequence, he has declined the role Yahweh had assigned to him. He has picked the forbidden apple, and entered history.

Creator of the universe, Yahweh has also played — in relation to the 'current' human society — a role entirely antithetical to that played by the Indo-European sovereign gods. Yahweh is not a 'civilising hero' who invents a social tradition. Rather, he constitutes an omnipotence that opposes Adam's 'fault' — the sort of human life the latter wished to enjoy: a post-Neolithic urban civilisation — implicitly referred to, in the Book of Genesis, in the story of the Tower of Babel. However, long before this, Yahweh had refused the land's produce offered by the farmer Cain, and 'had regard [only] for Abel and his offering' (Genesis 4:3–5). Abel is not a farmer; rather, he is but a nomad who has abandoned hunting and survives from carrying out *razzias*. He extends the Mesolithic tradition into a new society — born of the Neolithic Revolution — and rejects the new way of life.

Subsequently, the mission of Abraham — the nomad who had deserted the city of Ur — and that of his descendants, will be to negate and reject, *from the very interior of the world*, any form of post-Neolithic civilisation, since its very existence perpetuates the memory of the 'revolt' against Yahweh. After Abraham, Moses maintains this commitment. Just as the people of Israel were able to escape captivity in Egypt, the whole of humanity is called upon to escape the 'captivity' of history. The law of Yahweh, handed down at Mount Sinai, is presented as the means of rescinding, once and for all, Adam and Eve's transgression.

Man, in relation to the 'god' of the Bible, is not really a 'son'; rather, he is a mere *creature*. Yahweh has made him, as any other living being, just as a potter models a vase. He has made him in 'his own image' (Genesis 1:27) in order to have his *steward* on Earth: the guardian of Paradise. The power man holds over the world is a power by proxy: a power entrusted to him that he may use only on the condition he not use it *fully*. Adam, seduced by the Devil, challenged the role that Yahweh had wanted him to play. But man will forever remain God's servant ('And said unto me, Thou art my servant, O Israel, in whom I will be glorified,' Isaiah 49:3). The superiority of man over beast is as nothing — for all is vanity. 'All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again' (Ecclesiastes 3:20).

Man, according to the teachings of the Bible, has to remember unfailingly that he is dust; that historical existence has the sense only of that implicitly ascribed when history is actively rejected.

'Roman' Christianity, born with the *Constantinian arrangement*, was from the start an attempt to establish, within the 'ancient' world transformed by Rome in *orbis politica*, a compromise between the Indo-European *Weltanschauung* and the Judaic religion, adapted to Roman imperial civilisation by the alleged efforts of Jesus. The *one and only* god became, through dogmatic 'mystery,' 'one god in three persons.' The old trinity that the Vedic Indians called *Trimurti* has been integrated and, broadly, these 'persons' have assumed the three functions of Indo-European society, now in an *inverted*, spiritualised form. As *creator* and *sovereign*, Yahweh nevertheless continues to reject the *dual aspect* of reality: evil is the exclusive province of Satan. The new name '*Deus Pater*' — 'eternal and divine father,' revered by the Indo-Europeans — is substituted for the old name given by the Bible. Yahweh is father only of his 'second person':

a *son* sent to Earth to play a role opposed to that of ‘founding hero.’ He is a son who decides to become *alienated* from this world in order the better to show a way to the *world beyond*, and who, if he renders unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, does this only because to him what belongs to Caesar is of no value at all. He is a son, finally, whose function is not to ‘make war,’ but to preach a *jealous* peace that will benefit only the ‘men of goodwill’ — the adversaries of this world — those to whom is reserved the only *nutrient* of eternity: the *grace* administered by the third ‘person,’ the Holy Spirit.

Man, as a creature — and as a created being — is the serf of God’s serfs: ‘excrement’ (*stercus*, as Augustine of Hippo put it). However, *at the same time*, he is also the brother of the incarnated son of Yahweh, which ‘almost’ makes him a son of God — provided he knows how to will and deserve it, something that depends on the grace the Creator administers according to unfathomable criteria. The day shall come when humankind will be definitively and eternally divided between *the saints* and *the damned*. There is a biblical Valhalla: the Celestial Paradise, but it is now reserved for the *anti-heroes*.[100] The *others* belong to Hell.

This compromise has for centuries moulded the history of what is called ‘Western civilisation.’ For centuries, according to the deepest affinities, ‘pagan’ and ‘Levantine’ man has been able to see — in the ‘one and threefold’ god — his own respective divinity. This explains the numerous confusions that have always characterised historical Christianity. The coexistence of two antagonistic spiritualities — often confronting one another, even in the hearts of the same individuals — eventually crystallise into a veritable neurosis of the European mentality.

Today we can confidently state that the Constantinian ‘arrangement’ arranged nothing, and that the day the motto ‘*In hoc signo vinces*’ was proclaimed had detrimental consequences for the Greco-Roman and Celto-Germanic world. Until recently, the Church of Rome particularly, and the Christian churches in general remained, as organised secular powers, attached to the appearances of the old compromise. However, in more recent times they began to recognise the authentic essence of Christianity. Hence, Yahweh, finally casting off the mask of luminous and celestial Deus-Pater, was rediscovered and proclaimed anew. In 1938 Pope Pius XI declared: ‘Through Christ and in Christ we are the spiritual progeny of Abraham. Spiritually, we [i.e., Christians] are all Semites.’

However, long before the churches reached that point, ‘profane’ (demythicised and secularised) Christianity, i.e., *egalitarianism in all its forms*, had found its path according to biblical truth. This was marked by the rejection of history; the proclaimed will to ‘step out of history’ in order to return to ‘nature’; the tendency to reabsorb human specificity into the ‘physical-chemical’; all determinist materialisms; Marcuse’s condemnation of art on the grounds that by integrating man in society it would betray ‘truth’; finally, the egalitarian ideology that wants to reduce humankind to the anti-hero model: the *chosen one*, hostile to any specific civilisation in that he wishes to see in it nothing but unhappiness, misery, exploitation (Marx), repression (Freud), or pollution. All this has invariably restored — still continues to *restore* today, at that precise moment when *a new technological revolution* is inviting us to overcome old ‘forms’ — that motionless, ‘eternal’ (if there ever was such) Judaic vision: *an unequivocal ‘No’ to any present pregnant with a future*.

Saying ‘Yes’ to history — ever-becoming, ever re-proposing new *foundations* — implies assuming new forms and content. Saying ‘Yes’ is *creation*, the work of art. ‘No’ exists only by denying any value to such work. The Indo-European cosmogonic myth reassures us that saying ‘Yes’ is *always* possible. In a *different* world, arising from the ruins of the old, the mission of ‘civilising heroes’ is eternal, and it assumes, serenely, the splendid and tragic destiny of one who *creates, gives birth to himself*, and accepts, as condition of any historical adventure, of any life, the idea of *his own end*.

III

Before the development of diachronic linguistics, the Indo-Europeans *did not exist*! The term ‘Indo-European’ may be used to classify fossils or bio-macrophysical remnants, and so doing might be considered appropriate in that history is founded on human biology. Nevertheless, we know that an *historical Indo-European entity* has never existed: no record has been found of a people calling themselves ‘Indo-European,’ or demonstrating awareness of possessing that identity. This is scarcely surprising: an historical fact finds its reality only at the level of *human consciousness*. The Indo-European fact does not enter history, does not become historical agent, until it is ‘discovered’: that is, until human consciousness, bound to a determined epochal perspective — a consciousness and a perspective which are ours — conceives it as the past of its own present.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Indo-European fact becomes such only in us and through us. It is the projection of ourselves onto the past; at the same time it is the *reinvented myth* through which we project ourselves into the future. If we were Marxists, we might say that the Indo-European fact, in its ‘mythical substance,’ is the theory of our praxis.[101]

Despite its topicality, the Indo-European heritage today seems ‘forgotten’ — sometimes deliberately — or even hated.[102] European schools today tend to ignore Latin and ancient Greek. The histories of Rome, ancient Greece, and Germania were acceptable within the old perspective: as long as they were considered a series of ‘events’ preparing for, or prefiguring, the arrival of Christianity and the egalitarian ecumene. Once it is known from where these ‘events’ derive as historical aggregate, and to where they might be heading, it seems preferable to ‘remove’ them.

The key to this deliberate removal, this wilful forgetfulness, is, again, found in the eschatological will of modern societies. The West drove its pagan Indo-European heritage (Greek, Roman, Celtic, Germanic, Slavic, etc.) underground. Paradoxically, it is this aspect of the Western legacy that, over the centuries, gave strength and resilience to Western man, and turned Western societies into ‘hot societies’: essentially dynamic, forever on the

move, animated by an historical will. Now it would seem necessary for such a type of society to disappear or, at least, to become 'cooler.'

Human consciousness is *three-dimensional*. Past (as memory), present (as readiness to action), and future (as project) coincide: memory is projected into the future, and is pursued through our actions in the present. Throughout the historical present, and in a conflictive way, man himself sets the laws that will determine his future. Historical evolution is deducible only in the sense that it can only be explained *a posteriori*. The past is not significant; rather it is ambiguous: it may mean opposed things, may reveal contrary values. *Each of us, from his own present, decides what that past may signify related to the future projected*.

Hence, history is not the reflection of divine will, or the outcome of class struggle predetermined by economic laws, or the natural pursuit of reason. Rather, it is a battlefield on which groups of men confront one another and fight under the colours of an image/ideal they have themselves assumed, and to which they intend to conform — thus *realising* and *overcoming* themselves.

Virgil stated, 'We make our destiny by our choice of the Gods.'[103] Any decision on the future is always a decision on the past — on the origins — and vice versa. The cultural battle today implies, as always, a *conflict of genealogies*.

In every present, history is, unfailingly, a choice between opposing possibilities. The end of history is one possibility, since at every moment man is free to decide against his own freedom, free to abolish his own historicity, free to put an end to history. This option is the choice made, conscious or unconsciously, by the egalitarian. The alternative is to opt for historicity: to choose a '*more original origin*,' as Heidegger was wont to say — which is also the 'origin of history.' It entails selecting our mythic ancestors, who have already chosen in favour of history. At the same time it means becoming the ancestors of a new, regenerated humankind — provided we have the *political will* and *technical capacity* to make that will effective.

According to this conception of time and history, Indo-European culture has for us an *exemplary* character: it has represented, against any temptation to abdicate and abandon the path of human adventure, a specific response — and hence an original and originative one among innumerable

possibilities — to the challenges humanity has had to face, given the situation created by the Neolithic Revolution. At core has been — as nowadays — the situation created by the enlarged power that, suddenly, man has acquired to transform himself and his environment. Similarly, the conditions have been unknown, risky, problematic. Hence, Indo-European studies, far from a sterile exercise of academic erudition, have an immediate political, existential, and cultural interest.

This legacy that we reclaim might seem limited: the particular outlook transmitted is merely one among many others. The same could be asserted regarding these other views. In a world where the *principle of individuation* is condition of existence, every existence derives from a limiting option. In that sense, the Indo-European heritage is — for us — that which opens a door upon the future.

The re-appropriation of our deepest roots entails, in itself, the rediscovery, valorisation, and defence of our *identity* as Europeans. By exclusion we may decide what is ‘originally’ ours — in the sense of being created by us, and in harmony with our own perception of the world, our own *psyche* — and what does not belong to us, but has been incorporated at a later stage, lacking authenticity and genuineness. If the two inheritances of the European world, Christian-Semitic and Indo-European, reveal themselves as irreconcilable, it is for us — the current heirs — to decide which is our own, original, and originative, and which is not.

Furthermore, in a world which has become planetary — and where Europe, at risk of losing its identity and independence, is condemned to transform its centuries-old ethno-cultural unity into an organic whole — the rediscovery of our common roots, of our affiliation with the Indo-European past, has immense *political significance* as foundation myth of a community of destiny of European peoples. A synthesis — political, ideological, and philosophical — capable of safeguarding European civilisation — can be articulated only by returning to the primordial source: to the cornerstone of European humankind — the core of our human specificity. There, the *archetypes* of our psyche can be reactivated anew.

This is far from an attempt to replicate or resuscitate mechanically something already dead. Rather, it is an axiom of the suprahumanist tendency, and its three-dimensional view of historical time. The *depth* of the desired transformation, and the greatness of the collective destiny, must be

in proportion to the historic depth one may assume as one's own. 'The future belongs to those with the longest memory.'

Within this conceptual framework, the historic depth constitutes a yardstick for measuring the *revolutionary degree*, the otherness of the new tendency. It defines, based on the extent of the 'roots,' the dimensions of the 'tree' the new world view seeks to plant; and those adhering to the tendency constitute the 'seed.' In this sense, *return to origins* contrasts with the nostalgia for the recent past, which characterised the Romantic movement, and also with the traditionalist attachment to 'that part of the past which is still present.' On the contrary, the roots which the suprahumanist tendency has made its own constitute a revolutionary[104] instrument for radical rejection of the present — in its actuality, past or possible and progressive future development. The dialectics of 'conservation and progress' are as strange to the new tendency as those of 'good and evil.' The suprahumanist return to origins is to be seen as *magical* inspiration for the possibility of a 'new origin,' and for the arrival of a new age of 'founding heroes.'

A genuine suprahumanism is *neo-pagan*[105] and *post-Christian*, rather than merely pagan or pre-Christian: *postmodern* rather than premodern.

This will to project another world into the future — to build it in the present — contrasts with Christian, Liberal, and Communist egalitarian *utopias* (literally: 'no places'), which claim to be 'rational' only to become chimeras that bring about misery and ruin. Neither is this project the fruit of an 'irrational' hubris. Rather, it is the re-appropriation by Europeans of their own forgotten soul, an appeal to Europeans to recover their deepest identity and to reconstruct a world view and form of civilisation of which they have been dispossessed by the egalitarian virus, century after century, since the Christianisation of Rome. It is a formidable historical challenge, but an attainable objective, provided there is a will. Its impact is potentially immense and goes beyond, though including, any devised political programme.

Indo-European roots are the source, the past of which we may be future heirs — but only if we dare to *become what we are*. For us, indeed, an effective response to the challenges of modernity must re-produce, readapt, and reinvent it: the Indo-European adventure. It is for this reason that we

project the Indo-European inheritance twice: as re-presentation of the past — and as imagination and re-creation of the future.

Areté

Now the great law of this world is, not to do this or that, to avoid one thing and run after another : it is to live, to enlarge and develop one's most active and lofty qualities, in such a way that from any sphere we can always hew ourselves out a way to one that is wider, nobler, more elevated. Never forget that. Walk straight on. Do only what pleases you, but only do it, if it likewise serves you. Leave to the small minds, the rabble of underlings, all slackness and scruple.

— Arthur de Gobineau

Psyche Opening the Golden Box (1903) by John William Waterhouse.

For Aristotle, the doctrine of areté included the following virtues: andreia (courage), dikaiosyne (justice), and sophrosyne (self-restraint). In Greek mythology, Sophrosyne was a Greek goddess. She was the spirit of moderation, self-control, temperance, restraint, and discretion. She was considered to be one of the good spirits that escaped from Pandora's box and fled to Olympus after Pandora opened the lid. The complex meaning of sophrosyne, so important to the ancients, is very difficult to convey in English. It is perhaps best expressed by the two most famous sayings of the Oracle of Delphi: 'nothing in excess' and 'know thyself.'

I

The tragic urge to *self-overcoming* has been identified as the only way man and his presence in the world may be ennobled, and this has become the primary element of our suprahumanist ethic. It is what the ancient Greeks called *areté*, the quest for excellence: the act of living up to one's full potential.

Since suprahumanism recovers and transfigures the founding myths of Indo-European culture, when it comes to specifying its particular tenets such features as the following might be listed: an eminently *aristocratic* conception of the human individual; the importance of *honour* ('shame' rather than 'sin'); a heroic attitude towards life's challenges; the exaltation and *sacralisation of the world*, beauty, the body, strength, and health; the rejection of any 'worlds beyond'; and the inseparability of morality and *aesthetics*.

Modern materialistic society is based on two principles: that nothing is worse than death, and nothing is better than wealth. In contrast, aristocratic society is based on the principles that there *are* things worse than death and better than wealth. Dishonour and slavery are worse than death. Honour and freedom are better than wealth. Trading wealth for spiritual goods demonstrates one's freedom from material necessity. Hence, transforming wealth into the spiritual — into honour, prestige, or beautiful and 'useless' things — is an aristocratic virtue.[106]

The term 'aristocracy' (*areté*) is used, throughout this book, in its etymological sense, and should not be confused either with 'nobility' — as a social class — or with 'elite.' An elite is merely a minority holding power within a certain society; an aristocracy distinguishes itself by ability to interpret and express a certain collective will, identity — or sovereignty. An *aristocracy* incarnates the spirit of an entire community, not particular class interests. Georges Sorel, without lapsing into paradox or oxymoron, speaks of 'proletarian aristocracy.'[107]

The highest value for a suprahumanist ethics undoubtedly lies not in a form of 'justice' whose purpose is essentially interpreted as flattening the social order in the name of equality, but in all that may allow man to

surpass himself. Since to consider the implications of life's basic framework as unjust would be palpably absurd, such classic antitheses as noble vs. base, courageous vs. cowardly, honourable vs. dishonourable, beautiful vs. deformed, sick vs. healthy . . . come to replace the antitheses operative in a morality based on the concept of sin: good vs. evil, humble vs. vainglorious, submissive vs. proud, weak vs. arrogant, modest vs. boastful . . .[108]

Just as life and death incessantly transform one another and are mutually essential, the same is true of good and evil. 'Good and evil are one and the same thing,' says Heraclitus;[109] however, they are not 'equivalent': they are *similar*, but not *identical*. They are similar because they arise from the same source. 'What we call evil is only another aspect of good,' writes Goethe.[110] Good may become evil, and vice versa; just as 'what was cold becomes hot, and heat turns cool, the moisture dries and what is dry becomes wet.' However, there is a difference between hot and cold — though one constitutes the *becoming* of the other. It is because evil exists that there can be good. Indeed, every notion requires its opposite. 'Darkness is the greatest enemy of light, and this is the reason why light is visible,' observes Jacob Böhme.[111] Both good and evil are necessary for man to experience himself, and to construct himself.

'What is good?' Nietzsche asks. 'All that *heightens* the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that power *increases*, that a resistance is overcome.'[112]

Evil is what prevents us from being equal to the idea we have of ourselves — what makes us fall short of rather than exceed our limitations — and it is ultimately degrading. Taking human diversity into consideration, individual as well as collective, how could evil be identical for everyone? *There are no absolutes; there are only truths relative to given times and places.* This by no means implies that 'everything is permitted.' Nor does it mean that ethics should be utilitarian, i.e., concerned with the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Rather, ethics are inseparable from a conception of the world that roots it within a collective substratum. Evil is not a matter of 'sin' or *a priori* guilt. Its determination is dependent on that to which we belong, and on the choices we make. 'There are no moral phenomena; there are only moral interpretations of phenomena.'[113]

Non-distinction of absolutes, any human ‘claim’ to establish itself as *founder of values*, these are what the Bible condemns most fundamentally. It is the affirmation of this ‘neutral zone’ that Heidegger — himself condemned by Lévinas[114] — makes a characteristic of Being. Paganism has never ceased tasting what the Bible calls the fruits of the tree of good and evil. It has never ceased to assert the conjunction of opposites, which Judeo-Christian monotheism, horrified, describes as confusing and chaotic. ‘Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil!’ declares Isaiah (5:20).

Since any statement, any truth is human — and since every human possesses a unique perspective on things and on the world — then any truth is arbitrary. Man must nevertheless affirm himself, and this is unrelated to nihilistic relativism. According to the egalitarian illusion, all perspectives should be equivalent, although this would augur anarchy and paralysis. From a suprahumanist standpoint, one perspective is *necessarily* superior to, of greater value than, another. The fate of humankind at any time must be enacted within the *widest* perspective — the highest, that which encapsulates all the others and organises them hierarchically within itself. That is the perspective of the superior man. Only if egalitarianism and the last man were to impose a general levelling of humankind would there be one perspective: an absolute and miserable truth.

II

One fundamental feature of pagan thought lies in the denial of *dualism*.[115] At the sources of Indo-European thought one finds an animated world, and one whose soul is divine. *All* creation comes from nature and the world. The universe is the *sole being* and there can be no others. Its essence is not distinct from its existence. The world is non-created; it is eternal and imperishable. The idea of creation, Fichte argues, is 'the absolutely fundamental error of all metaphysics.'[116] There has been no beginning; or rather, if there has been one, it was the start of a (new) cycle. God achieves and realises himself only by and in the world. 'Theogony' is identical to 'cosmogony.' The soul is a piece of the divine substance. The substance or essence of God is the same as that of the world. The divine is immanent in, and consubstantial with, the world.[117]

These ideas were under constant development in early Greek philosophy: 'The abode of men is the abode of the gods,' says Heraclitus.[118] Indian thinking on origins attests to a similar concept with its ideas of a cosmic Being, a universal soul (Atman), and a conscious infinity (Brahman). Again, there is no irreducible dualism, no true opposition, in the play of opposites that constitutes the field of our perceptions. Whether spirit and matter, conscious and unconscious, inert and living, day and night, white and black, good and evil, active and passive, it is merely a question of opposition between complementary and interdependent elements existing only in relation to one another.

The world is in a perpetual state of recurring conflict and flux of which man is an inextricable part — hence foreclosing the possibility of any human effort to arrest it, or to forge it into some paradisiacal stasis.[119]

Taken without apperception or any human representation, the universe is neutral, chaotic — devoid of meaning. There is no 'universal key,' no objective necessity at work in the universe. This is not to say the universe is doomed to absurdity. There is no meaning *a priori*, but man *may create meaning* according to his *will and representations*. Such power is at one with his freedom, in that the absence of any predetermined meaningful form is, for him, equivalent to the possibility for all forms. This conception of

freedom, as mentioned above, is tied closely to a three-dimensional conception of history:[120] 'nature,' the innate, and the past may *condition* man's future but they do not determine it. Within the semantic space between 'conditioning' and 'determining' lies our freedom.

The intuition that connects man's consciousness and mind to the world has, incidentally, found numerous extensions in philosophy and modern epistemology, ranging from the monads of Leibniz to the entire Romantic tradition to Teilhard de Chardin's particles.[121]

Today, the greatest imaginable establishment of meaning is that which announces and foresees the *regeneration of history*. However, nothing is written in advance. Nietzsche was the first to sense that historic moment when man prepares to achieve total domination of the Earth. It is from this perspective that he demands, as its necessary condition, a *transition to a new state of humanity* — which amounts to asserting that man may fully dominate the Earth only when he can fully dominate himself.[122]

However, Nietzsche also felt this moment was one in which Judeo-Christian discourse would attain its maximum diffusion and dilution: never before had the negative evaluations of man's autonomy, his ability to establish himself as *more than himself*, been as evident as in this time of demanding its overcoming.

With the establishment of Christianity in Europe began a slow process of *alienation*, in the sense that today everything lacks value or significance. Fundamental to this movement — approaching its end today — has been the coexistence in the European mentality of two antagonistic spiritualities. The death of the 'moral God' — which is nothing other than the *nihilism* spoken of by Nietzsche — signals the failure of this coexistence. What matters now is to push this process to its conclusion: to reach its dialectical reversal, and to *go beyond it*.[123]

The problem of our age is a problem of sense and of purpose, linked to a problem of forms — a problem of power accepted willingly by man in order to become a creator once more. Our task is to bring about a new dawn, a new horizon of sense. So doing involves abandoning a metaphysics in which God has created the world *ex nihilo* — in which God is the *primus* from which heaven, earth, and men arise — in favour of a philosophy of life in which man may bring into existence a God who awaits his call in order to attain full self-awareness. It involves no longer seeking an

objective ‘truth’ outside the world, but rather creating this from a new system of values.[124] It involves the founding of an authentic lifestyle that permanently encourages the excelling and exceeding of the self. Lastly, it entails giving birth to a philosophy excluding all critical approaches that have not first posited the approval of the world, all mental approaches based on exile or negativity: the eternal ‘*no*’ of dualistic monotheism.

III

What is the most important thing one can do with one's life: the proper purpose of life?

This question has found a common response in most suprahumanist thinkers, expressed in various modes — poetic, philosophic, scientific — but all stemming from the same intuition.

Oswald Spengler said: 'What we are called upon to do is to render the greatest possible meaning to the life that has been granted us, to the reality that surrounds us and into which Destiny has placed us. We must live in such a way that we can be proud of ourselves. We must act in such a way that some part of us will live on in the process of reality that is heading toward eventual completion.'[125]

George Bernard Shaw observed: 'This is the true joy in life, the being used for a purpose recognized by yourself as a mighty one; the being thoroughly worn out before you are thrown on the scrap heap; the being a force of Nature instead of a feverish selfish little clod of ailments and grievances complaining that the world will not devote itself to making you happy.'[126] The purpose is to serve the Life Force: to do all possible to make a more conscious, beautiful, highly evolved universe.

Schopenhauer taught that the solution to the riddle of the world comes only from a proper connection of outer and inner experience.[127] Since matter and psyche are but two aspects of a single primal reality, in continuous contrast with one another; since, as far as we know, mankind is the only form of life in which consciousness, as the last and latest development of the organic, has emerged; and since our evolution can hence be viewed in terms of the evolution of the cosmos as a whole: given all this we might further elaborate on the same intuition and assert, now in idealistic terms, that there is but one reality. It is the whole cosmos — purposeful, self-creating, self-evolving — which has both material and spiritual aspects, inseparably conjoined. Man is part of the whole, and his consciousness is one manifestation of a universal, immanent consciousness — Heraclitus' 'fire,' Aristotle's *energeia*, Goethe's 'primordial essence,' or Shaw's 'life force.' His natural purpose is that of the cosmos — self-

realisation — and he serves it properly by striving toward ever higher, ever more conscious levels of existence, biologically and spiritually. His ordained task is to advance, generation by generation, along a cosmic path of evolving self-awareness.[128]

Man surpasses himself only in order to find further means of so doing. He is, in the elegant simile of Meister Eckhart, ‘a vase that grows larger as one fills it and which will never be full.’ What is man’s role? To master forces in order to create forms from them, and to master forms so as to create forces; to resort to what within allows the individual to attain what is greater — and other — than him. ‘To create or be superior to what we are ourselves, is our essence. To create above ourselves.’[129]

It follows that the highest purpose of life is to forward the growth of a superior humanity, whose role is to rule a healthy world: to lay foundations for the outward cosmic expansion, and the upward evolution of humankind. What is of supreme importance is that our most recent technological developments enable us to intervene creatively in our own evolution. Formerly, man advanced blindly, driven by an immanent urge to self-realisation, self-completion. Now he must guide his advancement, continuing toward greater complexity — and finally to attainment of universal consciousness, infinite consciousness, or godhood.

Many anthropologists believe that the evolution of the human species — phylogenesis — is by no means complete. Today we possess the means — provided by what has emerged from biotechnologies, cognitive sciences, robotics, nanotechnology, and artificial intelligence — to steer the evolution of humankind to a higher level. However, our societies seem rather to be intent on *undoing* 100,000 years of human evolution. This indicates the need for a radical and sharp change of direction. The challenge is now at a political, philosophical level: the question is no longer of finding the know-how, but of gaining a sense of direction.[130]

To resume the ascent of that upward path that has led us from subman to man, and now may lead us from man to superman and beyond, is a biological, cultural, and spiritual task that will demand both individual and collective effort. The elevation of the human type will involve political action, and will, specifically, require particular attention to matters of education, eugenics, and technology.

What then is the meaning of life? Since man is nature becoming self-conscious, it is for him to establish the meaning of life. Since he is called upon to inherit the Earth, this new god cannot remain merely himself. Rather, he must become the fruit of conscious creation, of preference for the superman over the last man.

History and Genes

We must draw a sharp distinction between the man who sees the world as divided between the 'human' and the 'non-human,' and the man who is most profoundly struck by the obvious racial groupings of mankind (Nietzsche's 'masters'). The bridge that connects us to the Cosmos does not originate in 'man,' but in 'race.'

— Ludwig Klages

Maternité I (1962) by Pierre-Yves Trémois.

I

> *If I am asked where the most intimate knowledge of that inner essence of the world, of that thing in itself which I have called the will to live, is to be found, or where that essence enters most clearly into our consciousness, or where it achieves the purest revelation of itself, then I must point to ecstasy in the act of copulation. That is it! That is the true essence and core of all things, the aim and purpose of all existence.*
>
> — Arthur Schopenhauer[131]

Why Schopenhauer does not believe the almost universal preoccupation with sex is disproportionate is because what is at stake is nothing less than *the constitution of the entire humankind throughout all future time* — and this in the most concrete and particular terms: namely, the determination of the individuals who must comprise it. For any given individual can be the offspring of only two given parents, and of no other couple. Hence, the couplings of parents determine not only that the world shall be peopled, but specifically *by whom it shall be peopled*. This is far and away the most important thing most people do in their course of their lives.[132]

Since historical production has a biological infrastructure, all matters regarding love, sex, marriage, family, ancestry, gender, and race merit our attention. They condition society's genetic foundations: its ethno-anthropological identity; the number of human beings and their quality; the form of the family unit — and the social hierarchy.

It was said earlier that *culture* is not in absolute rupture from nature, nor can it be reduced to nature alone. Culture is the nature man has given himself in the act of humanisation, so as to 'pursue,' self-consciously, his *biological* nature.[133]

In practical terms this entails that, even given vast latitude for radically different cultural conventions, cultures are ultimately constrained by natural necessity. Cultures incompatible with biological survival perish. Once they become too alienated from nature, or transgress the outermost boundaries of natural necessity, they collapse.

It took Will Durant more than three decades to write his monumental work, *The Story of Civilization*. After finishing the ten volumes of the history, he wrote, in collaboration with his wife, the essay *The Lessons of History*, which reflects both his erudition and accumulated wisdom. The following are some excerpts from one of the chapters, 'Biology and History':

> So the first biological lesson of history is that *life is competition*. The second biological lesson of history is that *life is selection*. We are all born unfree and unequal. Nature loves difference. Inequality is not only natural and inborn, it grows with the complexity of civilization . . . Nature smiles at the union of freedom and equality in our utopias. For freedom and equality are sworn and everlasting enemies, and when one prevails the other dies. Leave man free, and their natural inequalities will multiply almost geometrically, as in England and America in the nineteenth-century under laissez-faire. Utopias of equality are biologically doomed . . . The third biological lesson of history is that *life must breed*. Nature has no use of organisms, variations, or groups that cannot reproduce abundantly. She has a passion for quantity as prerequisite to selection of quality. She does not care that a high rate has usually accompanied a culturally low civilization, and a low birth rate a civilization culturally high; and she sees that a nation with low birth rate shall be periodically chastened by some more virile and fertile group.[134]

Hence, human evolution is governed by *natural selection* among groups; and this, in turn, is based upon genetic and cultural selection among individuals. The sole ultimate test of the fitness and progress of a group's cultural-genetic make-up is whether it survives.

From a suprahumanist perspective, the scientific discoveries of the second half of last century — ethological, psychological, psychometric, genetic, anthropological, etc. — are of the utmost importance. They provide a positive element of 'realism,' which is necessary to demystify the ideas of man as *tabula rasa*, and also of a humankind set apart from the rest of the biosphere and internally undifferentiated, and whose behaviour, alongside individual and collective variations, would be dictated by purely contingent factors. Until the 1970s, these notions were largely taken for granted within human sciences.[135]

The two main pillars upon which liberal 'humanism' rested were: first, the idea of the supremacy of the individual human over everything else in nature; and, second, that each individual is initially, at least, a *tabula rasa*. Each man is born equally blank and equally interchangeable. Modern genetics have given short shrift to any lingering belief in a *tabula rasa*. As

for the first principle, it is to be argued that there is one thing in nature greater than the individual: a collective of individuals working for a common purpose and aspiring to a higher level of existence — a civilisation. The *primordial* and irreducible character of ethnocultural *identity* and differences is what specifically distinguishes human beings from other primates.

Furthermore, knowledge gained regarding the biological 'nature' of man must be taken into consideration in view of a later and deliberate development of a higher form of life: the superior man — the one who knows how to master himself, acknowledges his own animal nature — and respects it. *Naturam enim non imperatur, nisi parendo*: 'nature cannot be ordered about, except by obeying her.'

Guillaume Faye's recent work, *Sexe et Dévoiement* (Sex and Derailment),[136] is an essay about practices and ideologies currently affecting European sexuality and leading Europeans into a self-defeating struggle against nature: against their nature, upon which their culture rests. Faye speaks of a collective pathology whose symptoms would include: the death of the family, the devirilisation and feminisation of European men, the idolisation of male homosexuality, feminist androgyny, spreading miscegenation due to Third World massive immigration and colonisation — and, in general, to the loss of bio-anthropological norms and all that comes with the denial of biological realities.

The destabilisation of the norms of sexual behaviour, with the consequent decline in the birth rate and absence of generational renewal — aggravated by the miscegenation caused by mass immigration — may irreversibly transform Europe's *genetic patrimony*, its biological composition. There is a civilisation-destroying tragedy here: once Europeans cease to transmit their cultural and genetic heritage, they lose all sense of who they are. If nothing changes, at the end of the twenty-first century the inhabitants of Europe will no longer be Europeans: 'Europe' will merely be a geographic label.

We are here contemplating the final stage of *egalitarianism*: the denial of life itself and its differentiations.

The dogma that differences between men and women are simply cultural is derived from a feminist behaviourism in which women are seen as potential men, and femininity is considered a social distortion. In Simone de

Beauvoir's formulation: 'one is not born a woman, one becomes one.'[137] This type of feminism affirms the equality and interchangeability of men and women, yet at the same time rejects femininity, which is considered something inferior and imposed.

Like feminism, 'homophilia' holds that humans are bisexual at birth and choose their sexual orientation — as if anatomical differences are insignificant and all humans are basically alike. To the idea of the bisexual being corresponds that of the mixed-race individual. Neither man nor woman exists, neither white nor black, but a gray, mixed, bisexual individual.

Specifically, it is the individual and the couple of mixed race who become prominent role models in our society: they symbolise the end of 'racial hatred.' If this last obstacle on the path to universal harmony was removed, nothing would impede the peaceful unification of all humankind.

This utopian objective finds its origin in secularised Christianity and the dogma of the unique filiation of humankind. It is based on the naive view that men are of a nature and value transcendentally different from those of all other living beings, yet essentially equal to one another.

As was mentioned above, these views lack scientific credibility and resemble Lysenkoism[138] in denying those biological realities incompatible with reigning dogmas. Human beings are not equal *nec forma neque valore*. 'Humanism' is wrong in its spatial and temporal dimensions: the human species is diverse and unequal, both among its genetic groupings as well as among the individuals within them; and the human species is subject, as is all organic life, to the laws of evolution. Furthermore, the evolution of the human species — its *phylogeny* — is not yet finished. This last consideration — as well as the fact that life is a continuum, that there is a *gradual distribution among sentient beings* of awareness, of consciousness — is what offers the possibility of men evolving into suprahuman beings, ever more conscious of environing reality, and of their own existence.

However, facts have rarely stood in the way of faith or ideology — or, in the twentieth century, ideologies that have become religious faiths. The reigning egalitarianism is ever extending itself, wanting to force reality to conform to its tenets.

For example, contrary to present-day delusions, *bio-cultural homogeneity* is the best guarantee of social peace. Areas with high racial

and ethnic diversity — e.g., Latin America, the Middle East, South-East Asia — are plagued by conflicts. Such ethnic chaos guarantees an unstable society, prey to internal dissension and, in general, to the equation 'multiracial equals multiracist.' As Aristotle saw, heterogeneous societies are unsuited to democratic forms of government, or to social peace, and they oscillate between anarchy and despotism.[139]

In *Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism*,[140] Professor Tatu Vanhanen presents the results of an ambitious research project, concluding that 'the more a population is ethnically divided and the more ethnic groups differ from each other genetically, the higher the probability and intensity of conflicts between ethnic groups.'[141]

The most obvious lesson from Vanhanen's book is that diversity is not a strength. The white nations of the world, which alone have adopted this view, are planting the seeds of future conflict when they allow large numbers of aliens into their countries. The 'melting pot' is only positive when it brings together ethnic groups closely related to each other, members of the same anthropological family.

These considerations should not be seen as either a deliberate or a covert attempt to justify racial hatred or injustice, but as a modicum of common sense that should prevail among European people — both in the 'mother' continent and overseas — who currently face the most serious and deadly menace to their identity and their very survival, which has arisen in their entire history, owing to a toxic combination of multiculturalism, demographic collapse at home, and mass migration from abroad.

II

In the Victorian Era, the great taboo was sex. Today, whatever the label we attach to our age, the greatest taboo is race.

— Samuel Francis[142]

The Victorians virtually denied the existence of sex. Today, race is confidently asserted to be a mere ‘social construct.’ No one has any trouble admitting the existence of different races of horses or dogs; the same goes for races of plants, commonly called varieties. The taboo really concerns only *human races* and their innate bio-psychical differences.

A good example of this social fact is what happened to the well-known biologist James Watson, attacked because he recently declared himself ‘inherently gloomy about the prospect of Africa because all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours — whereas all the testing says not really.’[143]

What Watson said is a truism that has time and again been confirmed by empirical data.[144] The so-called ‘intelligence quotient’ (IQ), just like most quantitative and measurable characteristics within a population, has a bell-shaped distribution curve. As is the case with practically all characteristics that are determined by genetics, the bell curves that represent the various components of the same population, or of different populations, cannot be ranked. It is also the case that measuring other characteristics or abilities (e.g., running speed, resistance to disease, empathy, longevity) may and do yield entirely different bell curves.

‘What is really striking about the Watson affair, even more than its merits, is the extreme and paradigmatic meaning it takes on by showing how far and how deep has reached the blanket of conformism and *political correctness* which today chokes freedom of thought, speech, and research across the planet.’[145]

Watson is a Nobel laureate who co-discovered DNA with Francis Crick — a scientist whose towering figure has impacted the twentieth century. At the end of his career — free from concerns of tenure, marking, or funding; financially independent; author of many bestsellers still in print — all but

outside the political arena — he might be considered one of the least vulnerable of people, be it to blackmail or to the reprimands of the intellectual establishment. And yet, because of a passing remark, quoted out of context, he has been forbidden to give talks and to present his latest book anywhere in the United Kingdom; he has been pilloried by media all over the world; and has lost the (now nearly honorary) chair which he has held for over forty years in the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. Furthermore, he has been unconditionally and irrevocably condemned and ostracised by representatives of academia, by public agencies and institutes, and by scientific boards.

In their time, Hans Jürgen Eysenck and Arthur R. Jensen were at times attacked by a minority of politically active students, and they were prevented from speaking on a few occasions. However, the controversial nature of their research was certainly no obstacle to their being invited to public debates or to having their work published. In fact, few public figures, even among their most scandalised opponents, openly admitted to wishing more than that their ideas be challenged and confuted. As recently as 1994 Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray were able to publish, relatively untroubled, *The Bell Curve*,[146] regarding racial differences in intelligence, the implications of which were taken seriously, despite the ritual anathemas.

A race is, as Theodosius Dobzhansky argues, merely an abstraction of the identifying features of secondary Mendelian populations within the same species.[147] Today, genetic analysis[148] brings an original contribution to the identification and definition of racial identities: a contribution that adds to, rather than replaces, the traditional typological classification. Hence, it is perfectly true that ‘races don’t exist’ (and neither in this sense do species, families, genuses, phylae, or kingdoms), insofar as they correspond to no tangible reality. Rather, they relate only to taxonomic criteria which define, as is the rule in such cases, a model founded not on intrinsic characteristics, but simply on tendential, statistical, or deterministic differences that might exist in respect of an inclusive set: something which does not preclude ‘species’ or ‘race’ from being useful, albeit ideal, concepts — at least as useful as those of ‘ideal’ rectangles, triangles, or circles.[149]

However, there is more. Scandal takes place elsewhere. We now know enough about the biologically based cognitive and behavioural differences

between the races of humankind to be able to say, with confidence, that race profoundly affects and shapes cultural life. However, in this nothing anomalous is entailed. Having previously defined ‘human nature’ as *culture in space*,[150] it could hardly be otherwise. ‘Nature’ determines the *framework* within which culture may express itself; however, it does not determine its *form*. Hence, the relationship between race and culture is a *relationship of potentiality*. Race is the raw material of history: by itself *insufficient* to creating civilisation, but certainly *necessary* to so doing.

Race is not *static*. Race shapes and limits culture. However, once culture develops, it turns back to and reshapes its racial substratum in the light of ideas not dictated by biology. These ideas include, for example, conceptions of beauty and fitness that guide mate selection, myths and religious beliefs that regulate sexual behaviour, and moral ideals that promote the propagation of certain types.

Hence, in the case of man, as Stefano Vaj points out, the alternatives ‘innate/acquired’ and ‘nature/nurture’ are merely a journalistic mode of expression.[151] In evolutionary terms, it is clear that environment selects the variants found within a species, and allows genetic drift to occur through the reproductive segregation of subpopulations. With regard to the *human* species, its specific environment is always a largely cultural product.

However, cultures, in their turn — although subsequently transmitted by *memetic* diffusion — are necessarily the creations of particular people, whose identity and composition are hence reflected in unique and unrepeatable ways. Cultural characteristics are reinforced and modified via wholly artificial ‘feedback loops’ — thereby defining lifestyles, collective values, and correlatively differentiated reproductive outcomes for culture ‘members’; and such characteristics are differentiated as between cultures and societies.

Consequently, human races may be considered, to some extent at least, as artificially selected: as the work of processes of segregation and oriented selection applied by man to himself within a process of self-domestication lasting tens of thousands of years.

Today’s world is distinctive in that technoscience has brought these processes into consciousness and initiated debate about them. Hence, ‘they may be maintained or developed — perhaps up to and beyond the limits of

speciation — only through deliberate choice for biodiversity and *suprahuman* change.'[152]

This particularly worries such *humanist* thinkers as Jürgen Habermas. He warns against what he calls the 'uncanny scenario' of a 'genetic communitarianism' according to which various subcultures pursue the eugenic self-optimising of the human species in different directions, hence jeopardising the unity of human nature as a basis for all to understand and mutually recognise one another.[153]

However, such unity, unless as ideological aspiration, has never existed. It is merely an alternative proposed to our world — and for many unalluring.

Hence, our 'nature' is destined to become — and this in a novel and deeper sense than has been the case hitherto — the object of a culturally deliberate choice: the genetic groupings (races) of the future will arise from self-conscious selection by each cultural group.

III

Races began to appear with the First Man[154] — hominisation — and have come to embody particular biological and aesthetic preferences consolidated over the centuries.

It may be presumed that people began to adapt independently to different environments as soon as the ancestral human population dispersed, 50,000 years ago. However, skull types throughout the world remained much the same throughout the Upper Paleolithic period, and it seems that those typical of today's races did not appear until 12,000 to 10,000 years ago.[155]

The European race developed its particular characteristics over many thousands of years, during which natural and cultural selection not only adapted it to its environment, but also advanced it along its particular evolutionary path. Those races evolving in the more demanding environment of the North — where surviving a winter required planning and self-discipline — advanced more rapidly in the development of such mental faculties as the abilities to conceptualise, solve problems, plan for the future, and postpone gratification — than those remaining in the relatively unvarying tropical climate.[156]

Furthermore, recent genetic studies confirm the high degree of homogeneity in Europe, as compared to the rest of the world: altogether some 90 per cent of Europeans are descended from people who arrived in those areas north of the Mediterranean and west of the Urals before the end of the Pleistocene ice age. Only 10 per cent are descended from ancestors who came to Europe around 10,000 years ago.

As Nicholas Wade observes: '. . . it is tempting to see the origin of today's Caucasians in the people who lived in the northern latitudes of Europe some 20,000 years ago . . . these populations would have driven southward by the advancing glaciers of the Last Glacial Maximum. Since all but the southern fringes of the continent were converted to polar desert or tundra, the heartland of Europe would probably have been depopulated . . . When the glaciers began their final retreat 15,000 years ago, the former northerners would have recolonized the abandoned latitudes. In this way

Europe would have been dominated by a people originating from a group that 5,000 years before had been a small population at some northern extremity of the human population range.'[157]

In this case, genetics confirm the observations of the physical anthropologist Carleton S. Coon who, in 1965, declared:

> Despite their linguistic differentiation, which is a product of history, the living Europeans are to a large extent unified racially . . . let us momentarily disregard three variables: pigmentation, stature and the cephalic index. The first is influenced by light, the second by temperature, and the third by artifice or some unknown selective factor or both. What remains then is a continent of people who are much alike in most respects.[158]

The high degree of relative genetic homogeneity may also explain another curious fact reported again by Wade and pertaining in this case to the Indo-European question:

> The Y chromosome common among Celts has a particular set of DNA markers known to geneticists as the Atlantic modal haplotype, or AMH. AMH Y chromosomes are also found, it so happens, in the Basque region of Spain, whose inhabitants are thought to represent the original inhabitants of Europe.
>
> Given the similarity between Basque and Irish Y chromosomes, some geneticists suspect that people who had used Spain as a southern refuge during the Last Glacial Maximum started to move northward as the glaciers melted. Many may have traveled by boat up the west coast of Europe, entered the waterway between Ireland and England and settled on each side of it.
>
> The carriers of the AMH Y chromosomes presumably spoke a language like Basque or some other tongue belonging to the first Paleolithic inhabitants of Europe. So it is a puzzle that the chromosome is now associated with Celtic, an Indo-European language that spread to Britain only in the first century BC, along with ironworking technology and agriculture. The solution is presumably that the Celtic way of life became widespread in Britain mostly by cultural transmission, not by a large invasion of Celts. The cultural shift evidently included the adoption of Celtic language by the original inhabitants of the British Isles.[159]

As Colin Renfrew points out, there need never have been an Indo-European invasion in Europe in the manner of the Aryan invasion of India — an incursion into a pre-existing civilisation which was racially and culturally unrelated.[160]

Indo-Europeans (or Aryans) are simply the branch of mankind that evolved from Cro-Magnons (*Homo sapiens sapiens*) on the western peninsular area of the Eurasian continent. These Cro-Magnons may be seen as a 'quantum leap' in evolution: they were the first to develop a creative

imagination, as seen in cave art in the south of France and Spain surviving from about 30 millennia ago. They were the first to create sculptured ivory and stone, and their weapons and other technologies underwent a corresponding advance in sophistication. Cro-Magnons created the Aurignacian culture, which later developed into the Megalithic civilisation of the western Eurasian seaboard.

As ice retreated from Europe 15,000 years ago, these former Cro-Magnons from France and Spain spread northward and eastward as far as Russia, Ukraine, Scandinavia, etc. They colonised and exploited the banks of the Rhine, Danube, Dnieper, Don, and Volga so successfully that waves of population in turn returned to the western coasts, reunifying the Aurignacian culture. The process has continued ever since, and evidence of Mesolithic and Neolithic trade right across Europe is prolific. Later, these same people would develop and record their *Weltanschauung*, pantheons, and social structure — which were closely related, if not identical, and which would later be classified as Indo-European.[161]

Europe has undergone continuous development for 30,000–40,000 years: Perigordian, Aurignacian, Solutrean, Magdalenian, Azilian (marking the end of the last ice age), Cardial (start of the Neolithic Age: farming, domestication), Mesolithic, Neolithic (Carnac, Orkneys, Malta, Iberia, Stonehenge, etc.), and ‘Aryan’ — with Europeans starting to record their myths in the Bronze/Heroic Age.

The Indo-European hypothesis should be considered a continent-wide cultural shift: a crystallisation of mythology, politics, technics, and aesthetics. It resembles the Industrial and scientific revolutions, the Renaissance, perhaps classical civilisation itself. However, it is *more* significant and profound by virtue of being the first pan-European cultural development of which we have considerable knowledge.

Within Europe, people have been moving about, invading one another, for millennia; however, this movement has made no difference to the overall genetic make-up of Europeans.

Hence, Indo-European (or Aryan) is best considered a level of consciousness — that which Cro-Magnons had achieved by the time ‘prehistory turned into history’: *the Second Man* discussed in previous chapters.[162]

The Indo-European issue calls to mind a question posed in Switzerland more than five hundred years ago: who were the Goths? At the Council of Basel (1434), a disagreement arose between Castilian and English delegates over seating priority — which reflected international standing and prestige. The Castilian representatives claimed precedence on grounds of the antiquity of their Gothic heritage. Nicolaus Ragvaldi, a Swedish bishop and representative of the king of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (which were then united), rejected this argument, citing a tradition that located the homeland of the Goths in Sweden.

The racial-physical fact acquires historic value only when removed from its *naturalistic* inertia and inscribed in a *cultural voluntaristic* project.

IV

Hegel's remarkable description of the European soul repays quotation at length:

> The principle of the European mind is self-conscious Reason, which is confident that for it there can be no insuperable barrier and which therefore takes an interest in everything in order to become present to itself therein. The European mind opposes the world to itself, makes itself free of it, but in turn annuls this opposition, takes its other, the manifold, back into itself, into its unitary nature. In Europe, therefore, there prevails this infinite thirst for knowledge which is alien to other races. The European is interested in the world, he wants to know it, to make this other confronting him his own, to bring to view the genius, law, universal, thought, the inner rationality, in the particular forms of the world. As in the theoretical, so too in the practical sphere, the European mind strives to make manifest the unity between itself and the outer world. It subdues the outer world to its ends with an energy which has ensured for it the mastery of the world.[163]

Hegel is saying here that the European mind takes an interest 'in everything,' in order to 'become present to itself therein.' In other words, the European mind strives to know the whole — and in doing so know itself. The European mind 'makes itself free' of the world (or nature) — meaning that it rises above the level of the animal and sees nature as other. However, it finds itself in this other and 'annuls this opposition.' In brief, the European mind achieves consciousness of itself in its study of nature, of the whole. But from that study, it is the whole (God) that simultaneously achieves knowledge of itself, and completes itself. For Hegel it is not 'mankind' that does this, but European man specifically: all other peoples may only approximate to what European man accomplishes.[164]

Certainly, neither the modern West, with its scientific and technological achievements, nor the ancient Greco-Roman world, with its vast political organisation and sophisticated artistic, literary, and philosophical legacies, could have been produced by races with a low level of cognitive capacity. Furthermore, the dynamism characteristic of white Europeans — their inclinations to innovation, exploration, expansion, and conquest — is not apparent among most non-white races, even if their cognitive capacities are greater than those of whites.[165] This particular dynamism is the *Faustian spirit* which exults in its striving to find and conquer new worlds, to

perform noble deeds, and — in the words of Tennyson's *Ulysses* — 'To follow knowledge like a sinking star / Beyond the utmost bound of human thought.'[166]

It would be wrong to infer from the foregoing considerations a sort of intrinsic or moral superiority of the European race. Races and cultures are certainly not equal to one another, but all are superior to one another from their own perspective, a perspective that cannot be universally shared. Neither the 'objective' observer (every world view requires inevitably a particular perspective), nor the common framework of reference required to pass such a value judgement — neither exists.

The ambition to overcome oneself, the instinct to pursue the tragic destiny of man till its ultimate end — neither is an obligatory or universal category that establishes the superiority of European man, other than from the perspective of European man himself. Again, this might be better put in respect of one of the *possible* perspectives — for it was in Europe where its antithesis also came to fruition: namely, the system for the universal homogenising of the world, the end of history, the aspiration to return to Edenic, prehuman conditions.

In this complex world, diversity and natural differences are original, authentic, absolute. In this lies the true richness of humankind — and in the agonistic principle deriving from it.

Man measures himself against nature, and against *other men*. Societies compete with one another, and may be brought into comparison at any given time, depending on their respective success in those fields arbitrarily chosen to be considered. Among the latter is, in particular, *historical success*, which least allows itself to be contested, in that it translates into *facts*. If European civilisation has led to outcomes which other civilisations have sought to make their own, if European customs and habits seem to be a meeting point for the rest of the world, how might one not to see in this a mark of *practical*, if not moral, superiority?

It has been claimed — initially by Arnold J. Toynbee[167] — that the success of certain civilisations is due only to 'the favourable occasion,' to a sort of 'fair challenge' set to man by nature. However, if it is true, as suggested above, that man begins 'advancing' from a natural base, it is also true that not every man and every civilisation has 'advanced' in the same way and with the same degree of success. There is a fundamental condition

— natural and biological — of success of human civilisations. However, by definition the determining cause cannot be other than *human*, unbound to man's 'animal' side — the level of the species. Rather, it must be to man's 'historical' side.

The 'superiority' of European man is an historical superiority: demonstrated *a posteriori*, and at any time capable of being called into question by history *in fieri*. Man and history — though conditioned by a past that has brought about the present — may discover a new free future in the choice that ever exists between perpetual repetition of a given present — falling back into the purely 'biological' condition — and breaking the 'natural' framework: a perilous leap into self-overcoming.

The possibility of finding a truly advanced response to the challenges of globalisation in the direction of higher consciousness and higher forms of life, such passes through the survival of European bio-culture (race) as a collective agent of progress, the safeguarding of its unique characteristics, and its enhancement.

However, if new generations do not renew their bond with the *identitarian myth* — if they do not know how to actualise and bring forward a sense of a project that is recalling the past — Europe will not arise from its present narcosis. Ahistorical peoples are destined to perish.

The Artist-Tyrant

The dignity of mankind is in your hands; preserve it!
It sinks with you! With you it will ascend.
— Friedrich Schiller

The Venus of Willendorf (24000 BCE).

I

Art is the celebration of life, and the exploration of life in all its aspects. If life is unimportant — a mere diminutive prelude to the real life which is to begin with death — then art can only be of negligible importance.

As Richard Wagner explains in *Opera and Drama*,[168] Greek humanism was superseded by Christianity: by a religion which divided man against himself, teaching him to view his body with shame, his emotions with suspicion, sensuality with fear, sexual love with feelings of guilt. This life, it taught, was a burden, this world a vale of tears — our endurance of which would be rewarded at death: the gateway to eternal bliss. This religion was, inevitably, anti-art and anti-life. The alienation of man from his own nature, especially from his emotional nature; the all-pervading hypocrisy to which this gave rise throughout the Christian era; the devaluation of life and of the world — and hence, inevitably, their wonderfulness; the conception of man as not a god but a worm, and a guilty one at that: all this is profoundly at odds with the creative impulse and its subject matter.[169]

The importance of *the desert* in biblical symbolism is clear: a desert that erases all representations and rejects them on behalf of the invisible and the uniform. Yahweh's believer must consent to transforming the imagination into a desert, and this implies a ban on all representation.

Not only are depictions of *Yahweh* forbidden, but also images of all worldly things — starting, of course, with man, who was created in God's 'image.' It is not hard to find a clear *anti-aesthetic bias* in biblical iconoclasm.

Christian art began as heresy. Transported to an art-loving people, Christianity became a religion more artistic than would have been the case had it remained in the hands of the Judeo-Christians. However, this came only from a long, slow process. In the Christianity of the first centuries, iconoclasm was the rule: the Mosaic prohibition of image representation was widely observed. The idea of the great ugliness of Jesus was also widespread (e.g., Tertullian, Origen, Clement of Alexandria). Only when the Church, following the compromise of Constantine, became more pagan did the birth and development of a Christian iconography become apparent.

However, traces of iconoclasm may still be found in Byzantine ritual as well as Protestantism.[170]

Iconoclasm is also present in Islam, where the rare Arabic Muslim thinkers who concerned themselves with aesthetics tended to envision art only in abstract form.

The emptying of human representation goes hand in hand with the abandonment of human particularity and diversity, *for these are themselves images*.

Extensions of — and contemporary points of comparison with — the Mosaic ban on representation have often been sought, for example, in respect of *abstract art*, whose birth and development coincide, metaphorically, with that of structural linguistics and — experienced in concrete terms — with the internationalist ideal of the abolition of borders. 'An entire aspect of Western modernity finds resonance with the old iconoclast exigency, and from this point forward, thinkers of Judaic filiation actively intervene at the tip of this modernity to mark out where it is going, not truly in opposition to it but rather in advance of it.'[171]

A connection might be made between the *secular* ascent of biblical values in today's world and the depreciation of beauty that otherwise characterises it. Beauty today is often pronounced 'monotonous' — or denounced as a 'constraining' norm — if not reduced to pure spectacle accompanied by the rehabilitation, or even exaltation, of deformity and ugliness.

The contrast with the Indo-European world is striking. In the Bible, the beautiful is not necessarily good, and the ugly is not necessarily evil. It may even happen that good may be so precisely because of its ugliness, and, similarly, that evil is handsome precisely because it is evil. Lucifer is an angel glowing with light. The Devil will adorn himself with all the paraphernalia of seduction, whereas the arms of Yahweh, says Isaiah (53:2), have grown 'as a root out of a dry ground, without beauty or comeliness to attract our eyes.' In paganism, however, good cannot be separated from beauty; and this is normal, because the good is in *form*, the consummate forms of worldly things. Consequently, art cannot be separated from religion. *Art is sacred.* Not only may the gods be represented, but art is the means of their representation; and insofar as men perpetually assure them of representation, they possess full status of existence. All European

spirituality is based on representation as mediation between the visible and the invisible. Beauty is the visible sign of what is good; ugliness is the visible sign not only of what is deformed or spoiled, but of what is bad.

For the ancient Greeks, solemnity is inseparable from visual, tangible representation. It is through the fusion of the aesthetic and the sacred that religious sentiment attains its peak.

Like Wagner, Nietzsche gave aesthetics the highest standing. ‘The dramatic art work is likely to replace religion.’[172] He adds that we are already the images and aesthetic projections of the true creator of this world of art. As works of art we attain a higher dignity, for existence and the world are eternally justified only to the extent they are aesthetic phenomena.

The Rape of Proserpina (1622) by Gian Lorenzo Bernini.

II

The finest art is that in which the *aristocratic* (in the etymological sense: *areté*, rule of the best) principles of *culture, selection, precision, and simplicity* are embodied. This art can flower only in a society in which aristocratic order is observed.[173]

Art which sets out to appeal to everybody — to be totally ‘accessible’ — typically represents the lowest cultural common denominator, and hence is worthless as art. Similarly, art which strives to be obscure is likely to be worthless as art.

The best art is that made for a particular higher stratum in a particular culture, and draws on its deep traditions. There needs to be a canon of artworks which proclaims the standards to be aspired to and achieved. Artists will be trained within that milieu to the highest standards: they must first master the canon before they can contribute to it.

Hence, quality culture — otherwise known as *high culture* — is necessarily the product of an elite. Likewise the art of the masses — sometimes called *popular art* — will reflect those masses: of low intelligence, lacking willpower, ignorant of form, drawn to the lowest common denominator. When masses transform themselves into a community — manifesting a commonality of spiritual concerns rather than the divisive principle of material interest — popular culture becomes national: *folk culture*. The folk art of great peoples starts with depicting great personalities and events. *Das Volk* — which is entirely other than proletarian masses — is the totality of the political community: the sum total of the dead, the living, and those yet to be born. Only on the basis of a folk culture is aristocratic culture able to flourish.

Wagner’s operas are high art, and the stories collected by the Brothers Grimm are popular art; however, they are interconnected. Such interconnection represents healthy folk culture. Art, according to Wagner, simultaneously expresses and creates the essence of the *Volk* — the people. *The artist* is he who contributes to ‘shape’ the people, and who, by so doing, makes life more ‘authentic’ — in a Heideggerian sense.

Higher culture arose during absolutist eras — slave-owning Greece and Rome, the regal medieval and Renaissance, and imperialist premodernism. The modern capitalist era has brought about cultural decay. The ‘plebeians’ of Rome created their version of ‘pop culture’ as do the ‘plebs’ of all civilisations. The difference lies in the culture of the Roman elite being dominant — and hence of great distinction — viz. Virgil’s *Aeneid* and its relation to the Emperor Augustus. Today’s capitalist Western culture, which began its decline in the Victorian era, has come to elevate proletarian culture so as to make it a dominant trash aesthetic. Hollywood does not represent a high culture, or even a Euro-American culture. It does represent ‘plebeianism.’ It is the perfect medium for those adhering to international finance: ‘Big Business Art.’

Music has always been considered important by philosophers. For Schopenhauer, it is in music alone that we experience immediate apprehension of the ‘Will to Life.’[174] Music, then, is king of the arts, whilst architecture is ‘frozen music.’

Classical music has modes of construction that befit a culture of master builders. Comparison may be made between Bach’s Brandenburg concertos and the architecture of Gothic cathedrals.[175] In terms of ‘architectural’ composition, pop music is poor: more a simple dwelling, a hut — or even a cave decked out with sparse motifs.

Classical music tends to express refinement; however, it also expresses immense power — the sort of refined power that a true European government should express. Politics should be a means to express that higher power in all art forms.

Benefits Supervisor Sleeping (1995) by Lucian Freud.
Benefits Supervisor Sleeping held the world record for the highest price (U.S.$33.6 million) paid for a painting by a living artist. It was sold at Christie's in New York in May 2008 to Roman Abramovich.

III

Not science and philosophy alone, but also the fine arts work towards solving the problems of existence. Art is primarily a mode of cognition which gives us knowledge of the inner nature of things, in contrast with science — a mode of cognition giving us knowledge of what is observable. The two are not in conflict; they function in different realms.

What is life? Every genuine and successful work of art answers this question in its unique way. That is why the principles of art are inextricably bound to the laws of life. Hence, an aesthetic dogma may promote or depress vital forces; and a picture, symphony, poem, or statue is as capable of pessimism or anarchy, of being Christian or revolutionary, as is a philosophy or a science.

As mentioned above, 'the good, the true, and the beautiful' have been inextricably linked within the European psyche since Plato. As Goethe wrote: 'Beauty is the manifestation of secret natural laws, which otherwise would have been hidden from us forever.'[176] Hence, ugliness is 'false' and 'bad.'[177] It is the will to perfection which attains mythic form in immortality. As with the archer aiming his arrow slightly above his target, knowing that he may thereby actually hit it, *it is in aiming for perfection that we surpass ourselves*.

Aesthetics is connected not only with morality, but also with *race*. Nietzsche reminds us:

> Beauty is no accident. The beauty of a race or a family, their grace and graciousness in all gestures, is won by work: like genius, it is the end result of the accumulated work of generations. One must have made great sacrifices to good taste, one must have done much and omitted much, for its sake — seventeenth-century France is admirable in both respects — and good taste must have furnished a principle for selecting company, place, dress, sexual satisfaction; one must have preferred beauty to advantage, habit, opinion, and inertia. Supreme rule of conduct: before oneself too, one must not 'let oneself go.'[178]

Reason cannot tell us what is beautiful, what is good — and for what we should strive. It does not give purpose or fundamental meaning to our lives. Rather, it may help us only to achieve what our *souls* tell us we should try to achieve. Reason is a tool, a weapon, an instrument, a means. Why should a man live? Why should he shun death? He cannot answer, except to say

that he should live because he wants to — that he has an instinct to survive. It is in his genes, it is subjective — and reason has nothing to do with it. Ultimate questions, purpose, values — they relate to one's *nature*.

The human psyche, according to Carl Gustav Jung, has three layers: consciousness, the personal unconscious, and the objective or collective unconscious. The collective unconscious does not develop individually — rather, it is inherited. It consists in pre-existing forms, the *archetypes*, which may become conscious only secondarily, and which give definite form to certain psychic content:

> No doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of psychic development, where it is still impossible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic, Hamitic, or Mongolian mentality, all human races have a common collective psyche. But with the beginning of racial differentiation essential differences are developed in the collective psyche as well.[179]

Tradition is physically embodied in blood kinship. Every race has its soul, every soul its race. The phenomenon is genetic memory. The ancestral collective unconscious links us with our past and guides us towards our future (destiny). Memory and myth are inseparable: 'The original form in which experience apprehends past, present, and future as unity is created in relation to the *genos* (stirps).'[180] It was Dante's belief that our genetic memory can lead us to God via myth. This explains why the strength of every great civilisation, without exception, rests on an indigenous mythology.

Hence, the mission of all artistic expression includes the awakening of the 'racial soul' — the Jungian archetype. Good art is ever the expression of the organic racial soul. Its timelessness captures the hearts of all generations of that race-culture.

Furthermore, true art manifests the racial beauty of its people: it provides the members of the culture with a racial standard of true physical beauty.

Race dictates the sensual forms found aesthetically beautiful: this is a biological-spiritual nexus, and it relates also to reproduction: the drive to create beautiful offspring. The most highly evolved members of the race in terms of aesthetics are empowered to create those beautiful by means of art.

Hence, beauty, ethical excellence, and superior consciousness are interrelated.

In 1920, Knight Dunlap, President of the American Psychological Association, published *Personal Beauty and Racial Betterment*.[181]

Dunlap's thesis is that what is called personal beauty really inspires the emotional appreciation of the many qualities that make an individual a fit and healthy parent for a fit and healthy next generation of one's race.

Beauty is a measure of racial fitness for the future. Men and women long for it in their mates, even if they do not understand the nature or significance of that longing. The desire for a beautiful mate is an ineradicable, primordial urge. It is an instinctive part of us. It guides us on our recently interrupted upward journey to higher intelligence, greater strength and power — and increased consciousness and wisdom.[182]

Dunlap asserts that the preservation of beauty is inseparable from the preservation of all civilised values and progress. To lose one is to lose the other. Further, Dunlap warns that our civilisation is fostering increased human ugliness and a withering of human beauty so drastic that only radical and strenuous change may suffice to reverse the process.

What is personal beauty? Dunlap says that it varies distinctly from race to race, 'but the type which is highest in value tends to approximate the European type, wherever the European type becomes known.'[183]

What is personal beauty for Europeans? There are a great many markers of beauty applying to both sexes. In some cases, these are also marks of an 'advanced' race, from a phylogenetic point of view: characteristics which signify the greatest possible difference from more primitive forms.

Facial angle: from Edwin J. Houston, *The Elements of Physical Geography, for the Use of Schools, Academies, and Colleges* (Philadelphia: Eldredge and Brother, 1892).

Considering the profile of the face, one may note the facial angle: the angle, relative to the horizon when a man is standing normally, of a line drawn

from the greatest protuberance of the jaw to the most prominent part of the forehead. The average facial angle of the European race is the closest to vertical of any human race. Non-human creatures have lower and lower facial angles as we make our way from the more advanced to the more primitive. Less advanced and smaller-brained creatures (and races) have a lower, more sloping forehead (and hence less capacity in the frontal regions of the brain). More primitive creatures and races also tend to have larger teeth, and larger jaws which jut forward, hence making the facial angle ever closer to the horizontal.

A man or woman with a high or ‘noble’ forehead is better looking to us than one with a steeply sloping forehead. The latter we instinctively view as primitive and ugly, whether we use those words or not. The protruding jaw, so common in Africans and Australasians, or the underdeveloped chin and outsized nose common to some Semites, give — to European eyes — the human profile a convex and snout-like appearance. Hence, they are bars to beauty, as Europeans perceive it. We may not be conscious of the reason, but our instincts — our souls, perhaps — are telling us that the highly evolved is beautiful and the primitive looking is not.

The cast of expression of the human face may be the most important single factor in personal beauty. Even in classical sculpture, where the ideal of European beauty is literally carved in stone, and the entire nude form is revealed, it is still the sublimely high and spiritual expression of the face which arrests our attention more than any other single quality.

The face is the site of the most complex muscle structure anywhere in the body — with a complex nerve structure to match — hence giving our faces an extremely wide and subtle variation of expression. With the dependence of these many muscles on the structure, health, and current state of the nerves, it is unsurprising that much may be learned of the temperament, state of health, and intelligence of a man or woman by studying his or her face. The face and, to a lesser extent, the other parts of the body, offer a constant and multifaceted reflection of the brain and nervous system within.

Clearly, we find our instinctive ideals of beauty — not only as expressed in our sexual selection, but also in our art when uncorrupted and free — in these respects far outstrip reality. Very few embody all such ideals anywhere close to perfection. However, they are *our ideals*, and insofar as

these ideals are favoured in our selection of who will be the mothers and fathers of generations to come, they will indeed offer a glimpse of *unborn generations*: a glimpse of what will be; a glimpse of the future.

In modern society, it is the noblest and most intelligent and most beautiful who, effectively, sterilise themselves and beget the fewest children. It is the best among us who have the most urgent and difficult career tasks to perform, and the least time for children. It is, largely, the bright and the beautiful who are, in their prime parenting years, siphoned off to be used and abused by the 'entertainment industry,' and who are the most likely to be able to achieve the consumerist ideal of a life of trinkets, gadgets, indolence, indulgence — and childlessness. 'In our era, to the dull and the dark come the largest families.'[184]

Multiracialism also leads directly to the death of beauty in art. Different races have vastly different ideas of beauty. Michelangelo did not produce African masks. Chopin did not write rap or beat on hollow logs. John William Waterhouse and Jackson Pollock inhabited very different inner worlds. In a multiracial society, standards and traditions are abandoned. European standards are necessarily too 'Eurocentric'; no group may impose its standards on any other — nor even maintain its own traditions for long. In painting, sculpture, architecture, music, literature, and the decorative arts, there is no longer a 'centre.' The continuity of thousands of years is broken. There is chaos.

The film director Hans-Jürgen Syberberg considers the result of this unnatural perversion of European aesthetics to be the unrelenting preference of contemporary art for:

> . . . the small, the low, the crippled, the sick and dirt . . . the base as a strategy from below . . . the praise of freedom, of betrayal, of criminals and whores, of hate, ugliness, of lies and crime, of unnaturalness, vulgarity . . . The commandment of ugliness rules life as well as art.[185]

This is why — in the United States, for example — in place of Shakespeare, most universities are substituting courses in pop-culture — comic books, checkout-stand tabloids, rap ditties, advertising jingles — or trashy pseudo-literature by Jewish novelists such as Saul Bellow, Norman Mailer, and Philip Roth, with the pretentious scribblings of Maya Angelou and other non-whites thrown in for good measure. Georgetown University

now offers an English literature course on *The Gangster Film*, while Duke University has substituted *Melodrama and Soap Opera* for Shakespeare.[186]

The real danger of art for egalitarians is that it offers ideals and models, and those ideals — in classical European art — are not egalitarian ideals, nor are the models politically correct. If you are trying to prepare students to be rootless, cosmopolitan citizens of the New World Order, you certainly do not want them to come into contact with the undemocratic spirit of Homer or Shakespeare.[187]

From it all, a bland, offensive-to-no-one, make-it-as-cheaply-as-possible artistic ethos invades our lives from every side, coupled with an *avant-garde* which revels in the equally empty perverse. Again, as we begin to live in a society of ugly people, wherever we look we see ugly paintings, ugly advertisements, ugly clothing, ugly body deformations and decorations, and ugly buildings. A people disconnected from its own traditions of beauty — a people inundated with the bland and ugly, mingled with the weird and trendy and ugly — is sickened and greatly weakened.

When romantic love first strikes a man and a woman, beauty speaks loudly. The lovers may consciously think or say, ‘my beloved has beauty,’ but aeons-old instincts are at the same time saying ‘he is strong and wise and will make a good father; she is bright and fertile and life-giving and will make a good mother.’ They are also saying of the loved one that he or she is a fine example of my own kind: a perfect match for me.

Love, the only means of redemption, is also a principle which always leads to an ‘end.’ As the Wagnerian lovers Tristan and Isolde remind us, love and death are inseparable: they constitute the very essence of life itself. Love is not *caritas* but *eros*: sexual love; a fusion and transcendence of complementary opposites, of beings of the same blood — reunion and rediscovery which alone can engender the totality and perfection of human beings. *Life, of which love is the supreme law, is eternal alternation*: ‘all that lives dies.’ This is the law of life and so it must be for a being with consciousness of itself to accept and affirm life, without seeking refuge in forgetfulness or illusion: that is to attain, beyond life itself, the tragic dimension of history, to obtain true humanity — the ‘divinity,’ which no animal can ever possess. That is the message beauty and love offer us emotionally — by means of their most vivid representation, art.

Promethean Fire

I take eugenics very seriously, feeling that its principles ought to become one of the dominant motives in a civilized nation, much as if they were one of its religious tenets.

— Francis Galton

Launching Apollo 11 (1969).

I

The most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a posthuman stage of history. This is important, I will argue, because human nature exists, is a meaningful concept, and has provided a stable continuity to our experience as a species. It is, conjointly with religion, what defines our most basic values. Human nature shapes and constrains the possible kinds of political regimes, so a technology powerful enough to reshape what we are will have possibly malign consequences for liberal democracy and the nature of politics itself.

— Francis Fukuyama[188]

There can be no end of history without an end of modern natural science and technology. Barely ten years after the announcement of *The End of History and the Last Man*,[189] Francis Fukuyama conceded that his thesis was incomplete. He now predicts that humanity's control of its own evolution will have a great, and possibly terrible, effect on liberal democracy.

For those who do not share Fukuyama's value system, his pessimism on these matters cannot be but reassuring.

The world today is dominated by technology as never before. It is impossible to travel anywhere without seeing some manifestations of the technological wizardry that has shaped life on the planet today — particularly those innovations developed at the time of the Industrial Revolution.

One crucial — and typically ignored — feature of this astonishing technological revolution is that the great technological innovations which have set the pace for the entire world are exclusively the product of a tiny minority of Europeans.[190]

Following the Christianisation of Europe, paganism survived underground in several forms. It survived in folk beliefs and traditions;[191] in 'heretical' trends inside or on the margins of official religion that have

extended even into the present;[192] and in a collective unconscious that finds release chiefly in *music*,[193] and in *science and technology*.

One of the particular traits of Indo-European languages, already noticed in the nineteenth century by such philologists as Wilhelm von Humboldt[194] and Ernest Renan, was their implicit capacity for abstract thought — a precondition of any sort of scientific theory and praxis.

Renan was also the first to establish a connection between religion and ethno-geographical origin. He contrasted a 'psyche of the desert' found among Semites — 'the desert is monotheistic' — with a 'psyche of the forest,' characteristic of Indo-Europeans whose polytheism appears to be modelled on a changing nature and a diversity of seasons. He observed that the intolerance of Semitic people is an inevitable consequence of their monotheism. Indo-European peoples, before their conversion to Semitic ideas, never regarded their religion as absolute truth. This is why there is found among these peoples 'a freedom of thought, a spirit of critical inquiry, and individual research.'[195]

It is unsurprising that, for example, intuitions from within the more sophisticated of the mysticisms of the Indo-European East (Aryan Buddhism, the Upanishads) have been extensively corroborated by revolutionary developments in the natural sciences in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.[196]

Techne (technological development) — the appropriation and control of a surrounding environment via technology — may be considered a trait defining the 'specifically human.' It is inevitable companion to the progress of human knowledge; however, it also describes something that has been devised and developed in a peculiar way only in the Indo-European context: from the Battle-Axe culture war chariot to the laser and the moon rockets designed by Wernher von Braun.

In particular, modern technology is closely linked to the West — to a culture underpinned by a 'compromise' between Europe and Judeo-Christianity. In this sense, science and technology may be interpreted as arising from the impact of long-standing monotheistic repression of the European collective subconscious, and from the contradictory process of secularisation and emancipation to which this repression gave rise, and which began with the Renaissance.[197]

In *Man and Technics*, Spengler wrote: ‘To build a world *oneself*, to be *oneself* God — that is the Faustian inventor’s dream, and from it has sprung all our designing and re-designing of machines.’[198]

In a world where everything is dedicated to *becoming*, man is subjected to motion and change, and modifications occur either by chance or from the effect of unknown forces. Thanks to science and technology, the *Promethean project* consists in controlling these modifications so as to convert them into deliberate acts of human will.[199]

Possibilities for self-transformation have multiplied with the development of biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics, and the information society. Hervé Kempf argues that science is about to effect an epoch-making transition comparable to the Neolithic Revolution.[200] We shall be experiencing a ‘second great mutation’ — this time provoked by the developments of biology and informatics. Such a ‘biopolitical revolution’ entails the artificial transformation of living beings, and the humanisation of machines (quantum computers and biotronic processors), [201] together with reciprocal interaction between man and machine.

Technology of this level may provoke transformation of a *qualitative* type, manifesting to man his capability for self-determination — including of his own biology — and giving him the possibility of overcoming his historical tendency to see himself as a slave of God — or any of his secular equivalents — e.g., in the guise of determinism, moralism, and historicism.

However, what is unquestionable is that the planetary generalisation of European technoscience, after two centuries of industrial civilisation, has been profoundly disruptive: it has brought about global overpopulation, environmental degradation, genetic deterioration, and diminished biodiversity.

Modern technology increases exponentially the power man can exert over himself and others; and its effects — both beneficial and catastrophic — bring about the acceleration of history, and the existential anguish permeating our world.

However, neither technology nor human knowledge lies at the root of our distress — but rather the particular form in which scientific knowledge has been actualised.

Most of the inconveniences and dangers associated with modern technology are due to the uncontrolled release of its power. The egalitarian

ideology permeating the Western system prescribes that technology should be ruled only by impersonal economic or legal mechanisms, and/or be based on individual preference, so as not to give rise to the Faustian temptation.

Modernity is ambiguous.[202] Like the Roman god Janus, it presents two faces: one a Faustian, adventurous vitalism: a transformer of organic nature; the other a homogenising, inorganic ideology aiming to standardise the entire planet, bringing an end to history. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish two different modernities that appeared at the end of the Renaissance. A first — moralistic and devitalised, and corresponding to the narrow calculating rationalism professed by the bourgeois man, so well described by Werner Sombart[203] — underpins the irenic messianisms and other grand ameliorative narratives of modern ideologies. A second rationality, audacious and conquering, corresponds to an ascetic and creative rationalism theorised by Max Weber[204] — and underlies the great scientific discoveries. According to Oswald Spengler, this 'instrumental' reason is incarnate in a dynamic voluntarism characterising the Faustian culture of the West — which is affirmed as the 'most powerful, most vehement,' as 'a will for power that laughs at all temporal or spatial limitations, which precisely regards the unlimited and infinite as constituting its objectives.'[205]

However, according to the formula of Marcel Gauchet, even Faustian modernity leads to the dominance of quantity, to 'the Disenchantment of the World.'[206] Modern man, born into liberalism, individualism, and democracy, is the new Sorcerer's Apprentice: the hostage of an economic technological mechanism, created by him but now entirely beyond his control: a mechanism without soul, vision, goal, guidance: one which governs itself exclusively in accordance with its own growth and self-perpetuation, indifferent to human conditions.

Such is the fate of the Faustian spirit when separated from its founding myths. Torn away from such myths, its ethno-identitarian soil, its Indo-European matrix — conquering rationality succumbs to a petty, calculating rationalism, and to the dull ideology of 'meta-narratives,' or 'grand narratives': Progress, Enlightenment, Emancipation, Marxism.[207]

The only effective response is to make a *qualitative leap* — in accordance with a tradition and identity consistent with the scientific spirit

— and to establish a *superior level* of control and intervention.

The problems arising from the technological revolution can only be effectively confronted with *more* technology, power, wealth, and political will — and not with less. The history of the last century has shown that rethinking and redeploying the full potential of modern technology is prerequisite for any advance of freedom and power, and for any prodigious acceleration of that very technology.

However, scientific progress and technological development are moving ever more slowly, and the major technological innovations forecast for the end of the twentieth century have not materialised. There was a historic age, extending from 1860 to 1950, in which practically everything we use today was invented.

As Valérie Mérindol well illustrates, there are widely understood reasons for the constitutional incapacity of the market to invest in basic research, breakthrough technologies, risky medium term and long term projects, and, above all, *civilisational* projects.[208] On its own, capitalism is structurally incapable of investing in breakthrough technologies, or in making epoch-making decisions.

Techno-scientific creativity requires a climate of historical incandescence, a particular cultural atmosphere, a background of collective mobilisation — as demonstrated by the fertility of conflictive epochs. Stability, uniformity, cultural and political atomisation do not seem to favour its efflorescence or even its maintenance. A certain pace of technological development is scarcely compatible with the final success of a globalised, entropic, neo-capitalist system — and the end of history the latter would be destined to occasion.

The Jewish-Christian tradition — and the ‘grand narratives’ it produced — is explicit in the rejection of the Faustian temptation. Nietzsche remarks in *The Antichrist* that ‘such a religion as Christianity, which does not touch reality at a single point and which goes to pieces the moment reality asserts its rights at any point, must be inevitably the deadly enemy of the *wisdom of this world*, which is to say, of *science*.’[209]

Man must repress his ‘pride’: he may not eat the fruits of the Tree of Knowledge, lest he create instruments competing with the perennial nature created by God. It is sacrilegious behaviour, as the myths of the Golem and the tale of Frankenstein remind us. As in the past — when opposing

dissection — the Church now condemns contraception, genetic engineering, and biotechnological research in general.

In their *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno distinguish two kinds of reason in European thought. A first, attracting their allegiance, is purely normative: the reason of a 'meta-narrative' that imposes abstract standards, develops ethics of conviction, and is allergic to any will to power. The other is strictly 'instrumental' and bestows power on its user. It is scientific and technical reason, as described by Max Weber: it controls the forces of the universe and puts them to the service of man. The Frankfurt School, inspired by the biblical rejection of human power, portrays the second form of reason as 'Promethean,' and the source of all evils — from capitalism to fascism, from electro-fascism[210] to the destruction of nature.

The most recent supporters of these 'neo-Luddite' views tend to congregate today under the flag of bioethics.[211] The recent stem cell controversy is paradigmatic. Cloning — perhaps because its realisation is already in view — has become, in recent years, the primary target of the worldwide 'bioethics' movement, galvanising a strange coalition between conservative politicians, fundamentalist Christians, the Catholic Church, left-wing intellectuals, and environmentalists. All of them realise that gene technologies, welded to stem cells and cloning, might finally enable humans to decide their own biological future. With cloning technology it is now possible to genetically engineer a cell with a particular desired trait, to insert that cell into an egg, and to produce a custom-made creature. It was invented for precisely this reason. Stem cells have made such an outcome even simpler to realise.[212]

It is not difficult to see why egalitarianism is anti-Promethean. Every new advance in technology is an advance in respect of the ability of some to control others. If one considers, as in the Bible, Rousseau, or Marx, that it is an ethical duty to condemn the exercise of control or power — the *domination of man by man* — then it is easy to perceive that such epochal mutation as our societies are experiencing will produce new vertical division between man and man, and between society and society, just such as the Neolithic Revolution provoked: namely, (1) differentiation between the body of consociates and the aristocracies that came to exercise political

power, creating cultural forms and directing community life; and (2) the fact of certain societies coming to dominate others.

Today the system employs technology. It cannot do otherwise, and needs to do so to an ever-increasing degree. However, at the same time, technology presents problems and questions which the system cannot address. Hence the existence of various 'neo-Luddite' views and movements; restrictions regarding the circulation of information; proposals to compulsorily 'freeze' investments in GNR (genetics, nanotechnology, robotics); attempts to 'regulate' the Internet . . .

It is the case that nothing prevents the fracture of time in which we live — the *interregnum* — from accelerating the end of history as opposed to its regeneration. Such would entail the system — through large corporations and complicit public administrations — stabilising and reinforcing, by means of new biotechnologies, its own power as regards food, energy, and industrial resources, and channelling it towards ever greater social control. This would be achieved either by means of genetic manipulation of populations so as to produce planetary uniformity in respect of the human species — or by the rejection of any deviance which might be potentially destabilising.[213]

According to Gilles Lipovetsky, we are falling into 'hypermodern times,' marked by hyper-consumption and hyper-narcissism: the triumph of instantaneity, with the here and now predominant.[214] This would constitute the capitalist option for guaranteeing 'the end of history' via consumerism and hedonism.

The new technologies might then be instruments of a global 'market' en route to total exploitation and destruction of the planetary environment: merely preventing famine among an undifferentiated, uprooted, decadent, and overcrowded humanity; satisfying the petty hedonism of a decadent pseudo-elite; and perhaps pathologically inclined to artificially prolong the average lifespan of its members. In short, a scenario of progressive dehumanisation. Such a perspective, insofar as it might become entirely beyond control, would entail a catastrophic outcome for our species and the environment.

There is, in addition, an anti-capitalist, anti-technological proposal to accelerate the end of history. This has been successful among the most decadent circles of the extremes of right and left in Europe. It is founded on

‘return to nature,’ neo-primitivism, and the suicidal ideology of ‘degrowth.’ Degrowth would seek to renounce any hope, project, or ambition regarding our future.

The utopian ideology of degrowth attracts the same objection as pacifism. In the same way that a pacifist society — in a world where economic development is checked only by a struggle for scarce resources — would condemn itself to eternal servitude in every confrontation with non-pacifist ones, an economy committed to degrowth would shrink fatally where others did not follow the same course. Given Darwinian competition, its capacity to maintain political sovereignty would disappear all too quickly.

There is another possibility — beyond consumerism, ‘sustainable development,’ and degrowth. This would be to develop a *powerful economy*, only for it to shrink not through consumerism and individualism — from the scattering of resources on gadgets that quickly become obsolete — but with the object of increasing the will to life and the power of the community of reference. This policy would be capable of guaranteeing the maximum of freedom, sovereignty, power, and social justice — and the comprehensive ecological protection and recovery of the territory in question.

Any dream of independence and self-determination — individual or collective — any sort of political, economic, or cultural sovereignty — may be realised only through the technical means necessary for such ambition.

The essence of technology lies not in ‘accelerating progress,’ but in intensifying power. Modern technology constitutes, as Ernst Jünger argued, ‘the most powerful and least arguable instrument of total revolution.’[215] Technology offers man a surplus of power, and hence of freedom. However, how such overabundance of energy is directed — its purpose and use — must be decided by a human will. Jünger also observed: ‘As Nietzsche had intuited, we have reached that historical moment in which there is no other choice but either renouncing to our own humanity or to take in hand the *dominion of the Earth*. Nietzsche himself indicates what that means: *Übermensch*.’[216]

The challenge is inevitable, in that man — in one way or another — has extended his presence over the whole surface of the world, determining

with his actions, consciously or unconsciously, the ecosystem of Planet Earth.

The choice presents itself as between retaking the incomplete project of modernism, and cleansing it of any dangerous heroic deviance, or opting for a solar Nietzschean one.

If new technologies bring into play colossal forces never faced before, then *a new myth* is essential. The will to power that lurks in technology — latent and unconscious, present but hidden — may become self-conscious and dominant: a will without purpose overcome by a will with a project. Such would be a 'return to ancient Greece': to the reconciliation of science and philosophy, planetary technology and *poiesis*, instrumentality and spirituality. Sacredness would return to its origin — in human consciousness as integral part of nature.

The biopolitical and suprahumanist revolution, in its properly epic dimension, is nothing but the primordial demand for poetry of a world vowed to becoming. As Heidegger remarks, 'the inherent nature of technology is nothing technical, and instead claims an originary and originating *poiesis*.'[217]

In ancient Greek and in Latin, such terms as *techne* and *ars* refer to both fine and mechanical arts. Technique — the machine — is not merely useful or useless, safe or dangerous: it may also be beautiful, or even *sublime*. The sublime requires elements of power, scale — and risk. Separation as between engineering and poetry is a contemporary notion, and one that limits mental horizons.

Beyond doubt man today faces radically new challenges — problems that effectively reproduce the factors that gave birth to the Neolithic Revolution. They entail a transformed capacity to intervene regarding himself and his world: new risks and new responsibilities — a new adventure of which we, Europeans, *must choose* to take charge.

Regarding our future, all we know for certain is that it lies before us. We also know it is never possible to turn back the clock. Every invention contains the need for further inventions. Any fulfilled wish gives rise to a thousand others. Any triumph over nature stimulates still greater triumphs.[218]

'There may only be return to what formerly allowed us to confront new challenges, and to affirm ourselves. Our restless exploring of the world, and

the technologies derived from so doing, condemn us to making choices: they offer us power, but cannot direct us as to its use. Such decisions lie not with engineers, scientists or lawyers, but with *founding heroes*, poets — and with a new aristocracy that knows how to activate the obscure collective will of the community of destiny from which they arise.'[219]

Rejecting a postmodern, consumerist, narcissist 'best of all possible worlds' — and any neoprimitivist utopias — we may look for the advent of a postmodernity combining Faustian vitality and ethno-European rootedness.

Science is a domain which the European mind has monopolised, and technology a tool that can make man into a god. These must be especially valued by Europeans if they are to mount a primordial, Faustian response to life which can recapture and transcend the Indo-European outlook for post-Neolithic man. This may become the only way to create a world not *in*human, but *more* human — and even *more* than human: suprahuman!

II

Eugenics, the applied science for the self-direction of human evolution, is nowadays the object of Freudian, hypocritical repression.

Nevertheless, one may say that eugenic concerns are an implicit constant in most post-Neolithic cultures. ‘What come to mind are the practices that most disturb modern sensibilities: from Mount Taygetos and the Spartan *agogé* to the Tarpeian Rock in Rome, to the medieval exposure of newborns — to the *mabiki* (a euphemism referring to the trimming of the leaves of the weakest rice plants in order to allow the better development of the others) as practised by Japanese midwives until the Meiji Restoration, and beyond. However, in order to establish that practices for improving the genetic composition of populations have long existed, it is sufficient to think of typical exo-endogamic regimes in respect of matrimony, or of the incest taboo as guard against monozygotic individuals with harmful recessive traits.’[220]

On these matters, Schopenhauer wrote at the beginning of the nineteenth century: ‘With our knowledge of the complete unalterability both of character and of mental faculties, we are led to the view that a real and thorough improvement of the human race might be reached not so much from outside as from within, not so much by theory and instruction as rather by the path of generation. Plato had something of the kind in mind when, in the fifth book of his *Republic*, he explained his plan for increasing and improving his warrior caste. If we could castrate all scoundrels and stick all stupid geese in a convent, and give men of noble character a whole harem, and procure men, and indeed thorough men, for all girls of intellect and understanding, then a generation would soon arise which would produce a better age than that of Pericles.’[221]

The essential question of eugenics flares up with the advent of the Darwinian revolution, and of Mendelian genetics — which has long been considered one and the same with eugenics. This arose in anticipation of a very real dysgenic risk in modern times that ‘traditional’ selective factors would break down.[222] Few believe that the changes wrought upon these factors by modern lifestyles and medicine, and as a result of a decline in the

differentials that were once applied in reproduction, could improve the genetic pool of the community one identifies with.

In Galton's eugenics — founded upon the idea of evolution, and upon the assumption that human will is in some small measure capable of guiding its course — it is possible to see a first stage of the scientific realisation of Nietzsche's dreams.

In 1909, Maximilian Mügge stated, with the emphasis characteristic of Edwardian times: 'To Sir Francis Galton belongs the honour of founding the *Science* of eugenics. To Friedrich Nietzsche belongs the honour of founding the *Religion* of eugenics. . . . Both aim at a Superman, not a Napoleonic individual, but an ideal of a race of supermen, as superior to the present mankind — many of whom, alas! have not even completed the stage of transition from animal to man — as man is superior to the worm.'[223]

Galton, who coined the term, defined *eugenics* as 'the study of all agencies under human control which can improve or impair the racial quality of future generations.' The philanthropic motives that encouraged him to develop the new science are beyond question: 'Man is gifted with pity and other kindly feelings; he has also the power of preventing many kinds of suffering. I conceive it to fall well within his province to replace Natural Selection by other processes that are more merciful and not less effective. Natural Selection rests upon excessive production and wholesale destruction; eugenics on bringing no more individuals into the world than can be properly cared for, and those only of the best stock.'[224]

The significance was obvious. The moment had arrived when the evolutionary mechanism of *natural* selection should be superseded by a conscious process of *artificial* selection so that, as George Bernard Shaw was wont to put it, the way of hunger, death, stupidity, delusion, chance, and bare survival — natural selection — is replaced by the way of life, will, aspiration, and achievement — *conscious evolution*[225] — not merely on a temporary and local basis, as in ancient Sparta, but permanently and universally.

Breeding may itself be considered an early aristocratic technique. The *will to form* is an aristocratic principle which is manifest in the need to create 'distance.' Nietzsche's philosophy may virtually be captured in that word: the *distance* between caste and caste, class and class, man and

woman. ‘The aim should be to prepare for a *transvaluation of all values* for a particularly strong kind of Man, most highly gifted in *intellect and will*, and to this end slowly and cautiously to liberate in him a host of slandered instincts previously held in check.’[226] Indeed, modern technologies — especially biotechnologies — can be seen as developments of the aristocratic principles of discipline and breeding.[227]

It was reported in other Greek city-states that Spartan women were of exceptional beauty and fitness. This points to eugenics having aesthetic as well as military value. Hence, eugenics was of great importance to the Greeks because human beauty was one of the two basic elements that constituted their ideal of *kalokagathia*.[228] And human beauty arises from good breeding. A eugenic society may be discerned by the quality of its members. If they are tall, with good physique and handsome features, then one may be assured that a form of eugenics is in operation.

Evolution tends only towards evolution: the notion that it is inherently progressive is spurious. Similarly, a mutation — a ‘quirk of nature’ arising from chance variations in genetic replication — may be beneficial, harmful, or inconsequential, depending on the environment. However, evolution by natural selection is not incompatible with the view of eugenics which, unlike evolution, is a *qualitative* concept. Indeed, evolution by sexual selection is a component of eugenics.[229]

It was impossible to return to earlier Western social forms based on a hereditary aristocracy that had achieved their position by means of the military accomplishments of their ancestors. Hence, in the early twentieth century, one current of suprahumanism headed in the direction of developing a natural aristocracy based on intelligence, moral probity, and meritocratic social mobility. This was the heyday of eugenics as a belief system common among European elites — both liberal and conservative. An important component of this world view was an understanding of the genetic basis of intelligence and behaviour.[230]

Ultimately, the eugenics movement was shattered; it was a victim of the outcome of the Second World War, although eugenics was not expunged from polite society until the 1960s as an outcome of an energetic campaign by Holocaust-haunted egalitarian intellectuals bent on striking a blow against their rivals.[231]

However, before it was ‘cursed,’ eugenics had long been perceived — essentially until the 1930s — as a ‘progressivist’ theme, since it was linked to concerns about the evolution of society in general (and correlated with the latter ‘taking charge of itself’), to the extent that even Soviet intellectuals and scientists promoted its study. Of course, where the term was put into universalistic or moralistic terms, it quickly risked grotesque outcomes. These included a mania for sterilisation as a penalty and means of social control (the ‘Indiana Idea’), which was prominent in the United States from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the New Deal. This enjoyed the ultimate blessing of the Supreme Court, to the point of ridiculous bills for the compulsory sterilisation of car thieves, to Theodore Roosevelt’s timocratic proposals for selective breeding, and to the other more or less bizarre examples cited by Jeremy Rifkin in *The Biotech Century*.[232]

The issue of Nietzsche’s influence over eugenics has once again become contemporary. In Germany, the Karlsruhe philosopher Peter Sloterdijk[233] — politically on the left — has recently argued that, given the understanding existing in genetic science, the eugenic dream of ‘selection’ is now within reach. Sloterdijk’s use of the word ‘selection’ has horrified his colleagues, for whom the word evokes the ramp at Auschwitz. What most worried critics, however, was Sloterdijk’s argument that this capability should be exploited to *breed a new generation of human beings*.

Coming after Sloterdijk’s open letter in *Die Zeit* attacking Jürgen Habermas as the representative of an outdated humanism, suggestions were made that he was ‘flirting with fascism,’ which reveals the uncertainty and fear still evoked by the issue of ‘conscious evolution.’

The Sloterdijk controversy demonstrates the almost exclusively ideological nature of contemporary discussions of eugenics. ‘This has been accentuated by the increasing erosion, because of technoscientific progress, of the subjective costs of eugenic practices. Such costs have plummeted ever since the exposure of newborns, and the strict parental or communal control of mating gave way to the chemical or surgical sterilisation of severely retarded individuals, as well as to birth control. These have been succeeded by prematrimonial *anamnesis* — replaced, in turn, by prenatal diagnosis and genetic screening. In turn, these will be supplanted by IVF with embryo and gamete selection; and, finally, by direct therapeutic

manipulation of germlines. In fact, in respect of contemporary and upcoming procedures, the natural empathy for the individuals concerned operates in an entirely favourable sense — to the point of rendering unconditional rejection of eugenics an increasingly embarrassing and untenable position.'[234] Paradoxically — in view of the egalitarian, hedonistic, and individualistic values of the prevailing world view — this is the case *even* for 'humanists.'

According to Gregory Stock, statistics show that today 90 per cent of U.S. couples (Catholics included) who discover by means of prenatal tests that they are expecting a child affected with cystic fibrosis now choose to abort it.[235] It is reasonable to suppose that the minority of Americans who are currently ready to continue an already-commenced pregnancy with an affected foetus would be even smaller if it were possible to remove the disease from the embryo, and from all its descendants — to the benefit of all. So the spectre of State eugenics is destined to remain no more than that — given there is no plausible reason why legal enforcement of eugenic measures would be required. If anything, large enforcement effort would be required in the near future to prevent their generalised adoption.

Testing for congenital defects via amniocentesis is already accepted, and the debate over stem cells and cloning continues. Clearly, a form of eugenics will become reality, even if legislated against.

As Stefano Vaj remarks: 'There remains, however, the issue of socio-cultural, rather than legal, norms that will direct the utilisation of such techniques — from selection of the reproductive partner on the basis of genetic traits, to the selection and modification of the embryo. Here, again, emerges the potential for disaster in respect of the technologies in question — at least for those who care for the biological wealth and diversity of our species, not to mention its flexibility and long-term evolutionary capacity.'[236]

The hegemony of a universal, intercultural, mono-ethnic, standardised model, particularly through the cultural alienation of all the peoples inhabiting the planet by means of the current globalisation process, risks eugenics being converted from an instrument of communitarian self-assertion and self-determination to a merely additional factor of deterioration — together with the vanishing of genetic drift, and of diversification of selective mechanisms via a stabilised and uniformised

environment on a planetary scale. An entropic ‘end of history,’ as evoked by Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World*.[237]

However, this seems unlikely. The implicit destiny of modern technology is for a clash with modernity itself, in that it carries with it the temptation of history: its essence being to set the world in motion. In this sense, it is interesting to note a recent book, *Eugenics: A Reassessment,*[238] by Richard Lynn, Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Ulster. In it, Lynn summarises the main arguments for eugenics, and his conclusions deserve our attention.

Lynn argues that eugenics now consists of eight core propositions. These are:

1. Certain human qualities are valuable.
2. They are valuable because they provide the foundation for a nation’s achievements and quality of life.
3. Genetics substantially determine moral character, intelligence, and health.
4. The Western world has been in dysgenic spiral for the last 150 years.
5. Classical eugenics offers a solution to proposition 4 via both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ eugenics: positive to increase the number of higher-quality births (in terms of proposition 3), and negative to reduce the births among those of lower quality.
6. New and coming developments in human biotechnology may be used to do the same. Lynn calls this the ‘new eugenics.’
7. Eugenics benefits both nation-states and the individual, whether parent or progeny.
8. History shows that suppressing technologies that serve human needs is impossible.

The key issue regarding eugenics are which countries will develop it to its fullest extent and, if this should constitute a threat to Europe, how it might be countered. Lynn’s ‘wake-up call’ lies in his final section. Here he argues, somewhat convincingly, that the European nations are set to exit the stage of history, to be replaced by China — which will rule the world, perhaps

until the end of time. Why? Because the Chinese accept eugenics as a positive good and are unhampered by Western liberal ethical concerns regarding population control and genetic manipulation.

Francis Galton had already predicted in 1909 that ‘the nation which first subjects itself to a rational eugenical discipline is bound to inherit the earth.’[239]

III

Our zeitgeist is affected by a primitivist attitude: by a generalised and apocalyptic denunciation of European man's Faustian spirit.

Specifically, environmental transformation is universally frightening: matters pertaining to ecology or natural resources now arouse atavistic fears. Perhaps the will to knowledge and conquest is the *original sin* that will lead humankind to its self-destruction.

The optimism characterising liberal technocracy and messianic Marxism has vanished. The evolution of the means of production and of industrial society — a dialectical presupposition for overcoming capitalism — has come to crisis. Western liberals (called 'progressives' in continental Europe) rediscover Rousseau, the 'state of nature' which man should have never left, the ideals of a bucolic-Arcadian life, and biblical curses against science, urban life, and work.[240]

Apocalyptic science fiction and futurology — from 'global warming' to the 'convergence of catastrophes' or 'peak oil' — become successful genres. The idea of progress turns over into its contrary: optimism at all costs into *millenarianism*.

The study of the environment — or, rather, environments — in relation to the forms of life it contains, and the transformations that take place there, began at the end of the nineteenth century. Ernst Haeckel introduced the term 'ecology' in 1868.

Ecology, as any other science, establishes its own *technique*, allowing, and creating, a situation of appropriation and dominion of man over the studied object — in this case the environment, the ecosystem: *nature*. By semantic glide, the term ecology refers today to an ideology: *environmentalism*, whose proponents are pleased for it to be called 'ecologist.' The central tenet of this ideology — which is a transposition of Marx's predictions from the economic to a 'naturalist' domain — might be summarised as follows: Industrial society produces a set of ecological contradictions that will necessarily lead it to its own ruin in the near future.

Environmentalism commits an ancient error. It is an error based on the false, abstract, universalist idea of *nature* as (1) static, motionless, and

forever *given*; and (2) distinct from — in opposition to — man and *culture*. Environmentalists tend to ignore man, as a living being, constituting *part* of nature. The environmentalist view leads, necessarily, into a *paradisiacal* view of nature: purely intellectualistic, and typical of those living in a hyper-protected environment. Furthermore, it tends to deny the *dynamic* reality of the universe.

The very same discipline of ecology rejects this vision and shows how ecosystems evolve and decay: how ecological balance is, in reality, the result of different dynamics that may vary, and typically do so, without *human* intervention. Balance results from the interaction between (1) the struggle of all living species to survive and increase their numbers, and (2) the characteristics of a given biotope at a particular time. In fact, there is no prearranged and indefinitely self-sufficient *natural balance* in danger of being 'disturbed.'

The environmentalist idea of nature departs from the experiences of a world which, for millennia, has experienced man's formative intervention. In itself, nature is neither unpolluted, nor benign, nor apt for human life — merely 'adaptable.' Whoever imagines nature as a cross between orchard, zoo, garden, and golf course fails to realise how much he is conditioned by an environment which is already the product of human activity.

Finally, man is an animal species as any other, with the same 'right' to participate in the ecosystem as a seal or a penguin. That 'right' to participate according to his own 'nature' — that is to say, his *culture* — gives shape to himself and to his world, according to a certain world view, a certain *technique*: the appropriation and dominion of that which environs him. Oswald Spengler has shown how history, man's own nature, is based entirely on opposition to the 'purely natural.'[241]

Such philosophical considerations, however, should not — and cannot — hide the extremely serious environmental problems facing contemporary society. The challenge, however, is not to achieve the *dominion* of man over nature, but to bear in mind that any dominion must carry a condition, which is *protection*. Being 'on top' carries responsibility for those below. Any freedom, through offering the possibility of choice, entails risk. Any dominion must carry corresponding responsibility. Man has at his disposal a power over the environment unknown until now. It may also entail an unpredictable measure of destruction.

It should be evident that man needs to preserve the *capital* which his own environment — together with related natural resources — represents for him, and to avoid its dilapidation in the space of one generation for purposes of immediate consumption. Contemporary society is oriented in precisely the opposite direction. The system — commercial- and market-oriented — is constitutionally incapable of perceiving value unless it is immediately calculable in economic terms: translated in the short term into an increase of purchasing power. This handicap prevents Western civilisation from foreseeing not only the costs the ‘standard of living’ may exact in terms of mental health or environmental degradation, but even the very same economic costs generated by the lack of an organic environmental policy.

It will not be possible to end this situation and to carry out a consciously organic and effective intervention through an (unlikely) programme of social pedagogics. Only when European society is capable of expressing a political will, and becomes again a subject — rather than an object — of history; only when the political domain is restored to its proper place above today’s economic and financial dictatorship; only with such conditions met will it be possible to devise proper policies on environmental issues, natural resources, and energy self-sufficiency. Any state fully integrated into the Western system, with its free-market liberalism and commercial mentality, has the same chance of making an impact in this domain as does a private individual full of good intentions: precisely none.

In fact, the entire cultural milieu gives signs of profound unsuitability in respect of facing the present challenge. The hegemony of deterministic ideologies — optimistic or pessimistic as they might be — and the corresponding erosion of sense of responsibility produced; and the mediocre hedonism characterising our societies — these represent so many obstacles for the adoption of a different attitude. The present paradigm tends to destroy environmentally both the past (roots) and the future of the community (territory, capital, and ethnic resources).

Scientific progress in the environmental domain gives us the opportunity to intervene: not only to protect the ecosystem but to transform it, according to our intentions, on a scale unimaginable until now. Our rejection of both primitivist ecologism and of the blind greed and plunder of large corporations is based on the notion that environmental protection and

technological development and expansion are not mutually contradictory but rather are mutual preconditions.

Pollution began when man first made fire: when *technique* allowed the exploitation of energy sources. From then on, technological progress and energy consumption have never ceased to accelerate. Until very recently, health conditions and quality of life have improved in proportion with the level of energy consumption and technological development. Now, however, further increase in energy consumption may reverse the process, due to high levels of pollution and environmental degradation which reduce the welfare of individuals and nations.

Another hypothesis may perhaps be formulated: technological progress and energy production, accelerated and directed by the right political will, may erase the very inconvenience and degradation they cause today and threaten to cause in the near future. With proper organic environmental policy and precise and determined will, it is possible to advance much further along the right path.

The First Man was immersed in his natural environment; the Second Man had to take into consideration the consequences of his own presence in that environment; the Third Man lives in a wholly cultural environment: he is fully responsible for its balance, aspect, and compatibility with human life — everything depends on him and his choices. Once the ‘natural’ environment has forever disappeared — and this is so on our planet at least — a park or garden become as ‘artificial’ as a factory or a temple, and such may come into existence — or be maintained — only on condition there exists a *political will*, and the *technical capacity* to apply that will effectively.

Environmental degradation and ecological catastrophe are not consequence of the development of technology, nor will they be avoided by limiting its use. They are collateral products of transition into the Third Man, and the persistent delusion that decisions on such matters may be entrusted to impersonal and ‘rational’ mechanisms, of legal or economic kinds.

It may be possible to imagine environmental policy that has more ambitious goals than merely assurance of the basic conditions for survival of the human species. For example: the maintenance of biodiversity, or the creation of rich differentiated ecosystems, for symbolic, affective, and/or

aesthetic reasons. The extreme limit of such discourse would be *terraforming*: millennial projects destined to transform environmental conditions and to create new ecologies.

We must not forget that our situation as a species in the universe is more precarious than we commonly accept. It behoves us to evolve in knowledge and power, and to secure command of possible environments as quickly as possible.[242] This may involve 'genetic engineering,' or it may be achieved as by-product of solar system colonisation and terraforming.

Environmental problems are real. The issue is not to know who is for or against pollution, environmental degradation, or global warming. Nobody is *for* these things. We need to know whether solutions to the problems caused by the transformation of the environment may be found going *forward* and 'surpassing,' or *backward* into 'regression.' The 'naturalist' illusion maintains that man should stop transforming the world. The suprahumanist position urges that man transform himself in order to retake possession of the world transformed by him.

Nature as abstract entity has no existence independent of its manifestations: ourselves. Nature is us. Life is an aristocratic pyramidal structure. We cannot survive without earth, water, air . . . At the same time, every community, every organisation needs leadership. Man as a species is the highest organic form on Earth. Who should direct the Earth if not he? We cannot acknowledge a higher agency; we have all responsibility regarding this planet. Not by letting things take a 'natural course' — or by trying to return to a utopian 'state of nature' — will the environmental problems be solved.

All questions concerning knowledge and direct manipulation of the landscape of Planet Earth, of the living species that inhabit it, and, in particular, of man himself, may be effectively confronted only by a capacity for political projection that involves a bigger rather than a smaller degree of technology, and of dominion of man over man and over his environment.

Europe, the Land of Our Sons

Europeans do not know how to live unless they are engaged in some great enterprise. When this is lacking, they grow petty and feeble and their souls disintegrate.

— José Ortega y Gasset

Hadrian’s Villa at Tivoli, Italy.

I

According to Plato, the *quest for spiritual domination* is the essence of politics.

The Bible does not acknowledge any political specificity. In the perspective it establishes, politics is continually brought back to morality, sovereignty to the law. The sovereign political power exercised by men cannot possess the slightest tinge of divine nature; only Yahweh is sovereign. Subsequently, justice is entirely distinct from power. It will provide happiness: men will be 'happy' when the justice of Yahweh reigns. It is the *judges* and the *prophets* — not the *kings* — who represent the political ideal of the Bible. The great king is neither a builder nor a conqueror. He governs according to the Bible, and strives to realise the moral ideals of the Torah.[243]

This is how the biblical model has inspired the principles of the 'limitation of powers,' and of the submission of politics to the judiciary: the idea that political problems are fundamentally 'moral,' and may be resolved entirely by juridical means. In modern times, this system has found its logical extension in America's *nomocracy*: the republic of judges founded on the spirit of the Bible, and within which the Supreme Court plays a privileged role. It is not coincidental that American democracy shows so many similarities to the first government of the Hebrews.[244] The Founding Fathers knew the world of the Bible well — indeed, several of them knew Hebrew sufficiently to be able to read its ancient texts.

If political autonomy is rejected, this is because it is among the favoured forms of a *greater* autonomy: that of man in general. And one of the fundamental relations implied by the essence of politics is the relation of *authority*. The mastery of man by man is challenged to the very extent it is exponentially transferred to God. Yahweh is absolute master, and man his servant — with all that implies. The man of the Bible has greater justification for his refusal fully to recognise the sovereignty of a *human* authority in that he owes as first priority total obedience to the Completely Other: to the faceless face of the absolute master.

That man comes from a unique source in the biblical story of creation not only lays the foundation for philosophical universalism: it also represents a deliberately *egalitarian* option. Before Yahweh all men are equal in that all share a common origin. It is because Yahweh is the only God that all men come from the same source; and, correspondingly, it is because they all come from the one source that there are not multiple gods. The differences between men are secondary in respect of their common identity as regards Yahweh. The anthropological foundation of the biblical theory of politics is clear.

It is in the Bible, writes Ernst Bloch, that we find 'the most impassioned reaction against those on high and against worshipping them; only the Bible contains an appeal to revolt against them.'[245]

This appeal to 'social revolution' is most enthusiastic in the books of the prophets, whose tragic fate stems from their developing, in the face of the 'powerful,' a perpetually *critical* ideology. This egalitarian sentiment accompanies an irreducible animosity toward the rich and powerful — who will be denied entry into the future kingdom. On countless occasions the Bible condemns as intrinsically evil imperial undertakings, and powerful cities and nations. It multiplies anathemas against the 'haughty ones' who, by the same token, are the 'accursed.' It calls for the toppling of beauty, power, and 'pride.' To the pluralism of civilisations and their achievements, born of the creative will of *men*, it opposes the voluntary deprivation of monotheist affirmation, the desert of the absolute, the equality in *uncreated being*. It legitimises weakness, and it criminalises strength.

A day will come when the weak — who are the 'just' — will triumph, when the powerful are cast down from their thrones, and when human 'pretension' will crumble before Yahweh. This version of social justice, imbued with a spirit of revenge and resentment, anticipates all forms of socialism. The Bible identifies relationship with God with social justice. However, this affirmation is a means of contesting human authority *in principle* only, and not *in its applications*.

It is not the *abuse* of power that Yahweh condemns; rather, it is power itself. From a biblical perspective, human power established as sovereign is intrinsically evil: it is evil in its very essence. The 'just' are not just in one respect and weak in another. They are just *because* they are weak, by *virtue of* this weakness, just as the powerful are evil by virtue of their power. In

this sense Yahweh is manifestly a god of vengeance. He will realise in the absolute of history what his people were incapable of doing in the relative order of their own history (see the Book of Jeremiah). The metaphysics of *revenge*, the ideology of *ressentiment* as underpinning the reversal of all values, as origin of the substitution of negative for the positive — these find their true source in this system. The spirit of vengeance is the necessary precondition of bad conscience, itself implying the idea of sin. The culmination of this idea in Christianity will be the discourse of the beatitudes (Matthew 5:3–12, Luke 6:20–26): a veritable programme for the *reversal of all values*. All sickly types aspire to form a herd. Quantity compensates them for what they lack in quality. If several suffer together they believe their suffering is reduced.

Predictably, in the political domain Christianity began to assume more pagan features *only* after its accession to power. In the Euro-Christian blend the biblical problematic reverses itself with the assertion that man must obey the king as the king obeys God: that temporal authority is itself the expression of divine will. Christianity may survive only at the price of compromise between its constituent principles and an elementary political realism of primarily Roman origin.[246]

Under these conditions, it is entirely natural that Christianity — which is today undertaking a critical analysis of its own history — would distance itself from the principles that allowed the establishment of its power. The oft-proclaimed return in the Gospel — the primacy of pastoral duties over dogma — thus brings to an end an equivocation which has persisted far too long. Faustian energy and the Christian spirit are undergoing a divorce from a union never truly consummated — and, even within the Church, the notion of ‘Christian politics’ is increasingly contended. Better, the very notion of politics is condemned in precisely the spirit of original biblical mentality.

Insofar as the majority of contemporary ideologies are secular distillations of Judeo-Christian values, it was inevitable that the ideal of nomocracy — devaluation of the very idea of power, the delegitimation of politics — would become theoretical watchwords.

The common denominator of all such opinions is that politics is a struggle in respect of man’s power over man, and that ‘mastery’ arises from all human power coming, of its own nature, to surpass itself out of a

tendency towards extremes. From Augustine of Hippo, who sees the history of Rome as that of a ‘band of robbers,’ to Erich Fromm, who denounces European heroics as a ‘history of conquest, pride, and rapacity,’ the tendency is unchanging.

One might note the kinship of this hypothesis with Marxist theory, which sees politics as deriving from (economic) alienation, and with a certain liberal (particularly American) mode of thought based on the primacy of economics and of juridical morality.

‘In a very systematic fashion,’ writes Carl Schmitt, ‘liberal thought evades or ignores state and politics and moves instead in a typical always recurring polarity of two heterogeneous spheres, namely ethics and economics, intellect and trade, education and property. . . . These dissolutions aim with great precision at subjugating state and politics, partially into an individualistic domain of private law and morality, partially into economic notions. In doing so they deprive state and politics of their specific meaning.’[247]

This aspiration to eliminate politics is obviously utopian — and particularly dangerous. Man lives in society, and no society can live without politics.

The essence of politics entails three presuppositions: the relationship of command and obedience, determining *order*; the relationship of public and private, determining *opinion*; and the relationship of friend and enemy, determining *struggle*. It is in mobilising these presuppositions — especially the first and the third — that the essence of politics prompts radical hostility from those who deny that relations of authority, not necessarily despotic, derive inevitably from human diversity. This to the point, moreover, where acts of resistance and refusal may have meaning only with regard to the givens of obedience and command. A society without politics would be a society without order: this would be anarchy, the prelude to the overcompensation provided by dictatorship; without opinion: the most total absence of liberty imaginable; and without struggle: this would be death. Hence the definition provided by Julien Freund: politics is ‘the social activity that proposes to guarantee by force, generally based on law, the exterior security and interior concord of a particular political unit by ensuring order in the midst of all the struggles that are born from the diversity and divergence of opinions and self-interests.’[248]

The normal political authority is the State. Its two essential roles are designating the enemy *outside* — actual or potential; and preventing personal conflicts *inside* from degenerating into civil war. If the State is prevented from ensuring — or does not wish to ensure — its normal political role of authority, other sources of authority will be found.

As for the ancient debate, instituted by the Bible, regarding the antagonism between force and law, it becomes moot on realisation that no law is viable without the means to apply it. Peace is a primordially political rather than juridical matter. Only when politics is sufficiently powerful to counter violence both within and without may it impose solutions by law. Law is not essentially original. It presupposes politics as the very condition of its existence and perpetuation. To wish simultaneously for the rule of law and for the minimum politics possible is contradictory.

In the 'ideology' of Indo-European paganism, not only is the biblical antagonism between morality or law and political sovereignty non-existent; rather, the two notions are closely connected. It is precisely this which is vigorously expressed by the theology of the first function — to which Georges Dumézil has devoted several books.[249]

It is noteworthy that Indo-European law and sovereignty are embodied by gods representing the two fundamental and inseparable aspects of this first function: Dius Fidius and Jupiter for the Romans; Mitra and Varuna for the Vedic Indians; Tyr and Odin-Wotan for the Germans.

The notion that the use of force leads necessarily to its pathological escalation is contradicted by historical experience. Moreover, the notion that law can replace force is palpably utopian: clearly, exceptional situations cannot be governed juridically. The balance of force and law under strict political sovereignty is characteristic of every organic society: it is only the disappearance of one or of the other that leads to despotism, or to anarchy. The representation of all power as evil, of every recourse to force as 'unjust,' arises not only from propaganda that might or might not be effective, it also reveals a profound inability to grasp such notions in any other way. It signals what preachers of 'justice' and universal peace might do with power should the opportunity arise for them to assume it.

Those who proclaim Judeo-Christian values sometimes attribute to the 'powerful' feelings they would have — or be tempted to have — if they were in their place. They fail to see that true power is an end in itself and

does not aim, as long as it is tranquil, at any utility. In traditional Indo-European thought, happiness is never the adversary of power. However, neither is it the antagonist of equity.

Similarly, freedom is not a state resulting from suppression of all human constraints. Neither is it a *natural* state of man seized from us by society, power, the social order: in no sense is it a formlessness corresponding to the very nature of man, as so regarded by Rousseau. Liberty is a *political* rather than *moral* notion. As such it cannot escape the presuppositions of politics. Liberty must be conquered. It has no 'spontaneous beneficiaries' — but rather founders and guarantors. Freedom results exclusively from action taken to install or take possession of it, whether such action is taken by individuals or by groups. Hence, by nature it assumes *full sovereignty*. As with individuals, people and nations are free only insofar as they are sovereign. 'The free man is a warrior,' declares Nietzsche, and such a formulation is made explicit by the definition he provides: freedom consists in possessing 'the will to self-responsibility so that the distance that separates us may be maintained.'[250] As Carl Schmitt writes in a now famous passage, 'If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.'[251]

As an ideal at the end of history, the Bible aspires to 'universal peace.' These words of Isaiah 2:4 are inscribed in enormous letters on the front wall of the United Nations building in New York: 'And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.' This ideal of 'universal peace' is an ideal of non-contradiction, and logically implies the disappearance of difference — and until their disappearance, their devaluation, for it is differences that generate contradictions. Contradiction is the very motor of life; the desire to eliminate it is a death wish.

Indo-European thought is entirely different. Here conflicts of opposites, and their resolution in and by the being of the world, sacralise the struggle as positive fundamental reality. Struggle is not the foundation of an order; rather, it forms the framework of the universe. Implying both conservation and transformation, contradiction — which, clearly, is dialectical rather than mechanistic and fixed — ensures its own transcendence. The clearest

perception of it — at its empirical and preconceptual stage — is evident at the time of high antiquity, captured notably by Heraclitus: 'It must be known that the fight is universal, that justice is a struggle, and that all things are born in accordance with struggle and necessity.'[252]

In contrast, Judeo-Christian monotheism — vehicle of obsession with what is unique and homogeneous — demands the extinction of all conflict, ignoring that conflictual structure is coterminous with life, and that its extinction implies entropy and death. European paganism rests on a pluralism of antagonistic values. In its most immediate manifestation, polytheism is the expression of such antagonism: one which never terminates in irreversible opposites and radical dualism, but which naturally resolves itself into an harmonious whole.

In the spirit of paganism, even the public enemy does not represent evil in and of himself: he remains a relative adversary. Far from necessitating the dishonouring of an enemy in order to fight him — obligatory in a 'pacifist' system — an opponent may be acknowledged as a peer for standing up and fighting well. Paganism excludes war of religion (war between categories of belief) — along with class struggle (war of social categories) — precisely because of their irreducible nature.

Carl Schmitt also shows that the substitution of morality for politics, rather than *eliminating* conflicts, in fact leads to their *aggravation*. The enemy is *guilty*; he must be *punished*. This assignation of guilt to the adversary is a necessary condition of the entire system. The entire development of contemporary international law — largely founded on the values of the Bible — in effect aims at making the enemy, from the moral-juridical viewpoint, the guilty party. Step by step, we have arrived at the idea that the enemy *should not exist*. If the enemy *does* exist, then he does so beyond human laws — *outside of humanity*.

Wars waged in the name of abstract universal morality — yesterday it was religious morality, today it is ideological — have always been the most atrocious. Adding radical devaluation of some people and the good conscience of others to traditional conflicts abolishes classic distinctions of civil and military, the state of war and the state of peace. Such wars imply the destruction of the adversary, eventually to be replaced by his 'conversion' or 're-education': it is deemed impossible (and unthinkable) to come to terms with what the adversary represents.[253]

It is by reason of its universalism that biblical thought rejects politics. Politics is essentially a particularist and *non-universalist* vocation. Moreover, insofar as clergy and intellectuals claim to be servants of the universal, they are inevitably hostile to the political.

In *Aphorisms in Prose*, Goethe remarks of vitally mobile individuality that it becomes aware of itself as 'inwardly limitless, outwardly limited.'[254] This captures a fundamental law of all intellectual life. For the individual, 'outwardly limited' effectively signifies personality, and 'inwardly limitless' freedom. The same is true of a people. Houston Stewart Chamberlain pursues this thought, remarking that the two conceptions are mutually dependent. Without the outward limitation the inner limitlessness is impossible; if, however, *outward* limitlessness is targeted, the limit must be set *inwardly*. He contrasts the triad *personality, people, polis* with the universalist formula of ecclesiastical Christianity:

> Inwardly limited, outwardly limitless. Sacrifice to me your human personality and I shall give you a share in Divinity; sacrifice to me your freedom, and I shall create an Empire which embraces the whole earth and in which order and peace shall eternally prevail; sacrifice to me your judgment and I shall reveal to you the absolute Truth; sacrifice to me Time and I shall give you Eternity.[255]

Indo-European thought legitimises politics to the statutory extent of blessing the pluralism of collective identities: encouraging — between *humanity* and the *individual* — an *intermediary* dimension of the specific culture from which man constructs and transforms himself.

From an historic viewpoint, the projects, conflicts, identities, decisions, liberties, and interests that have significance have, typically, not individual but rather collective — i.e., political — character. 'Freedom' — without its historic and political component, without sovereignty and self-determination — resembles the freedom enjoyed by gas molecules: they may move freely — but go nowhere.

'Identity' and 'sovereignty' presuppose the existence and acceptance of a radical 'other' with whom to fight, compete, or collaborate. From an evolutionary perspective, it is plain to see why 'humanity' has never functioned as a political community. The species is an inclusive population in which the Darwinian mechanisms of mutation and genetic drift operate. Evolution occurs not in individuals but in populations — in the

interbreeding groups of individuals of one species. As changes in the gene pool occur, a population evolves. Furthermore — as sociobiology and ethology demonstrate — ‘sociability’ and ‘altruism’ have developed among social mammals, not for reasons of morality, but in order to enhance the inclusive fitness of a group in relation to its competitors. ‘Humanity,’ as political formulation, ever comes to dissolve, for its religious or secular upholders, into a purely individualist perspective.

II

If every science ends up producing the technology that allows scientists to manipulate the objects of their studies, similarly, politics is the technique that permits *the creation of human history*.

The great social genius of European man has been his skill in ordering society so as to provide close to the maximum possible yield of genuine liberty: that is, the maximum possible scope for human endeavour (e.g., the ‘free men’ of Celto-Germanic tradition, the political theory developed in the Greek *polis*, or the political edifice developed in Roman times).

Judeo-Christian monotheism, in contrast with what is often asserted, creates *less* the conditions for respecting individuals and *more* those for their deformation in the guise of *individualism* — an ideology which, once transposed to profane life, justifies as an abstract universal truth the rupture of the individual’s solidarity with the city.

By and large, European man has avoided both the extreme of social disorganisation which we call anarchy, and that of social over-organisation which gives rise to the ‘ant-heap societies’ characteristic of the Orient.

To go too far towards unrestrained individualism — to approach an atomistic society — is to sacrifice that scope of action which exists only when the will of an entire people may be unified and focused on a common goal.

To totally ignore the qualities of the individual — that is, to approach a society where individuals are merely interchangeable economic units — is to sacrifice great potential for innovation: for creation, for leadership which exists not in the mass but only in exceptional individuals.

Today we suffer from the worst of both extremes. We live in an oppressively overcrowded environment with ever-diminishing privacy, solitude, peace, and quiet. But at the same time we lack solidarity — cultural, national, and otherwise. We lack a common purpose and unity of will as compensation for the loss of privacy. Egoism and materialism reign in place of selfless idealism. In brief, we live in an atomised ant-heap: *Chimerica*.[256]

Society must be organised and structured to create orderly processes of advancement. It must have a clearly defined hierarchy in all societal activities; and hierarchy necessitates diversity — otherwise it cannot distribute its individuals within the hierarchy. This is why universalist-egalitarian societies fail to function properly.

Modern politics rests on the idea that a long and comfortable life is the highest value, something to be purchased even at the price of dignity. Aristocratic[257] politics is founded on the notion that honour is the highest value, to be purchased even at the price of one's life.[258]

Hence, the spiritual aristocrat must be ready to die; he must conquer his fear of death; he must even come to love death: for it is his ability to choose death before dishonour that raises him above the mere status of a clever animal. It is what makes him free: natural master rather than natural slave. It is, ultimately, the foundation of all forms of higher culture which involve the rejection, or subordination and stylisation, of merely animal desire.

A natural slave is one who is willing to abandon his honour to save his life. Hence, 'modern politics — which exalts a long and prosperous life as the highest value — is a form of spiritual slavery, even where the external controls are merely soft commercial and political incentives rather than chains and cages.'[259]

'Aristocratism,' as a vital attitude, consists in bestowing *value* — in its proper sense — on things without *price*. Distinction, politeness, distance, a sense of hierarchy: in short, what adds to life quality which is *inappreciable* in an egalitarian world — in that it cannot be appreciated *quantitatively*.

The political task of an aristocracy is to restore to its community of reference an historical perspective — one capable of seizing the true dynamics of history.

Guy Debord has remarked that manipulation is possible when historical memory is erased.[260] The appeal of mass democracy lies in the fact that in essentially every country in the world the number of people unable to think for themselves is substantially larger than that of those able to make independent decisions. Those unable to think for themselves have their thinking done for them by those who control the mass media. As Spengler notes, in the modern democratic age 'the press's main objective is to shepherd the masses, as object of party politics, into the newspaper's power-area.'[261] Democracy is the preferred system because it gives

political power to those who own or control the mass media, and at the same time allows them to remain behind the scenes and evade responsibility for the way they use that power. The more inclusive is the democracy, the more certain is the grip on the political process of media masters. Whoever controls the mass media is able to control most of the public's perception of what is fashionable in ideas, policy, behaviour. For the majority of people, perception of what is fashionable determines what they say and do and, to a large extent, what they think. In a democracy — where people who are easily manipulated by the media are allowed to vote — whoever controls the mass media also, for all practical purposes, controls the government. Put differently, to take control of the flow of information and ideas, it is necessary to gain control of the mass media of news and entertainment.[262]

Politics — currently subject to economics and commerce — can no longer guide citizens by proposing a path for them to follow; rather, it remains possible only to try to please the largest possible number in the shortest period of time. Election depends on this. An animal which is better fed than average is not necessarily more grateful, only more discontented when its feeding is interrupted. It would be pointless to insist on the social repercussions deriving from this truism.

The *suprahumanist* view as to what is historical in man has always differed from the *egalitarian*. For example, the 'economic sphere' belongs mostly to man's biological rather than historical domain. Hence, questions as to ownership of the means of production — which represent the quintessential political problem of communism and liberal capitalism — have, from the suprahumanist standpoint, a merely instrumental nature. The economic sphere should serve a superior end — the *political* sphere — and the latter a *metapolitical*.

A modern state — one using all the most advanced economic techniques, and resolved to safeguard what is most specific in man — cannot but incarnate a conception of society where the economic dimension lacks predominance over the political and metapolitical dimensions of the community of reference.

Hence, the state should take measures to safeguard the existence, survival, reproduction, and progress of the *polis* — in our case Europe — understood not merely in geographical terms but also as a bioculture.

Political praxis also implies a ‘selective discipline,’ tending to conform ‘actual’ human material to the ideas of ‘nation,’ ‘race,’ ‘people’ that emerge from historical election. Hence, politics is transformed into a mode of *historical aesthetics*: the sovereign function takes charge of modelling, in the long term, and towards the furthest future, a *destiny*, a project, for the community of reference.

Politics extends into geopolitics. Great politics implies international relations and finds fulfilment in diplomacy. In this sense, Europe may be perceived as a geopolitical entity, surrounded by potential foes and needing to control its periphery militarily. The British polymath Colin McEvedy[263] sees history as a succession of collisions between ‘core peoples’ (Indo-Europeans, Turkish-Mongolic tribes, Semitic nomads of the Arabian Peninsula . . .) which he likens to balls moving on a huge billiard table: Eurasia with its highways across the steppes. Reading McEvedy’s comments on the maps he presents, we may understand history as the systolic and diastolic movements of ‘core peoples’ (along with assimilated alien tribes or vanquished former foes) against one another, seeking to control their land, highways, and sea routes. Demonstrably, European history is a long process of resisting — more or less successfully — Mongolic or Turkish assaults in the East, and Hamito-Semitic incursions in the South.[264]

The one great goal toward which European foreign policy should strive is the development of a worldwide community — transcending present geographical nationalism — in which all men and women of European blood and culture will be part. The replacement of a parochial outlook with European world solidarity and a final elimination of fratricidal war would count among the enormous benefits of such a development.

The richness of humankind lies in the personality of those who make up a community. The richness of Europe lies in the personality of its regions. All have individual existence, but they are, nevertheless, permanently related to one another. Plurality is necessarily dialectical. As mentioned above, a community is always and simultaneously threatened by individualism and collectivism. For Europe, retreating into micro-nationalist separatism is as fatal as Jacobin extreme centralism. There is evidently a relationship between separatism and individualism, between Jacobinism and collectivism. Europe’s genius is essentially *communitarian*.

The state as body politic is born out of devotion to the social community (*ethnos*) through a process known in ancient Greece as *syngeneia*. Heinrich von Treitschke argued that 'the greatness of the State lies precisely in its power of uniting the past with the present and the future.'[265] This suggests the only justification for the existence of a *state* is its capacity to guarantee power and sovereignty, through a common historical project, to the populations it brings together. In light of this, the European nation-states are dead today.

In the twenty-first century, any issue of importance — from scientific research to migratory fluxes, industrial policy to global terrorism, energy sources to military defence — cannot be confronted at the level of the nation-state. Decision-making has been transposed to a supranational and transnational level. In order to recover its freedom and independence, the sole option for Europe is to extend national sovereignty to the continental and/or the global levels, and to endow it with the fundamentals of power: monetary sovereignty, industrial production, energy resources, demographic sustainability, military defence, research and development . . .

In the twenty-first century, politics must be global. Carl Schmitt — as early as the 1930s — lucidly demonstrated that the European system of *national* powers had been destroyed by the emergence of America as a *world* power: American economic exceptionality negated any potential for the European political tradition.[266] The 1945 defeat of Europe showed petty-statism to be no longer viable. The old European nation-states have lost their *vis politica*. The victory of the United States has demonstrated that the future belongs to superpowers, to hyperpowers.

In a perceptive essay, the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk observed that to be European means always to participate in (yet another) 'translation of empire.'[267] The notion of *Imperium* would be Europe's mythopoetic idea. Europe would begin to march and keep in motion as long as it managed to re-claim, re-enact, and transform the empire that existed before her: the Roman.

The European empire has lain dormant since its last replicas were destroyed — on the continent — as a consequence of the Great War; we would be currently witnessing the next translation, which would inevitably take place on a *symbolic* level. The empire, having existed in numerous vestiges, would be undergoing resurrection.

After the Second World War, the primary aim of uniting Europe into a single political entity has been common among suprahumanist thinkers. Apart from Sloterdijk, one might mention Francis Parker Yockey, José Ortega y Gasset, Jean Thiriart, Giorgio Locchi, Oswald Mosley, Alain de Benoist, Julius Evola, and Guillaume Faye.[268] Today, undoubtedly the most comprehensive formulation may be found in Norman Lowell's *Imperium Europa*: 'An Imperium on a planetary basis, uniting all Europids, everywhere: two white rings north and south of the Equator will girdle the earth, bringing together Slavs, Teutons, Anglo-Saxons and Latins.'[269]

It is clear that the European Union represents the worst possible way to work for the realisation of a free and sovereign Europe. Since its inception, the European Union has conceived itself as a 'province' of the Atlantic International led by the United States — protected by its armed forces (NATO) — and as a 'zone' of the American-led world economy. This inhibits Europe from expressing an independent political will in the world, and from regulating its economy to protect itself from the crises (industrial delocalisation, financial turmoil, and migratory fluxes) inherent in the phenomenon known as 'globalisation.' The present economic turbulence sparked by the United States's subprime mortgage crisis illustrates this situation well.

The various aspects of the external menace threatening Europe — e.g., dependence on foreign sources of energy, competition from developing countries, collapse of the international financial system, mass migrations — can find no 'international' solution. The present crisis originates in an excessive internationalisation of economic mechanisms. The solution is to modify the 'frame of reference': the creation of self-sustained 'economic spaces.' *Imperium Europa* might be one of such spaces. In this case, a new organic economy would pursue the creation of a semi-autarkic space, develop alternative sources of energy, and make an orderly withdrawal from globalisation. The economic and technological tools already available might be used to develop both a new economic model — different from mass consumption, and subordinate to the political — and a great historical project to relaunch Europe on a new basis.

The synthesis of a spiritual Europe for the sake of producing or enhancing a higher breed of men — this is what underpins our passion for European unification. How the idea should manifest itself in the future, and

what statutory or legal forms it might assume — such considerations are unimportant. What matters is not the *form* but rather the *content* of a new imperial idea excluding petty nationalism, and offering to all European peoples — North, South, East, and West, both on the Mother Continent and 'Overseas' — the chance to nurture their uniqueness, while also discharging their common duties.

An extension of patriotism is needed — a higher patriotism which proclaims: 'I am a European and therefore the heir of an ancient culture which has civilised the whole world.' Only then will a united Europe dominate the world, as is its birthright.

III

In general, Indo-European peoples have perceived the need to preserve their originality while accepting the consequences imposed upon them by the expansion of cultural and geopolitical horizons generated by the Neolithic Revolution. However — and thinking just of the ancient world — it was only the Romans who succeeded, thanks to the concept of *Imperium*, in achieving synthesis of permanence, faithfulness to themselves and to their origin, and full acceptance of 'cosmic involvement.'[270]

Clearly, *Imperium* and *Empire* must not be confused with each other. In fact, the notion of *Imperium* has found its truth and perfect realisation more in efforts that led to the establishment of the Roman Republic than in the maintenance of the post-Julian Empire. The notion of *Imperium* reflects a will to cosmic order, and it is this order that organises hierarchically the various *gentes* living under the protection of Rome. In theory and in practice, *Imperium* is at the antipodes of any sort of 'universalism.' It does not seek to reduce humankind to one and the same; rather, it seeks to preserve diversity in a world heading towards unification.

The Romans wanted to preserve their own city — their own *ius*: by temperament, all was conceived through rite and through law. However, such will to authenticity logically implied acknowledgement of 'the other.' In this resided their political greatness.

As organised and conscious rejection of any sense of universalism — of any *reductio ad unum* — Imperium has, nevertheless, a political nature: it is realistic, not utopian. It is hierarchical: each member keeps its own *ius*, its own law; each people is free to administer its own city according to its traditional form of justice. However, in the relations between individuals from different cities, or among the cities themselves, *ius romanus* prevails over *ius latinus* — which, in turn, prevails over all others. And where neither *ius romanus* nor *ius latinus* is applicable, then what applies is *ius gentium* — a typical Roman abstraction to identify what might be common, or should be applied, to the *iura* of all the other peoples. Hence, within the *Imperium*, Rome enjoys absolute primacy, and this may be explained naturally and in perfect justice. It is Rome which has conceived and created

— and which organises and secures — a cosmos/order where each receives his due according to history (*fatum*). Since *Imperium* represents an order consecrated by *fatum*, diverse peoples approach the Romans asking for admission to the Roman Empire.

'Regere imperio populos, Romane, memento / parcere victis ac debellare superbos.'[271] Such is the way Virgil defines the mission adopted by the Romans.

The description is telling, for once Rome vanishes, the peoples of Europe will experience acute nostalgia for loss of Roman order; and they will try, by all means at their disposal — though ultimately in vain — to re-establish it. Rome will become synonymous with 'political order,' and the name 'Caesar' — the *Imperator* par excellence — will be bestowed upon those holders of sovereign power charged with securing that order.

With the Industrial Revolution, humankind entered into a phase of planetisation. None may avoid such planetary perspective, or dream of impossible isolation. Planetary order is unavoidable. It is *fated* to come about, sooner or later. Tomorrow's Great Politics cannot be conceived or pursued without a 'world order' — what Ernst Jünger called a *Weltstaat*, understood as both impulse and purpose.[272] The symptoms have already been manifest: the League of Nations, then the United Nations (in the world of utopia), and the Soviet and American empires (in the world of fact).

Nevertheless, every indication is that neither the Soviet Union was — nor is the United States — capable of becoming a Rome. In its attempt to best organise the means to power bestowed by the technological revolution, the Soviet Union instead resembled the Egypt of the Pharaohs, whereas the United States resembles a commercial superpower like ancient Carthage.

In the past, there were European 'empires' and 'imperialism'; today, there is no 'American Empire.' What people label 'American imperialism' is, rather, an imperialism without an *Imperium* — a superior spiritual, formative, and organising principle. Roman imperialism carried with it a particular world view, a new form of social contract — the *Pax Romana*: similar to the feudal relation between *vassal* and *suzerain* — a spiritual principle implying a 'plus.' America is not a new Rome. As suggested, it is, rather, a new Carthage. America does not bring with it a 'plus.' Unaware, it carries out a *reductio ad unum* — a castration of the spirit. It enriches materially, while impoverishing spiritually. Wherever the 'American way of

life’ has been grafted — either in Europe, in Africa, or in Asia — nations have lost their identity, peoples have become decultured: the subtlest but surest mode of genocide.[273] The American way of life wants to become a ‘one-world way of life.’ For Europe in particular, the American way of life is an American way of death.[274]

The planetisation that is taking place demands a ‘cosmic order.’ Will such order be ‘imperial’ or ‘egalitarian’? In that the future is open, this must remain unknown: we can merely commit ourselves to one or to the other.

The egalitarian solution implies the reduction of humankind *ad unum*, the emergence of the ‘universal type’ and of global standardisation. The imperial solution, as mentioned above, is hierarchical. If freedom in egalitarian dialectics is one absolute opposed to another (the denial of freedom), in imperial dialectics, freedom is merely a relative proposition directly linked to the notion of social responsibility. Within the *Imperium*, only the right of the best is absolute, measured according to the *virtue* manifested by humankind at a particular moment. However, *Imperium* is also, from a planetary perspective, the *only* means of preserving differences, thanks to the principle of *unicuique suum*, which implicitly recognises the fundamental inequality of values and identities.

Imperium may be seen as the alternative to globalisation: strength and cohesion in diversity as a model of planetary organisation.

IV

‘Europe’ is myth — or rather, one of the *mythical elements* par excellence, according to the suprahumanist view of myth and history.[275]

Firstly, Europe is *roots*: the past we have chosen to belong to — the heritage, among others, that we claim as our own. Hence, the *religious* importance — in its etymological sense[276] — which the Indo-European phenomenon has for us. It concerns the primeval matrix of our culture: the ‘identification’ of one ‘identity’; the rediscovery of a founding origin. As argued above,[277] although the Indo-Europeans might not have been *a people* — in the sense that they did not perceive themselves as such, and did not recognise belonging to a cultural and political community transcending their most immediate horizon — these considerations have little importance in that it is *from the historical perspective of the contemporary observer* that this acknowledgement arises, and that an ‘Indo-European vision’ of our entire history becomes possible.

It is such a vision which allows us to put into perspective all the periods, events, and tendencies that have inhabited our past up till the present. Far from operating any sort of ‘progressive’ or ‘traditionalist’ Freudian repression, a comprehensive assumption of our past leads to tragic acceptance of all that became and made us what we are rather than anything else. Such acceptance is precisely the opposite of the general uncritical approval of historicist stamp, since the entire past is conceived in relation to a precise viewpoint: the contemporary (Indo)-European.

Being heirs of Lycurgus, Aeneas, and Siegfried, and not of Noah and Abraham, arises from a perspective that becomes true only in its historical actuality: common roots are defined above all by common destiny; and the past, the ‘history’ and the lineage to which one chooses to belong is but the image which a movement, a people, a civilisation gives of itself relative to the future that they aspire to create.

Secondly, Europe is *commitment in actuality* — in ‘national consciousness,’ perhaps. It is convenient to distinguish between two different ways of posing the ‘national question.’ One, developed in France, sees a nation essentially as a construction operated by a state, and bound *ab*

initio to a restricted horizon, a closure: historically, the closure and separation from Empire.[278] This attitude cannot but immediately give rise to the problem of fixing national borders: in this case first for the *natio francorum* without; then, for the political and cultural identities within those borders, on which 'reduction' is operated. This policy of self-exclusion *without* (from the Imperium), and homologation and repression of internal identities and differences *within*, was pursued by French absolutism — and to its ultimate consequences with the French Revolution. Subsequently it was emulated by all the democratic revolutions in Europe, to the point when all nationalisms based on 'the masses' and exclusion of 'the other' arrived, necessarily, at contemporary one world universalism.

Contrary to appearances, the one world ideology — which today impregnates the dominant culture and the political praxis of international institutions — is only superficially in contradiction to the presuppositions of the form of nationalism described above. Withdrawal into oneself implies, intrinsically, recognition, sooner or later, of equality among nations. The dream of political universalism is but the reproposal, on a global scale, of the very process that led to the formation of the nation-state.

Where the memory of the Roman imperial model persisted, and where the project of a Holy Roman Empire as restoration of the classical order remained politically active through the Middle Ages — approximately in Italian and Germanic areas — the process of 'national' unification did not take place (except partially and on a small scale) until the Romantic Age: during the nineteenth century. It assumed a deeply diverse aspect.

In this case, it is not the state that builds a nation and stimulates a national consciousness, but rather a national consciousness which, in its maturity, seeks to express itself politically through one state. Belonging to the German or the Italian nation was not, initially, *a fact* on which to build national consciousness, but rather an *idea* (in its political sense): a spiritual attachment to a project that needed to be defined and was linked to an old imperial vision of a hierarchically organised *cosmos*.

This attitude was clearer in the case of German nationalism, perhaps because its territory lacked natural borders. This is precisely why 'being German' was an ideal, and why German nationalism was the movement that carried forward that ideal. Novalis was wont to say: 'There are Germans everywhere.' Wagner, considered the foremost poet of German

identity, could write to Franz Liszt: ‘Believe me, we do not have a fatherland and, if I am a German, I certainly carry Germany within myself.’ Again: ‘German is whoever acts according to his own convictions.’ Germany became, like Rome or Greece, a mystical fatherland.

Today, the situation of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ is analogous. Europe does not enjoy a real existence. Europe is only the *destiny* of those who recognise themselves as part of it. Furthermore, it is precisely to this ‘ghost,’ to this choice of culture, values, civilisation (i.e., the regeneration of history) — to this *myth* — that the faith of the good European is addressed. Ultimately, it is also contrasted with the jumble of states and petty-states inhabiting our continent, together with their squalid supranational bureaucracies.

There is another reason why European nationalism associates itself with the second model described above: the very same idea of Europe amounts to a transfigured re-emergence of the imperial vision. The unification of Europe on the model of the Jacobin nation-state — and in direct opposition to regionalist tendencies (even perhaps forcing linguistic, cultural, and administrative homogenisation) — is unthinkable. There is a further reason: the non-existence of the matter of Europe’s borders. Europe is not a territory, but rather a destiny offered to all who can trace an ethnic and spiritual relationship to it. This consideration helps clarify how un-European, in this sense, are institutions like the Council of Europe, an institution of which Turkey is a member today — and perhaps Israel tomorrow.

The third dimension of the European myth, besides heritage and commitment, is that of a *project*. The existence of a project clearly does not imply it should be realised within a specified period of time. However, it is important to stress how its mere existence as project makes Europe a historically active reality. Since the end of the Second World War, all have had to confront this reality in one way or another — even if only to oppose, sterilise or try to retrieve it for their own interests. As project, Europe may be considered — from an existential point of view — the destiny and destination of all those who feel part of it. As Nietzsche remarks:

> O my brothers, your nobility should not look backward but ahead! Exiles shall you be from all father- and forefather-lands! Your children’s land shall you love: this love shall be your new

> nobility — the undiscovered land in the most distant sea. For that I bid your sails search and search. In your children you shall make up for being the children of your fathers: thus shall you redeem all that is past. This new tablet I place over you.[279]

‘Fatherland,’ ‘community,’ ‘race’ have metamorphosed into project. They are no longer a memory to be preserved; they are before us, not behind. ‘What we want to become’ — rather than ‘what we are’ — has become the question.

Europe, despite current appearances, continues to be the only reality with potential historically to mobilise the European population. This is much more than so in respect of either the tangible and concrete nation-states — devoid today of any *vis politica* — or of those regional tendencies that will never come to represent even vestigial resistance to the formation of already moribund nation-states. In this sense — and contrary to ‘Western’ propaganda — struggle for the construction of Europe is the most ‘realistic’ political position currently available.

Wagner, Nietzsche, and the New Suprahumanist Myth

I simply said to you that Wagner was the greatest man who ever lived. I didn't say that he was God himself, but I was tempted . . .

— Pierre Louÿs (letter to Claude Debussy)

Let us look one century ahead, and let us suppose my attack against two thousand years of unnaturalness and the desecration of man should succeed. That new party of life which tackles the greatest of all tasks, the upward breeding of mankind, including the pitiless annihilation of everything decadent and parasitic, that party will once more make possible that exuberance of life on earth out of which a Dionysian condition will again arise.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*

Arno Breker in His Studio (Berlin, 1940).

I

Richard Wagner's mature artistic work (from *The Ring of the Nibelung* to *Parsifal*) is the 'representation' of a *new myth*: a founding myth which started a new historical *tendency*.

Besides representing it, Wagner also attempted to formulate this myth in his theoretical writings. However, it was, above all, in Friedrich Nietzsche's formulation that it circulated throughout Europe during the last century. The identity of a myth represented by Wagner and formulated by Nietzsche has often been felt, though rarely recognised, largely because Nietzsche deliberately concealed the Wagnerian origin of his *Zarathustrian* vision.

As Giorgio Locchi argued in *Wagner, Nietzsche e il Mito Sovrumanista*,[280] *The Ring of the Nibelung* represents, together with *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, the eruption onto the European scene of a *Zeit-Umbruch* — a 'discontinuity' with the dominant world view of the previous two thousand years. It also represents the arrival of a *radically new* historical tendency — though one which nevertheless claims to have its origin in the *remotest past*, in the founding myths of Indo-European culture.

Since a historical tendency, once it appears, will manifest itself in the most varied forms and human fields, both openly and underground, the attempt to define it will be far from easy, especially if it is to be grasped in its first articulation — when it is inevitably obscure, owing to its utter novelty. In any case, at the beginning of the twentieth century the emergence of this new tendency within European society and culture was becoming evident from the opposition growing towards another (bimillenial) tendency — that which gave birth to the Christian West.

The German historian Ernst Troeltsch wrote: 'Whoever believes in the existence of an eternal natural or divine law, that humanity has a common and universal foundation, will see in the anti-Western part of German thought a strange combination of mysticism and brutality. But whoever considers that history is a continuous creation of individual living forms — ordered according to a law that changes incessantly — will see in western ideas the product of an arid rationalism, a levelling atomism; in short: a combination of banality and pharisaism.'[281]

In Troeltsch's text, 'Western' denotes the culture with roots in the value system introduced into Europe by Christianity, as well as the historical tendency Nietzsche labelled the 'egalitarian movement.' By 'anti-Western part of German thought,' Troeltsch instead designates the opposing tendency, which — diffusing throughout Europe with Nietzsche himself as point of reference — may be called 'suprahumanist,' despite its being constituted historically with the work of Richard Wagner.

The characteristic traits of the new tendency reside in its particular conception of *history* as 'continuous creation based on a law that changes incessantly,' and of *historicity* as the definition of what is 'specifically *human*.' Both concepts (history and historicity) may be identified with *consciousness*; and they are bound to the idea of *three-dimensional time* — named 'tri-static' by Martin Heidegger.

The adversaries of the new tendency have claimed that an aversion to rationalism — or even 'irrationalism' — is the distinctive trait of suprahumanism. This is the thesis of Peter Viereck's *Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler* as well as György Lukács' *The Destruction of Reason*.[282] These works are representative of an extensive literature which counts among its epigones such authors as Robert Gutman, Hartmut Zelinsky, Paul Lawrence Rose, Marc Weiner, and Joachim Köhler.[283]

The adversaries of the suprahumanist tendency confound — innocently or intentionally — 'irrationalism' and 'irrationality.' The exponents of suprahumanism, even where they claim to be 'irrationalists,' and therefore hostile to 'rationalist' philosophies, do not consider their world outlook to be at all 'irrational.' For suprahumanists, reason is but one of the faculties of intelligence — an *instrument*; for their adversaries it is both the foundation and the end of historical, even cosmic, becoming.

Essentially, the debate concerns the limits of human reason. However, from the start it has been set up inappropriately. It started at cross purposes, owing to the type of *expression* the suprahumanist tendency gave, and still gives, to its intuition and to its conception of man and the world. This form of expression is *myth*. Richard Wagner explicitly stated that he wished to 'regenerate myth.' Nietzsche, in that strand of his work that may be referred to as 'Zarathustrian prayer,' deliberately proposed a 'myth.' And the philosophical, artistic, and political currents of the twentieth century

associated with the suprahumanist tendency always flowed towards ‘myth.’[284]

Characteristically, *myth* refers to a fabulous narrative, or to a world conception expressed in a particular manner by primitive people or at the dawn of their civilisation. On the contrary, suprahumanist authors connect the ideas of ‘myth’ and of ‘revolution’ within a vision of history in which the linearity of historical becoming is only apparent, and in which ‘origin’ is both *in* and derives *from* every ‘present.’ Hence, myth is the immediate expression of a new — original and originative — world outlook — and, at the same time, the designation of a human ‘end’ served by reason.[285]

The gnoseological nature of the debate is highlighted by the controversy raised by Lukács. The Nietzschean ‘myth’ does not pretend to be ‘objective.’ Nietzsche explicitly acknowledges the arbitrariness of the ‘myth’ he formulates, which is not simply an interpretation of history, but also a historical project. For Nietzsche, any ‘principle’ concerning man and history cannot but be arbitrary; it is ‘moral prejudice’ alone — the famous ‘Circe of philosophers’ — which may induce man to imagine that a principle might be founded on an absolute. As with all Marxists, Lukács is, in contrast, convinced — and claims that — reason may ‘be founded on itself.’ He asserts, more precisely, that reason may ‘be founded on itself critically,’ and by so doing discover a principle that may be universally valid: of absolute value.

Marx and Marxists remain in Kantian positions: in a certain sense they acknowledge the limits of pure reason; but they also consider practical reason may respond to ‘ultimate questions.’ In contrast, Nietzsche goes beyond Kant and becomes the upholder of absolute criticism. He asserts that it is impossible to offer ‘rational’ responses to ‘ultimate questions’ — including that concerning man’s freedom and historicity.

The Nietzschean critique of reason — which is absolute — discovers the impossibility for ‘reason’ to found itself. Rather, it affirms that any ‘system of thinking,’ any philosophy, any world conception that includes as its object of study ‘man as historicity,’ that all such must be founded on ‘an act of human freedom.’ Nietzsche regards all previous philosophers as mistaken about the nature of that ‘act,’ as having interpreted it as deriving not from man’s freedom but rather from a transcendent law — to which man would be subjected. Hence, Nietzsche’s absolute critique of reason

turns into an assertion that both man and historical becoming are free. It is indeed this ‘freedom of historical becoming’ which makes possible the ‘regeneration of myth’ pursued by Richard Wagner. The ‘regeneration of myth’ is, in fact, the exercise of historical freedom by a human personality who sets his own will, as a new ‘origin,’ against another human will: one which, deriving from the ‘past,’ predominates in the objective ‘co-actuality.’

If one considers that ‘morality’ is precisely the law that rules — or should rule — human behaviour, it becomes clear that its specific content is always to be deduced from the definition of what man is: from an ‘idea of man,’ one that is sometimes unconscious, unexpressed. Nietzsche considers that there is no single law of human behaviour, and therefore of history. Rather, there exist potentially, in the absolute, as many laws as there are human personalities. In practical terms, macrohistorically, two opposed laws from time to time manifest themselves as opposed historical tendencies, incarnated by antagonistic human personalities. In history Nietzsche observes conflict between two types of man, two adverse moralities that he describes as *master* and *slave* souls. Later, he interprets the evolution of this conflict — from the beginning of Christianity — as a progressive assertion of *slave morality*: a tendency that, in relation to the end it pursued, he has wanted to label ‘egalitarian movement.’

Nietzsche’s ‘critical’ and ‘historical’ reflections are entirely independent of the ‘historical project’ he conceives and proposes in his ‘Zarathustrian prayer.’ Hence, his *position* opposes those of Christians, liberals, and Marxists, all of whom confuse inextricably — and posit an indissoluble interdependence of — theory of history and historical project.

Nietzsche conceives and proposes his ‘project’ — together with a ‘morality’ and ‘the ends to attain’ — not to *humankind*, but exclusively to what he names ‘superior man.’ He explicitly states that his purpose is arbitrary: that it derives from his personal taste (*Geschmack*), from his particular ‘aesthetic sensitivity,’ from a personal value judgement.[286] However, his conception of history does not prejudge the future. He believes that the future of humankind — *history* — has two possibilities, indicated mythically: the coming of the *last man*, or of the *superman*. For Nietzsche, the ‘movement of the last man’ is frighteningly palpable in Europe, and will lead to catastrophe. Such catastrophe is unavoidable, but

may be transformed into a ‘high noontide,’ should the ‘movement of the last man’ — *egalitarianism* — be opposed by a countermovement — that which Nietzsche wishes to arouse with his Zarathustrian prayer: *suprahumanism*.

Hence, the Nietzschean vision of history is ‘open.’ He proclaimed the ‘innocence of becoming,’ and also recognised — in the tracks of Herder, though long before philosophical anthropology — that man is an ‘incomplete animal’: always *becoming*. In Nietzsche, the statement ‘God is dead’ is the translation of a newly acquired consciousness of human historical freedom. By virtue of this new consciousness, man no longer believes himself governed by an historical law that transcends him, and that leads him, together with the whole of humankind, towards an end of history predetermined *ab aeterno*, or *a principio*. He knows that from hence, it is he who, in every historical ‘present,’ must establish conflictually a law that will determine humankind’s future: a law which, at any other ‘present’ of historical becoming, may be called conflictually into question and which hence varies incessantly.

It has been said that ‘humankind’ does not exist historically. This means that man is not historically determined by belonging to an animal species. The behaviour of any other animal consists in repeating the predetermined behaviour of its species. An animal does nothing but repeat the ‘past’; it lives in the past of the species — a past which may certainly manifest change, though not because of ‘biological decision,’ but rather from chemical or microphysical causes. Biological phenomena — like macrophysical phenomena, albeit in a different way — entail the cyclical repetition of the past. As such it is, at any time, predetermined. Human life also entails cyclical repetition, and hence becomes registered in the observable/phenomenological/empirical time of the species. However, man’s historical existence is not life and should not be confused with it. Man’s historical existence is not registered in empirical time, but rather in historical time. As long as it remains in that historical time, it is *becoming* that never concludes: *becoming* that *becomes*.

The suprahumanist myth is — in a fundamental aspect — a new vision of history, intuiting that the law of historical becoming ‘varies incessantly’ in every present: *becoming* that *becomes*, authentic historical *becoming*. The suprahumanist vision considers history within a specific time which is

neither linear nor one-dimensional, as with the previous visions — cyclical in antiquity and parabolic in Christianity — but is, rather, three-dimensional.[287]

A ‘vision of history’ is a fundamental aspect of any *Weltanschauung* (global vision of the world). It is not only interpretation of the past, but also commitment in actuality and project into the future. As such, it becomes part of an epochal conflict — a conflict that remains undecided and whose outcome cannot be predicted. Indeed, our epoch is characterised by conflict between egalitarian and suprahumanist tendencies — and choice concerns man’s historical existence.

Man’s historical existence is but possibility. The ‘coming of the superman’ in the Nietzschean formulation of suprahumanist myth is merely an image of possibility — as opposed to that of the ‘coming of the last man.’ The superman represents a possibility that must be eternally reconquered: as long, that is, as man remains in history and keeps choosing historical existence. If ‘in the past’ mankind might have believed existential-historical choice was to be made between two possible historical destinies, the suprahumanist myth, as opposed to the egalitarian tendency (in its mythical, ideological, or critical expressions),[288] proclaims that the choice today concerns the very same historical existence of man: *regeneration of history* or *end of history*; reaffirmation of human historicity or leap to the ‘kingdom of freedom’ — to pure ‘happiness,’ the generic indifference of the animal species.

II

Richard Wagner may be considered the most magnetic and powerful artistic voice of the nineteenth century, and a profound influence on modernity. From Wagner's death until the First World War, composers, painters, philosophers, novelists, dramatists, and poets strove mightily to come to terms with his strangely vibrant and living legacy. No composer before or since has left such an enduring mark on the course of cultural history.[289] Few artists have embraced public life so assiduously, and inspired so much controversy — in politics as well as in art.[290]

Wagner's work, especially his *Ring of the Nibelung* — an epic masterpiece of musical genius — represents a milestone and, arguably, the completion of a *parabola* symbolised by the great European tradition of tonal and polyphonic music, extending from Johann Sebastian Bach and his contemporaries to Mozart and Beethoven, and culminating, after Wagner, in Richard Strauss and Carl Orff.[291]

'Classical music,' far from being a universal phenomenon, represents a specific geographical and cultural epoch without equal in other eras or civilisations. Indeed, even in pre-Bachian Europe, the music the Church imposed on the Catholic ecumene was based on the imitation of the Greco-Roman musical tradition, which was fundamentally of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern origin and, arguably, deriving from an exclusive *melodic* sensitivity.

Shortly after Carolingian times — with the forced conversion of Saxon tribes that followed the Massacre of Verden and the restoration of the Empire — another musical sensitivity (in this case *harmonic*) starts to penetrate the musical universe of the Church, which had remained secluded until that point. What might have been the origin of such new sensitivity?

Musicologists refer to a 'pagan residue' existing in the indigenous cultures of Northern Europe.[292] Undoubtedly, a tonal system emerged, after a few centuries, from the opposition of the Church tradition and that of the indigenous music culture of Northern Europe.

As for Wagner, the *Ring* — the fifteen-hour grand cycle of operatic, theatrical, and literary representation, comprising one 'Prelude' (*Das*

Rheingold) and ‘three Evenings’ (*Die Walküre*, *Siegfried*, and *Götterdämmerung*) — has been described as a ‘total work of art’ (*Gesamtkunstwerk*). It is impossible to comprehend in its entirety merely by reading the poem or listening to the music in private. Full comprehension requires attending its representation on stage — ideally in the privileged emplacement of Bayreuth.

Together with *Parsifal*, the *Ring* has been, until very recently, in the annual programme of the Bayreuth Festival, and it was conceived by Wagner as a sacral rite in the regeneration of history.[293] He believed that art might redeem a culture, a society, and a people. Wagner likened the theatre to a temple of Aryan art and mystic rite, and through the Teutonic myth he found elements which would consecrate higher folk-consciousness, and an upward path to the *Übermensch*.

Only ancient Greece offers anything similar. In fact, Wagner has been often compared to Homer, only for it to be concluded by Herbert von Karajan that ‘Wagner is greater and more complete.’[294]

The key to understanding the suprahumanist myth lies in an ‘idea of music’ that sustains and structures Wagner’s work of art: the *living symbol* of history’s three-dimensional time.

In Wagner, music, drama (i.e., tragedy) and myth are closely related. *Music*, according to him, is an *idea of the world*: more precisely, ‘an idea of the world that encloses everything.’ *Tragedy* is born out of music, as if emerging from a maternal womb. It *represents* — realises on stage — this ‘idea’ of music, and does so by *regenerating myth*, the only form of expression able to reach and recover original purity — which Wagner names ‘the purely Human’ (*Rein-Menschliches*).[295]

Wagner does not explain this *idea of the world*. Rather, he *realises* it by means of the *Wort-Ton-Drama*: that is, by the association within dramatic action of word and sound. Hence, this *idea* organises space-time in a radically new way: by establishing humankind’s historical becoming in the form of a *tragedy* governed by the law of recurrence. *At any time*, past, present, and future *coincide*. Becoming is there: only the centre changes, as well as the perspectives resulting from it. Wagner replaces a unilinear conception of time — which he rejects — with a *three-dimensional* time: the *specific* time of human becoming.

The image of the ring of the Nibelung — the ring which gives its name to the tetralogy — is the living symbol of the ‘spherical’ conception of history: the music of eternal recurrence.

Always identical, though always renewed, Wagnerian *discourse* is structured around a certain number of ‘guiding images’ (*Leitbilder*): the affirmation of becoming (in opposition to being); the premonition of a ‘rupture’ of historical time (*Zeit-Umbruch*); the return to a *mythical* past associated with a leap into the future . . . To these images correspond different *Leitmotive* (‘guiding motifs’), which constitute their musical transpositions.

The *Ring* constitutes dramatic representation of the ancient destiny myths of gods and heroes, whose memory the Scandinavian Edda and several German medieval poems had perpetuated. But it is more than that. Wagner’s imagination has transfigured what was hitherto a mere collection of literary fossils: the past that he has chosen and freely reconstituted, the actuality he has given to the old stories, the future that he projects — all these structure *a new present of human consciousness*. From the birth of a world till its demise — which is also conceived as regeneration and recommencement — an entire history of humankind is prodigiously evoked. Moreover, that history is simultaneously past, current — and coming — and is sustained by an anthropological conception — the *Rein-Menschliches* — which implies a radical reversal of values. Brought back to life from its millennial tomb, the ancient Germanic myth acquires a *new* dimension, and at the same time recovers an intoxicating barbarian youth.

It is not accidental that Wagner chose the mythical material of the Edda to represent his idea of the world. Rather, the choice imposed itself on him from necessity, insofar as it corresponded to the choice of one past among others: the choice of a deeper past — that of *reconquest of origins* and the *promise of a longer future*. Return to origins, which in egalitarian and Christian romantic discourse was an apparently reactionary *lapsus* through which pagan unconsciousness found expression, finds in Wagnerian discourse its proper logic — and hence its true countenance.

Structured by and around ‘the idea of music’ — the three-dimensionality of time — and finally conscious of itself, Wagnerian discourse is both inspiration for a return to our deepest origins, and zeal to thrust forward into the furthest future: a revolutionary project. Hence, *conservation and*

revolution both confound one another and fuse together in opposition to a civilisation and a society that reclaim another tradition, Jewish-Christian, and another project, egalitarian.

Wotan, the central character of the *Ring*, is not only the Indo-European pre-Christian god of the first function, the unrecognisable noumenon of an extinct and unrepeatable religion, but is already the new post-humanist god: *the Third Man*,[296] who knows tragically that he has to take care of his destiny, of his own self-creation. By so doing, he tends towards the suprahuman.

For the tragedy of heroes and gods does not find realisation other than in the tragedy of Wotan: in a consciousness which *knows* and nevertheless *wills*. Hence, since everything is summarised and transcended in Wotan's consciousness, as all the characters in the *Ring* are aspects of the purely human — *Rein-menschliches* — embodied in one person, Wotan, the *Ring* is *psychodrama*. Drama, that is, in which Wagner's genius projects all the *Leitbilder* — which precede psychoanalysis by decades. Wotan sacrifices his most intimate will, suppressing what he most loves, Brünnhilde, surrounding her with fire. That fire is no other than Loge himself — the spirit who betrays Wotan — and is the very image of declining paganism accepting the fate of the Christian mask. However, his most intimate will is not destroyed: it lies dormant. Its presence invokes the person who will come to awaken it; and this is the end for which the god is waiting — the beginning of a new history: a regeneration.

The English philosopher Roger Scruton has remarked that 'contemporary Wagner productions *domesticate* the dramas, betraying a fear of sublime experience and the power of myth. Taking myth seriously is Wagner's "big idea." Wagner's mature operas concern heroes moving in a mythic realm, and who are prompted by emotions lifted free of ordinary human contingency and endowed with cosmic significance and force. In such works as the *Ring* and *Tristan* and *Parsifal*, the human condition is idealised, as it might be in narratives and liturgy drawn from a religion. To take these operas seriously is to be drawn into a peculiar modern project: that of remaking the gods from human material. This project identifies both the artistic triumph of Wagner, and the hostility with which that triumph is often greeted.'[297]

Today the adversaries of the suprahumanist tendency, perhaps unconsciously, fear Wagner more than Nietzsche — who for a time was considered the bigger ‘threat.’ Ultimately, Nietzsche may have been ‘just a philosopher,’ despite having at his disposal all the resources of poetic seduction. Consequently, he addresses himself to *intelligence*, making it easier to distort and falsify his message. In contrast, Wagner, although using all the means of poetry, was above all a ‘musician.’ Music speaks directly to the *soul* — to the senses and the imagination — and disarms ill-intentioned interpreters, rendering their blatant falsifications pitiful and ridiculous. Opponents unwittingly become servants of the Wagnerian project.

III

Given the concept of ‘tendency,’ it is easy to see an intimate relation between the work of Wagner and of Nietzsche. They constitute the two poles of the ‘mythical field’ of the suprahumanist tendency created in our age. It is important to stress this relation, for Nietzsche himself made a major manoeuvre of distraction, intending to demonstrate — perhaps first of all to himself — that his work was independent of, and even opposed to, that of Richard Wagner. This exercise of concealment has strongly influenced the judgement of philosophers and intellectuals, who are naturally inclined to pay more attention to the ‘intellectual’ work of Nietzsche than to Wagner’s ‘artistic’ work.[298]

When young, Nietzsche had prostrated himself before the altar of ‘the god Wagner,’ offering in homage *The Birth of Tragedy*, followed by *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*. However, the ‘wonderful days at Tribschen’ were not to last. Nietzsche soon distanced himself from Wagner. The fervent disciple became an apostate: apologist became denigrator and uncompromising adversary. Nietzsche’s later works, *The Case of Wagner* and *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, give every appearance of being the venomous attacks of a former disciple against a former master. Wagner is a ‘seducer,’ a ‘corrupter,’ a ‘rattlesnake’: presenting himself as opposite to what he actually is. ‘Schopenhauerian,’ ‘life hater’ — Wagner becomes the *ne plus ultra* of decadence. Worse, with the creation of *Parsifal*, he is seen to have fallen back into the Christian faith.[299]

Having started with an assault on Wagner’s music — decadent art *par excellence* — Nietzsche concludes by condemning almost all German music for leading inevitably to Wagner. He sets ‘pure melody’ — described as ‘Mediterranean’ — against ‘harmony’ — described as ‘Nordic.’ Frequently, his exegesis becomes mere caricature — as when, for example, he summarises the ‘intrigues’ of Wagnerian drama. At times his remarks become overtly malignant.

Nietzsche’s confrontation with Wagner has a tragic aspect. Nietzsche suffered greatly in distancing himself from the only man he had ever loved. However, this suffering arose from a kind of metaphysical jealousy.

Nietzsche desired the place in history that would be accorded to Wagner. Hence, he needed to show that Wagner was not what he seemed — the creator of a new myth, a regenerator of history — nor could he be, since music was itself a 'final art.'

Many have remarked on Nietzsche's jealousy. Thomas Mann addressed Nietzsche's love-hate relationship with Wagner in *Pro and Contra Wagner*.[300] Stefan George — who reproached Nietzsche with having 'betrayed' Wagner — is more positive: 'Without Wagner, no *Birth of Tragedy*, without the awakening initiated by Wagner, no Nietzsche.'[301] Although his jealousy was essentially intellectual, it crystallised around the person of Cosima Wagner. From the time of his first meeting with her at Tribschen (May 1869) Nietzsche was fascinated by her. He idealised her in the guise of Ariadne. Wagner was simultaneously Minotaur and Theseus, a human, all-too-human hero; he, Nietzsche, was the divine Dionysus. In relation to this there are many revealing passages in the work of Nietzsche — in particular the dialogue between Dionysus and Ariadne in *Twilight of the Idols*.

Nietzsche saw himself as the unique harbinger of perpetual becoming, eternal recurrence, and superman: only he had reached the foot of the abyss of decadence; only in him did the beginning find its origin. Nietzsche alone was the true Dionysus. The German public had allowed itself to be led astray by Wagner the seducer; Ariadne had mistaken him for God, and married him.

In short, Nietzsche, the philosopher of perpetual becoming, could not endure Wagner's expression of the philosophy in music. Nietzsche established the philosophical myth of the superman (*Übermensch*). He explained its logic and created a language for it. However, the myth existed already in the form of Wagnerian opera. Nietzsche merely gave a name to what already existed in music — but he could never admit this.

The structure and elements of the suprahumanist myth are already present in Wagner's 'Wotan myth.' In Nietzsche and in Wagner the same view of history, the same intuitive conception of man, predominates. Nietzsche's 'willing of the superman' corresponds to Wotan's 'will to regenerate the world.' To the 'will to accept the end' in *Götterdämmerung* corresponds the Zarathustrian *amor fati*, the new conscience of the 'superior man.' The temporal structure of the *Wort-Ton-Drama*, which represents the tragic history of humanity, is given a name by Nietzsche: 'eternal

recurrence' — 'linear' representation of the historical sphere of becoming. The 'high noontide' of Zarathustra prefigures a similar breaking with time (*Zeit-Umbruch*) — evoked, in the final scene of *Götterdämmerung*, by the wonderful *Leitmotiv* which has already promised the regeneration of Siegmund through his son Siegfried. The 'return to origins' — another essential element of myth in the *Ring* — is represented doubly in Nietzsche's writing: by the exaltation of the 'blond beast' of the Indo-Europeans, and, at an artistic and cultural level, by pre-Socratic Greece. Both are lost forever, 'historically unrenewable,' and must be recreated just as, for Wagner, the 'end of the gods' is a prerequisite for the return of the gods.

In their respective works, Wagner and Nietzsche pursued the same end: *the regeneration of history*. The *myth* prefigures this aim and is also the means of attaining it. The myth is a 'didactic account' which is to create the new man in his own words. The kinship between the music dramas of Wagner and the poetical philosophy of Nietzsche is comparable to the kinship, within egalitarian myth, of different Christian theologies and democratic, socialist, and communist ideologies. If the kinship of Wagner to Nietzsche appears to be very close — as it is in fact — this is because both men mark the beginning of suprahumanist mythology: the moment of birth. They are the twin stars of a new planetary system of human thought.

That they belong in the same 'mythical camp' does not, however, imply that in the myth they manifest the same ideological identity. In *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* (1876), Wagner was still, for Nietzsche, a universal genius: simultaneously philosopher, historian, artist, master of diction and mythology, and mythic poet. In fact, Wagner the philosopher never succeeded in drawing philosophy from the myth created by Wagner the poet and musician. In his theoretical writing Wagner's style is still that of Romanticism; and the mythical elements appear as if deformed by a discourse alien to them. Nietzsche realised this and became conscious of his superiority as a philosopher, a superiority Wagner was happy to acknowledge. Hence, Nietzsche's opposition to Wagner on the grounds that his theoretical work was imposture was spurious.

However, Wagner and Nietzsche did genuinely diverge in the interpretations they gave to certain aspects of the civilisation and culture they execrated. In the triumph of the 'Judaic principle' Wagner identified

and denounced the essential cause of the decline of humanity: the ‘poison’ he claimed was destroying all real culture. For Wagner this was a relatively recent phenomenon. He attributed it, somewhat naively, to the rising social influence of the Jews, and the resultant Jewish ascendancy in political, artistic, and cultural spheres. Consequently, the different ‘forms’ of German culture — and European culture, also, beginning with the religious form, Christianity — are negative, insofar as they have been ‘invaded’ and ‘perverted’ by the ‘Judaic principle.’ For Wagner, the necessary response to this was to revitalise the ‘Germanness’ of cultural and social forms, and to begin doing so meant removing Jewish influence. Inevitably, Wagner’s analysis auspicated social and political anti-Semitism on his part.[302]

Nietzsche also considered the ‘Judaic principle’ had provoked the debasement of man: that it is at the source of ‘the radical falsification of all nature, all naturalness, all reality’; that it initiated the revolt of the slaves; and that the West has been in decline since ‘God became a Jew.’ To this principle — ‘a declaration of war against everything on earth that represents the ascending tendency of life, to that which has turned out well, to power, to beauty, to self-affirmation’ — Nietzsche gives a socio-political definition, which he summarises as the principle of equality. For Nietzsche, however, this is not a recent phenomenon: it began with Christianity.

Christianity cannot be understood apart from its place of origin: it is a consequence of Jewry, a logical progression from it. Nietzsche’s anti-Judaism does not lead to anti-Semitism. He doubted the existence of a ‘Jewish people’ as such and believed that the Jews wished above all else to assimilate. On this basis all anti-Semitism is dangerous as it obliges the Jews to band together in self-defence. Furthermore, according to Nietzsche, the damage done is in any case irreparable: no preventive measures can check the decay of European civilisation. Nietzsche’s conclusion is that it would be best to accelerate the process of disintegration. Only on the ruins of Europe would it be possible to rebuild; only once Europeans have become a mass of innumerable slaves resigned to their fate might the master race arise from the abyss. In his autobiographical *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche confirms that his ‘attack’ on Wagner is also an attack upon a ‘German nation which is becoming ever more lazy in spiritual matters, ever more impoverished in its instincts.’ The ‘blond beast’ must be ‘reconceived’ in the form of the future ‘good European.’ Nietzsche did not

altogether abandon hope in the German people; he was unable to see to what *other* people might one day be awarded the honour of being the 'first anti-Christian people of Europe.'[303] However, his condemnation of Bismarck's Germany — according to him socialist and democratic — is uncompromising. Wagner's ironical compromise with the *Kaiserreich* was another source of disagreement.

Wagner and Nietzsche fought in the same cause, but their strategies were opposed. Nietzsche's initial enthusiasm, his subsequent reconsideration — and finally his intensified criticism — took place only within, and can only be explained by, the Wagnerian myth. Nietzsche was conscious, and spoke of, a *Sternenfreundschaft*: the friendship of two stars condemned in their predestined eternal course never to meet.

Moreover, Nietzsche qualified his venomous attack in *The Case of Wagner*: 'I loved Wagner and no other . . . Needless to say, I allow no one the right to appropriate my present judgement on Wagner.' Nietzsche saw his quarrel with Wagner as a family quarrel: his 'anti-Wagnerian' polemic should have been the concern only of those whose attachment was already to the myth of the superman and the theme of eternal recurrence.

Perhaps the true reason — the necessity of the 'betrayal' of the master — is to be found in the Apollonian commandment to every noble soul, to every 'superior man,' to discover himself and to realise himself. Where the egalitarian precept demands the imposition of a single and absolute truth — and, concomitantly, the adaptation of all to the same human model — the opposing precept necessarily pledges each person to the search for true identity in eagle-like solitude.

This provides a new perspective to the suprahumanist myth, a myth which neither demands nor requires one mien. Wagner and Nietzsche each gave a different faith to the myth, and the myth has gained from the tension between its Wagnerian and Nietzschean aspects. Yet again we are reminded of the image of two stars. The immense philosophical, artistic, literary, and, finally, political consequences of the suprahumanist myth — a movement to which Armin Mohler gave the name 'Conservative Revolution'[304] — have always been characterised by tension between its Wagnerian and Nietzschean poles. It is Wagner, in his theoretical writing, more than Nietzsche who provides that 'conservative revolution' with a coherent entirety of themes which remain emotive and relevant; meanwhile the

political sketches drawn by Nietzsche prove too abstract in their concern with a too distant future. From that perspective, the ‘theatricality’ which Nietzsche deplored in Wagnerian drama is actually effective — enabling the myth to penetrate where it had not previously been evident. The so-called ‘theatricality’ of Wagner — which answers only to a superficial understanding of the drama — has become the exoteric aspect of the myth. This subordinate quality of the work conforms to the same principle: where an equality of intelligences and sensibilities does not exist, ‘information’ has to be multi-dimensional, in order to communicate at every level.

Created at the dawn of the age of the masses, Wagnerian drama is a *Kunstwerk der Zukunft* — an artwork of the future — by virtue of the hierarchical plurality of ‘information’: simultaneously initiatory and propagandistic. In other words, it draws inwards and upwards while reaching outwards. What we call ‘propaganda,’ and scorn or condemn, is the only effective means of reaching the masses. The misfortune today is that propaganda is one-dimensional; what should be the adornment of more serious information is today the *only* information. In the realm of art this leads either to the disposable products of consumer society, or to the sterile self-indulgence of ‘experts.’ Furthermore, from this perspective the multiple dimensions of Wagner’s work exemplify what a work of art should be in our time.

IV

Suprahumanism, as historical tendency born from the European soul in the mid-nineteenth century, became a sort of expanding magnetic field with two poles: the artistic work of Richard Wagner, and the poetico-philosophical work of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Their activities exercised tremendous influence in *fin de siècle* Europe and the first half of the twentieth century — both negatively, provoking rejection and reaction, and positively, inspiring philosophical and artistic development, animating spiritual and religious action, and, finally, finding political expression.

The work of Wagner and of Nietzsche demonstrates an eminently agitating character; their importance resides in the *new historical and psychological principle* they introduce into the European spirit. The word 'principle' is understood as perception of the self and of man in general. Perception, which has its own discourse, is expressed with its own logos — from *legein*, to link: what structures and gives coherence to a particular discourse. As it pursues a goal, a principle is also *will* — individual and communitarian. Furthermore, since it is perception, feeling, emotion, a principle is a system of values. Hence, 'principle' is perception, thinking, logos, will: the point of departure for any discourse and action.

As *poiesis*, their artistic endeavours may be considered a campaign of poetic seduction and provocation that should give rise to a new type of man: a superior man, always tending towards the superman, capable of guaranteeing to humankind eternal historical becoming, eternal creation, and self re-creation.

The level of penetration reached by the suprahumanist principle, just fifty years after its original dissemination, is difficult to imagine today.[305] It became particularly intense after the epoch-making trauma of the First World War, and gained depth after the no less momentous Crash of 1929. Suprahumanist discourse left its imprint on the remotest corners of the Earth, and influenced — including through the strong reactions it provoked — all aspects of the culture of that time. This mechanism of repulsion, fascination, influence, emulation, and polarisation manifested itself more

acutely in the 1930s, and in the particular climate characterising that decade. Suprahumanist values may be detected in the most unexpected places: for example, in Ayn Rand's 'Objectivism,'[306] and within communist discourse — where such concepts as 'community of destiny,' 'creation of a new man,' 'will to power,' and 'Faustian spirit' begin to appear, ambiguously, within texts propounding Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.[307]

Most suprahumanist currents converged at that time into an ill-defined, magmatic movement. It later came to be known as the 'Conservative Revolution,'[308] and its most famous representatives came from Germany. Examples of the latter include: the 'first' Thomas Mann (*Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*), Ernst Jünger (*Total Mobilisation*, *The Worker*), his brother Friedrich Georg Jünger, Oswald Spengler, Martin Heidegger, Alfred Baeumler, Stefan George, Erwin Guido Kolbenheyer, Hans Grimm, Hans Blüher, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Gottfried Benn, Ernst Wiechert, Edgar J. Jung, Rainer Maria Rilke, Max Scheler, Ludwig Klages, Eugen Diederichs, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, the jurist Carl Schmitt, the biologist Jakob von Uexküll, the anthropologist Hans F. K. Günther, the economist Werner Sombart, and the archaeologist Gustaf Kossinna.

However, the phenomenon was not exclusively German. Others include — under the general description of the 'Conservative Revolution' — several individuals and groups active between the *Belle Époque* and the Second World War, and influenced to a varying extent by Wagner and Nietzsche. These include, among others: D. H. Lawrence, George Bernard Shaw, W. B. Yeats, Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis, Lothrop Stoddard, Knut Hamsun, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, José Ortega y Gasset, Miguel de Unamuno, Pío Baroja, Gabriele D'Annunzio, F. T. Marinetti, Julius Evola, Georges Sorel, Maurice Barrès, Georges Vacher de Lapouge, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and the Bayreuth Circle. To this list may be added the *Jugendstil* and the *Wiener Sezession* artistic movements, the late pre-Raphaelites, some members of the Fabian Society, and personalities such as Matthew Arnold, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, and William Morris.[309]

When suprahumanism speaks in the *received social language* it claims to be, simultaneously, conservative (or reactionary) and revolutionary (or progressive) — for these terms, within the three-dimensionality of historical

time, no longer indicate the opposing directions of time's arrow. The reclamation of a mythical past coincides with a project for the future.

Furthermore, this explains why suprahumanist thinkers and politicians — when they are not fully aware of the historical consciousness animating them — have an ambivalent relationship to so-called 'tradition.' They continue to imagine the tradition to which they refer both exists and has significance independently of any choice they may make. An advocated 'return to tradition' is actually a choice '*against* the tradition' affirmed in the social institutions and customs of the mass society in which they live and '*for* a tradition' already lost or dead — or repressed and condemned to live underground.

The suprahumanist discourse is indeed mythical. Myth, within the suprahumanist world view, is discourse conceiving itself as originative will. It creates its own language by feeding parasitically on another. A myth emerges when a historically new 'principle' appears within a social and cultural milieu that is already *informed* and *conformed* — primarily in its language — by an opposed principle. In order to speak, the new principle must necessarily borrow from the pre-existing language — a language dominated by another principle, another *logos* — because it does not yet have a language of its own. Similarly, while employing this received language, the new principle must reject the 'reason,' or more precisely, the 'conceptual dialectics,' of the opposed *logos*.

The 'opposed contraries' instituted by the previous dialectics[310] are no longer felt as such, but rather as unity and identity — at other times as mere difference, though not as opposition.

All this is evident in Wagner,[311] and even more so in Nietzsche — with his proposal to go 'beyond the good and evil' of Christian dialectics. Later it characterises the mental attitude of those German thinkers and political movements included under the label of the 'Conservative Revolution,' who gave themselves such labels as 'national bolsheviks,' 'national communists,' 'national socialists,' 'conservative revolutionaries,' and 'social aristocrats.'

The 'mythical discourse' is, in its linguistic materiality, one from which the new *logos* is absent, as a principle identified with the new myth. The materiality of the language conforms to another principle and *logos* — hence, the 'ambiguity' characteristic of myth, remarked by a number of

thinkers — without having nevertheless individuated its cause — and the ‘irrationality’ that would seem to define myth.

However, if the ‘discourse’ necessarily appears ambiguous and irrational, the myth — related to itself, to its own principle — is in no way so. Its own *logos* is present not in the materiality of language, but within those who speak and understand it. A myth presupposes the existence of men who, beyond language and discourse, have the means of understanding it. As Meister Eckhart observed: ‘This address is only for those who have already found its message in their own lives, or at least long for it in their hearts.’

If the myth appears to those who participate in it, as consciousness and will of *origins*, to those who remain ‘outside’ it seems an impossible return to ‘primitiveness.’

The entire suprahumanist field — in its artistic, philosophical, and political manifestations — is imbued with these notions: of ‘overcoming the contraries’ or ‘negating the dialectics’ of egalitarianism; of recognition of ‘the people’ — understood in an anti-democratic way as an organic community, as the single and exclusive source of sovereignty; and, simultaneously, of the affirmation of aristocratic values or the cult of the leader. In other cases, heroic individualism and anti-conformism are admired, together with a cult of the community and its traditions. Authority and liberty are no longer considered as opposite poles of the same alternative, but rather as values that may be pursued simultaneously and with the same intensity. Nowadays, the same phenomenon may be observed — for example, in the title of Guillaume Faye’s *Archeofuturism*,[312] where ‘futurism,’ as modernity and technology, is combined with the promise of a new beginning — one which is imagined with ‘archaic’ traits.

Suprahumanism, as an emerging historical tendency, must also be understood as *immediate instinctivity*. Its ‘discourse’ incessantly reaffirms, in its *mythemes* (structural elements of the myth), the *unity of contraries*. These mythemes, or ‘guiding images,’ refer always to *symbols* and to their *ritualisation*. Hence, the myth is, objectively, representation of itself — and, subjectively, sentimental activity: *feeling of sacredness* — not as something transcending man, but as man transcending himself, going *beyond life*, through *historical existence*.

Since in its most coherent forms it radically opposed the dominant culture that permeated and moulded contemporary social and political forms, *suprahumanism* and its political expressions maintained a discourse that could not but seem 'irrational' to those animated by the opposed egalitarian principle.

As mentioned above, suprahumanist elements may be found in a range of political expressions of that time. However, the new historical tendency found its most consistent political translation within the 'Conservative Revolution.' An integral part of that heterogeneous assembly of personalities, parties, associations, and splinter groups was *Fascism*,[313] which may be seen as a first attempt — both *premature* and *immature* — to implement in some European societies a project of national independence and self-determination, based on a tragic vision of life and history, and on the ethics of self-overcoming and triumph of the will.[314]

However, between suprahumanism and Fascism — more than in the intellectual connection that Marxists were wont to establish between theory and praxis — there is, rather, a *spiritual* reference: sometimes an unconscious adhesion to the suprahumanist principle which is immediately followed by political action provoked by that adhesion.[315]

Hence, a different degree of awareness may be observed in the various fascist movements, or in their respective political attitudes. For example, while all the political forms of egalitarianism are identified and combated, not so its cultural forms — or much less so. There is also, between the egalitarian and the fascist fields, much intermediary oscillation, with various spurious 'forms.'[316]

Fascism was a *precise and concluded* historical phenomenon. Paradoxically, however, despite being crushed seventy years ago, it continues to occupy the centre of public discourse, still apparently feared by the system. As Saul Friedländer states, 'fascism is the ultimate standard of evil, against which all degrees of evil may be measured.'[317] This Orwellian omnipresence of 'fascism' exerts an obscure fascination; and it represents the ultimate transgression, explaining the immense cultural production and exploitation arising from historical fascistic movements and regimes, and their protagonists. It does not circumscribe the Holocaust narrative, but manifests itself at all levels: specialised historical studies, cinema, television, literature, political criticism . . . The energy dedicated to the

topic far surpasses that elicited by, for example, the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War, the Vietnam War, the Bolshevik Revolution — or Imperial Rome.

The inter-war period (1918–39) was characterised by economic turmoil, ideological fanaticism, exacerbated nationalism, and opposing geopolitical ambitions. During that incandescent interval, the suprahumanist principle forced the egalitarian principle to acknowledge its own nature; forced it to become wholly conscious of the common parenthood of its diverse political and spiritual forces, and to recognise that they all conformed to the same principle — opposed to the former: namely, the egalitarian or Jewish-Christian. Once these conflicting vectors ruptured into war, fascism — having until then constituted but one political component of the suprahumanist world view — became, in retrospect, the most relevant. For Christians, liberals, democrats, socialists, and communists, 'fascism' became the absolute adversary and mortal enemy, against which everyone had and still has the moral obligation of solidarity: i.e., 'anti-fascism.'

The cataclysmic event which was the Second World War became not only the conscious 'anti-fascist' foundation of the new world order, but also what led to the blackout and repression of many of the elements of suprahumanist discourse: what condemned it to 'the catacombs.' If before the conflict the 'suprahumanist' label was useful to confirm a definitive moral condemnation of Fascism, in the aftermath of the war it was, conversely, the accusation of 'fascism' that helped excommunicate any suprahumanist discourse.[318]

Demonstrations of 'anti-fascism' originally responded to a strict 'moral' requirement for those belonging to the egalitarian field. However, nearly seventy years after the defeat of fascism, 'anti-fascism' now appears increasingly grotesque: 'anti-fascism' is increasingly the basis of the dominant system's *negative legitimacy*.

Hence, the more the egalitarian principle affirms itself in all the details of Europe's cultural and political life, the more also does 'anti-fascism' affirm itself. In this way, 'fascism' acquires a 'negative existence' as strong as the positive existence of its triumphant adversary — perhaps not unlike the 'anti-matter' of microphysicists. This is an interesting phenomenon, for in this way suprahumanism comes continuously to be reborn as potentiality. Provided they know how to deflect the Jungian 'shadow' that egalitarianism

tries to project onto its adversaries in order to render them politically ineffective, those who would be suprahumanists must take such considerations very seriously.

Suprahumanism is a ‘ghost’ that haunts its enemies. They recognise that unless it is completely extirpated the new myth will continue to obsess them: it remains the fundamental and only possible *alternative* to the incapacity of our societies to face the problems modernity has unchained.

Suprahumanism resurfaced ‘from the catacombs’ successfully in Paris at the end of the 1960s, thanks to Giorgio Locchi (1923–92). At that time a correspondent of the Italian newspaper *Il Tempo*, Locchi was, between 1968 and 1979, one of the ‘spiritual masters’ of the GRECE (Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne).[319] Thanks to the members of the branches the GRECE opened all over Europe, Locchi’s message gained — often without acknowledgement — a powerful echo.[320] Giorgio Locchi drifted away from the GRECE when the think tank — against his advice — passively accepted the label of *Nouvelle Droite* (‘New Right’) that hostile media began to use polemically in the summer of 1979. He preferred to use the label *Nouvelle Culture* (‘New Culture’), arguing that suprahumanism should be neither right-wing nor left-wing; that it should represent neither the egalitarian right nor the left but instead stand for both wings, both temperaments (conservative and progressive) of the new historical tendency. May this work be a late tribute to him.

Postlude

In a word — and it shall be an honourable word — we are Good Europeans, the heirs of thousands of years of the European spirit.
— Friedrich Nietzsche



Friedrich Nietzsche (Basel, ca. 1875).

Postmodernity may be defined as an *interregnum*. Giorgio Locchi described this interregnum as a period of waiting during which destiny hangs between two options: either to complete the triumph of the egalitarian conception of the world, *the end of history*, or to promote a *historical regeneration*.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a new historical tendency — antithetically opposed to egalitarianism — made its entrance: *suprahumanism*.

The essence of suprahumanism lies in its original intuition about *the three-dimensionality of time*. This immediate sense of the 'sphericity' of time is intimately linked to a fundamental view of history, human life, and the universe.

A society is set historically in time, and culturally in space. Just as the linear vision of history corresponds to an egalitarian conception of society, so the spherical conception of time corresponds to the spatial 'image' of aristocratic suprahumanism, and to a hierarchical conception of society.

Throughout the foregoing, these two world views — egalitarianism and suprahumanism — have been contrasted, and the system of values logically deriving from each perspective described. Within lies the origin of divisions — increasingly accentuated with passing time: namely, between those who understand that any reflection on life requires a reflection on *quality of life*, and those in whom the egalitarian passion will be stronger; between those who will come to admit that the triumph of an idea requires *taking the necessary power* to make it triumph, and those in whom the aversion from power will prevail; between those who want to define the primacy of *an aesthetic conception of life*, and those arguing for the pre-eminence of a moral attitude; between those defending *living realities*, and those fighting for abstract entities; and finally, between those who will try again to make *man master of his own destiny* and those who will want to stop history lest it create more 'slaves.'

The reader may have spontaneously questioned the validity — the truthfulness — of these conflicting narratives of history: egalitarian and suprahumanist. The historian may confirm only that both are real, in the sense that both have existed and exist historically, that particular men feel this and have felt it. A philosophy shaped by the egalitarian principle will assume the suprahumanist vision of history to be false — as well as the

perception of time which constitutes its foundation. A coherent suprahumanist philosophy will consider the egalitarian world view as proper to the 'Second Man' and hence already overcome — overtaken by the *self-consciousness of the 'Third Man.'*

The age in which we are destined to live is *an era of passage* in which the foundations of life on this planet will be unavoidably altered. It is a primordial age when aspirations to a paradisal end of history, of differences and conflicts — of 'human arrogance' — will clash with a new dream of greatness on a scale never hitherto imagined — and one capable of projecting a human freedom and will to power hitherto unrivalled.

Today's alternative is between 'globalisation,' entropy, and narcissistic consumerism, in a scenario of ever more dehumanising effects, and the possibility of a community[321] deciding to take charge of its own destiny and to regenerate humankind — reaching ever higher. We hope — and we believe — this community will be *Europe*: *Imperium Europa*.

Europe's most important deficiency lies in its *lack of soul, its lack of spirit*. For centuries, we have suffered ourselves to be dragged step by step into a nihilist whirlpool whose depth has yet to be properly probed. Its chief feature is the denial of this world with all its complexity and differences.

However, dismissal of the distinctiveness existing between peoples, individuals, the sexes, and social ranks; the refusal to assume control of history; the rejection of politics — the activity which, according to Aristotle, distinguishes man from other animals (*anthropos zoon politikon*); the denial of form and character in contemporary art — all the foregoing were already in embryo in the *egalitarian ideology* of primitive Judeo-Christianity. The *masses*, devoid of real *masters* — true models with whom to identify — reject the pagan residue inhabiting the collective unconscious of Europe for centuries (*the Indo-European heritage*) and aspire to a humble and mediocre happiness through *regression into a pre-human past*.

Only a small and scattered minority, inspired by the deeds and values of their Indo-European ancestors, attempts to found *a new aristocracy*, yearns for return to a glorious pagan past — a return which cannot take place as such, but which can be transformed into a regeneration of history. This minority may seem small and negligible today. However, it is ever a minority of will and determination that comes to lead the majority.

Our current struggle is a gift, in that it forces European people to *improve and evolve* who they are *spiritually, mentally, and physically*. This period of struggle offers a great gift of learning. European man is being forced to evolve, forced to choose between evolution or extinction. Nietzsche reminds us: 'That which does not kill you only makes you stronger.'[322]

The fundamental issues are existential: of *identity and purpose*. History is open, man is free: the choice is ever between following a path of ethnic, cultural, social, and ecological entropy, or of struggling for existence and self-affirmation.

Identity may be defined as issuing from three factors: *nature, culture, and will*. It is ever human will that makes history, taking charge of bio-cultural identity and projecting transformed memory into an historical project.

The future belongs to those who will express *the strongest will and the deepest consciousness*. It belongs to those who grasp the scope and significance of changes occurring and who — assuming the responsibilities deriving from it — are capable of imagining and forging their destiny through a project giving a new sense to history and to their individual existence: a *higher synthesis* that will overcome all the dialectics of the old paradigm, ever moving *forward and upward*.

Nietzsche prophesied that the Earth will eventually belong to either the *last man* or the *superman*. There are no other alternatives.

Magna Europa est Patria Nostra.

Switzerland, 2013 CE

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by Andrew Fraser

We are Generation Identity
by Génération Identitaire

War and Democracy
by Paul Gottfried

The Saga of the Aryan Race
by Porus Homi Havewala

The Owls of Afrasiab
by Lars Holger Holm

Homo Maximus
by Lars Holger Holm

De Naturae Natura
by Alexander Jacob

Fighting for the Essence
by Pierre Krebs

Can Life Prevail?
by Pentti Linkola

The Conservative
by H. P. Lovecraft

The NRA and the Media
by Brian Anse Patrick

The Ten Commandments of Propaganda
by Brian Anse Patrick

Zombology
by Brian Anse Patrick

Morning Crafts
by Tito Perdue

A Handbook of Traditional Living
by Raido

The Agni and the Ecstasy
by Steven J. Rosen

The Jedi in the Lotus
by Steven J. Rosen

It Cannot Be Stormed
by Ernst von Salomon

Tradition & Revolution
by Troy Southgate

Against Democracy and Equality
by Tomislav Sunic

Nietzsche’s Coming God
by Abir Taha

A Europe of Nations
by Markus Willinger

Generation Identity
by Markus Willinger

The Initiate: Journal of Traditional Studies
by David J. Wingfield (ed.)

[1] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

[2] Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932).

[3] I am particularly indebted to Stefano Vaj, National Secretary of the Italian Transhumanist Association and curator of Giorgio Locchi's texts. His study Biopolitica: Il Nuovo Paradigma (Milan: Società Editrice Barbarossa, 2005) has greatly influenced this work. A translation into English of Vaj's work is about to be published. See www.biopolitica.it for all updates.

[4] Arnold Gehlen, Man in the Age of Technology, trans. Patricia Lipscomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

[5] Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

[6] See Guillaume Faye, Le Système à tuer les Peuples (Paris: Copernic, 1982).

[7] Vaj, Biopolitica.

[8] Giorgio Locchi, Mythe et Communauté: Actes du XIIIième Colloque fédéral du GRECE-1979 (Brussels: Éditions Résistance et Intervention, 1991).

[9] On the question of 'myth,' see also Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and History, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954), and Myth and Reality, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans. T. E. Hulme (New York: Dover Publications, 2004); Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John Weightman and Doreen Weightman (New York: Atheneum, 1975); and Carl Gustav Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963).

[10] See Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society, trans. Charles P. Loomis (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2002).

[11] Giorgio Locchi, 'Über den Sinn der Geschicht,' in Das Unvergängliche Erbe: Alternativen zum Prinzip der Gleichheit (Tübingen: Grabert Verlag, 1981).

[12] The terms 'myth,' 'ideology,' and 'synthetic theory' are used here as conceptual limits or operative concepts: useful categories for describing the macro-historical evolution of a certain tendency.

[13] When suprahumanism is contrasted with 'humanism,' it is liberal humanism which is questioned here, not the Florentine Renaissance represented by Marsilio Ficino or Botticelli. Locke's individualistic Protestantism, combined with Descartes's materialism, produced the universal solvent which dissolves all cultural bonds and threatens to render Earth's diversity into an atomised, undifferentiated gloop. The two main pillars upon which this humanism rests are: (1) the idea of the supremacy of the individual human over everything else in nature; and (2) the idea that every individual is, at least initially, a tabula rasa. Each man is born equally blank and equally interchangeable, like a widget.

[14] Stefano Vaj, Indagine sui Diritti dell'Uomo: Genealogia di una Morale (Rome: LEdE-Akropolis, 1985).

[15] See also Slavoj Žižek, 'Against Human Rights,' New Left Review, no. 34, July–August 2005.

[16] See Alain de Benoist, Les Idées à l'Endroit (Paris: Libres-Hallier, 1978).

[17] Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932).

[18] The Hebrews form a people of priests: 'And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. These are the words which thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel' (Exodus

19:6). In Les Valeurs de la Loi (Paris: Beauchesne, 1980), Jacques Goldstain notes that ‘Israel will thereby be the priest for whom the rest of humanity is the laity.’ Election is in fact not in contradiction with universalism. It is by means of the law he entrusted to his people that Yahweh means to determine the fate of all humanity. For a different view about the fundamental way in which Jews and Christians are related to one another, see Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). The relation between ‘priests’ and ‘laity’ turns, according to MacDonald, into one of deceivers and deceived.

[19] Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music.

[22] ‘The Sermon on the Mount (and by this is meant the absolute ethics of the Gospel) is a far more serious business than is imagined by those who like to quote its commandments nowadays. In truth, it is no laughing matter. We may say of it what has been said about causality in science: it is no hansom cab that can be stopped anywhere, to jump into or out of at will. Rather, the sermon is a matter of all or nothing; that is the point of it if it is to amount to anything more than a set of platitudes.’ Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures: Science as a Vocation, Politics as a Vocation, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004).

[23] See Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 6 vols. (London: Strahan and Cadell, 1776–88).

[24] See James C. Russell, The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity: A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[25] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist.

[26] Alain de Benoist, On Being a Pagan, trans. Jon Graham (Atlanta: Ultra, 2004).

[27] Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Rise of Global Christianity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); The New Faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[28] Stefano Vaj, ‘Identità europee e questione religiosa,’ www.uomo-libero.com.

[29] Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (London: Penguin Group, 2006).

[30] By exchanging its foundational myth for that of biblical monotheism, the West has transformed Hebrewness into its superego. See Israel Shamir, Masters of Discourse (North Charleston: BookSurge Publishing, 2008), and Neal Gabler, An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood (New York: Anchor Books, 1989). According to Vanity Fair (October 2007), Jews make up more than half of the ‘100 most powerful people’ in the world. Of the top 400 richest individuals in the United States, at least 149 (37 per cent) are Jewish (top 400 reported in Forbes, 30 September 2009; Jewish count by Jacob Berman, www.blogs.jta.org [5 October 2009]). Fully half of the top 50 political pundits are Jewish (top 50 list from The Atlantic, September 2009; Jewish count by Steve Sailer [www.isteve.blogspot.com]). In media and entertainment the dominance is almost total. Jewish executives lead all five of the top U.S. media conglomerates — Time-Warner (Jeff Bewkes, Edgar Bronfman), Disney (Robert Iger), News Corp (Rupert Murdoch, Peter Chernin), Viacom (Sumner Redstone, Leslie Moonves, Philippe Dauman), and NBC-Universal (Jeff Zucker). All are Jewish with the possible exception of Murdoch. Six of the top seven American newspapers have Jewish management. Virtually every major Hollywood studio executive is Jewish — see ‘How Jewish Is Hollywood?’ (Los Angeles Times, 19 December 2008).

[31] See Guillaume Faye, Convergence of Catastrophes, trans. E. Christian Kopff (London: Arktos, 2012).

[32] When we speak of European man, we are thinking not in geographical, but in anthropological terms — the white man — and include both the peoples of the continental homeland as well as 'Europe overseas.' Their plight is common and, even if they are unaware of it, they are experiencing a similar fate — they all suffer from the same disease.

[33] Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920). Also see Oswald Spengler, The Hour of Decision, Part One: Germany and World-Historical Evolution, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934).

[34] See Garrett Hardin, Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[35] See José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1957).

[36] For recent statistics and demographic projections for individual European countries, see Walter Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009).

[37] See, on these topics and from a Jewish-Christian perspective, Lawrence Auster's blog: http://www.amnation.com/vfr/.

[38] See Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1958).

[39] Degrowth thinkers and activists such as Serge Latouche advocate the downscaling of production and consumption — the contraction of economies — arguing that overconsumption lies at the root of long-term environmental problems and social inequalities.

[40] Giorgio Locchi, 'L'Histoire,' Nouvelle École, nos. 27–28, 1975.

[41] Despite the sudden collapse of Marxism after the end of the Cold War, it is still important to analyse the Marxist idea of history, since it has percolated to this day the world of academe in the West. See Paul Edward Gottfried, The Strange Death of Marxism: The European Left in the New Millennium (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005).

[42] America as a symptom of mental alienation has been invented by Europeans — symbol of the will to self-denial. That is why, in the present text, 'the West' is — terminologically — opposed to 'Europe.' From our point of view, 'the West' designates that negative mental space conducive to European man's spiritual alienation: the aggregate of egalitarian and liberal values arising from universalist Jewish and Christian messianism. Today, a majority of European countries — but especially the United States — still identify with this idea of 'the West.' That is why, obviously, there are many spiritual 'Europeans' in the United States, and spiritual 'Americans' in Europe.

[43] Bernard-Henri Lévy, Barbarism with a Human Face, trans. George Holoch (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); The Testament of God, trans. George Holoch (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).

[44] See p. 17.

[45] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

[46] Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. James H. Nichols Jr., ed. Allan Bloom (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980).

[47] See p. 159.

[48] Giorgio Locchi, 'Nietzsche et ses "Récupérateurs," ' Nouvelle École, no. 18, 1972.

[49] It is a view maintained today among modern supporters of the ‘traditionalist theory of cycles’ (René Guénon, Julius Evola) who consider that our age corresponds to the end of a cycle: the Hindu Kali Yuga or the ‘Age of the Wolf,’ according to Nordic mythology. If that were to be the case, human freedom would be consequently restricted, with all the risks logically inherent in such an analysis: fatalism and the strategy of making things worse in order to achieve one’s ends.

[50] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM Press, 1962); Nietzsche, 2 vols. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991).

[51] Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).

[52] Freely adapted by us from diverse speeches pronounced by George Bernard Shaw between 1906 and 1937. See George Bernard Shaw, The Religious Speeches of Bernard Shaw, ed. Warren Sylvester Smith (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1963).

[53] See p. 47.

[54] See Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, with A Theory of Meaning, trans. Joseph D. O’Neil (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

[55] See Arnold Gehlen, Man: His Nature and Place in the World, trans. Claire McMillan and Karl Pillemer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

[56] See Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations (New York: Atheneum, 1966), and Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, trans. Marjorie Kerr Wilson (San Diego: Harvest Book, 1966).

[57] See Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Der vorprogrammierte Mensch: Das Ererbte als bestimmender Faktor im menschlichen Verhalten (Vienna: Molden, 1973).

[58] Giorgio Locchi, ‘Éthologie et Sciences Humaines,’ Nouvelle École, no. 33, 1979.

[59] In his lectures on heroes, Thomas Carlyle uses various examples of great men throughout recorded history to convey his notion of a Hero: as Divinity, Prophet, Poet, Priest, Man of Letters, and King. See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (London: James Fraser, 1841).

[60] See Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2 vols., trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1967).

[61] Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals.

[62] The presence of one tool is not sufficient to conclude there is ‘presence of human intelligence.’ The tool might have been given naturally: its ‘fabrication’ may be inscribed immutably in the instincts of the species. Man is characterised by the ‘created’ tool — imagined, projected, and realised beyond any ‘natural’ endowments. Ultimately, a first fabricated tool does not give enough assurance in the matter. It is necessary that a second tool may be found, transformed in relation to the first.

[63] Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932).

[64] Giorgio Locchi, ‘Histoire et Sociétés: Critique de Lévi-Strauss,’ Nouvelle École, no. 17, 1972.

[65] See Arnold Gehlen, Urmensch und Spätkultur: Philosophische Ergebnisse und Aussagen (Bonn: Athenäum, 1956).

[66] Scholars have cited parallels between the Aesir-Vanir War from Nordic mythology, the Rape of the Sabine Women from Roman mythology, and the Mahabharata from Hindu mythology, providing support for an Indo-European ‘war of the functions.’

[67] Lévi-Strauss presents ‘cold societies,’ usually defined as primitive, as brilliant examples — or at least as something to contemplate with nostalgia — of fidelity to tradition. For example, he presents an alluring picture of the Aranda indigenous people, who blindly respect tradition and remain attached to the primitive weapons used by their ancestors, not even considering the idea of improving them. But this seducing homily plays on the most superficial appearances, on a fallacious definition of what tradition should be. With a certain facility, Lévi-Strauss mistakes the letter and the spirit, the act and the fact, the gesture and its effect. By continuing to use their ‘primitive weapons,’ the Aranda are betraying rather than respecting their ancestors. They are actually repeating where their ancestors improvised and invented; marking the step while their ancestors advanced; looking for shelter in a world made certain, while their ancestors, defying the unknown, opened up the gates of a new world. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

[68] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power.

[69] Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None.

[70] Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo.

[71] The rest of this section is mostly adapted from Stefano Vaj, ‘Sovrumanismo e Terzo Uomo,’ in Biopolitics: Il Nuovo Paradigma (Milan: Società Editrice Barbarossa, 2005).

[72] Pyric technology implies energy production technologies based on combustion (wood, coal, oil, etc.).

[73] Nicholas Wade, Before the Dawn: Recovering the Lost History of Our Ancestors (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

[74] Peter Sloterdijk, Regeln für den Menschenpark: ein Antwortschreiben zum Brief uber den Humanismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1999).

[75] See Richard Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[76] Gregory Stock, Redesigning Humans: Choosing Our Genes, Changing Our Future (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002).

[77] Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra.

[78] It is difficult to disentangle the twisted skein of contacts, exchanges, and influences that tepid cultures originally received from without. Some have hypothesised a role of primer for Indo-European influences and groups by way of imitation, competition, or re-elaboration. For example, Indo-Aryan influences on Chinese culture, and through the latter on Japan; or the complex pattern of contacts between Egypt and Mesopotamia on the one hand and, on the other, the different waves of invaders that from Central Europe on several occasions spilled into over the Near East. More uncertain are those hypotheses that suggest a connection of this type with the pre-Columbian empires, e.g., Jacques de Mahieu’s work concerning the story of an alleged Viking elite within the Inca Empire: see Jacques de Mahieu, Drakkars sur l’Amazone: Les Vikings de l’Amerique precolombienne (Paris: Copernic, 1977). Before dismissing this theory as an attempt at historical fiction, one should consider the importance that the myth of Quetzalcoatl played in the conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortes and his forces. There are also hypotheses, more scientific in this case, about the existence of a ‘hyperborean’ Indo-European civilisation which had influences on an almost planetary scale. See Felice Vinci, The Baltic Origins of Homer’s Epic Tales: The Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Migration of Myth, trans. Felice Vinci and Amalia Di Francesco (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2005).

[79] Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra.

[80] For an excellent summary of the Indo-European question, see Stefano Vaj, ‘Alle Radici dell’Europa,’ L’Uomo Libero, no. 9, 1 January 1982, from which this section is adapted.

[81] With the development of Romantic philology and Franz Bopp's famous work, Ueber das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache, in Vergleichung mit jenem der griechischen, lateinischen, persischen und germanischen Sprache (Frankfurt am Main: Andrae, 1816), a comparative grammar of Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin, Gothic, Lithuanian, and German was created. Later, Slavic, Celtic, Illyrian, and Armenian languages were added, and two languages discovered in the first decades of the twentieth century — Hittite and Tocharian — completed the picture. The only explanation for the similarities of these languages was the existence of a common parent language.

[82] Jean-Claude Rivière, Georges Dumézil: À la Découverte des Indo-Européens (Paris: Copernic, 1979).

[83] The original speakers defined themselves as 'Aryans,' but since the end of the Second World War the term 'Indo-European,' though historically inexact, has had — for reasons of conformity to new standards — a renovated fortune. At the geographical extremes of the great migration, we find Arya in Sanskrit and Indo-Iranian, and Aire in the language of the Irish Celts — out of which probably arose Eire: 'Irish.' The root *ar- signifies 'noble.'

[84] See Adriano Romualdi, Gli Indoeuropei: Origini e Migrazioni (Padua: Edizioni di Ar, 1978); Lothar Kilian, Zur Ursprung der Indogermanen (Düsseldorf: Habelt, 1988); and Alain de Benoist, 'Indo-Européens: à la Recherche du Foyer d'Origine,' Nouvelle École, no. 49, 1997.

[85] See Jean Haudry, The Indo-Europeans (Washington, DC: Scott-Townsend Publishers, 1998).

[86] A 2001 study, led by Michael Bamshad of University of Utah, found that the genetic similarity of Indians to Europeans is proportionate to caste rank: the upper castes have a higher similarity to Europeans than to Asians, and the upper castes are significantly more similar to Europeans than are the lower castes. The researchers believe that the Indo-European speakers entered India from the northwest, mixing with or displacing proto-Dravidian speakers, and may have established a caste system with themselves primarily in the higher castes. See Michael Bamshad et al., 'Genetic Evidence on the Origins of Indian Caste Populations,' Genome Research, vol. 11, no. 6, June 2001, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11381027.

[87] See Georges Dumézil, L'Idéologie Tripartite des Indo-Européens (Brussels: Latomus, 1958), and Mythe et Épopée I: L'Idéologie des Trois Functions dans les Épopées des Peuples Indo-Européens (Paris: Gallimard, 1968).

[88] Many such divisions occur in various contexts of early history. One example is the supposed division between the king, nobility, and regular freemen in early Germanic society; another is Plato's tripartite theory of the soul as proposed in The Republic, where it is argued that the soul is composed of three parts: the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. These three parts correspond to the three classes of a just society, each of which is characterised by the predominance of a given part of the soul. Again, in India we find three Hindu castes: the Brahmans or priests, the Kshatriya — those with governing functions — and the Vaishya — the agriculturalists, cattle rearers, and traders. They are associated with three philosophical qualities or gunas: Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, respectively.

[89] See Georges Dumézil, Les Dieux des Indo-Européens (Paris: PUF, 1952), and L'Idéologie Tripartite des Indo-Européens.

[90] See pp. 77–79.

[91] See, for example, the difference between the institutions of the Roman imperium and the Ottoman sultanate.

[92] Giorgio Locchi, ' "Le Vocabulaire des Institutions Européennes" d'Émile Benvéniste,' Nouvelle École, no. 11, 1970.

[93] If it were consistent and logical, a certain feminism would merge with the defence of European culture and values. Since ancient times, woman was considered a person and not an object in Europe — but only in Europe.

[94] Homer, The Iliad, 9.501.

[95] The Poetic Edda, Hávamál, 77.

[96] See Hans F. K. Günther, The Religious Attitudes of the Indo-Europeans, trans. Vivian Bird and Roger Pearson (London: Clair Press, 1967).

[97] Giorgio Locchi, 'Le Mythe Cosmogonique Indo-Européen: Reconstruction et Réalité,' Nouvelle École, no. 19, 1972.

[98] Kalidasa, The Birth of Kumara, trans. David Smith (New York: NYU Press, 2005).

[99] Heraclitus, Fragments, 62.

[100] In To Have or to Be? (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), Erich Fromm observes: 'The [Christian] martyr is the exact opposite of the pagan hero personified in the Greek and Germanic heroes. . . . For the pagan hero, a man's worth lay in his prowess in attaining and holding onto power, and he gladly died on the battlefield in the moment of victory.'

[101] See Giorgio Locchi, 'Radici Indoeuropee e "terzo uomo," ' in Definizioni, ed. Stefano Vaj (Milan: Società Editrice Barbarossa, 2006).

[102] For a recent example, see Christopher B. Krebs, A Most Dangerous Book: Tacitus's Germania from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2013).

[103] Virgil, The Aeneid, 6.743.

[104] Revolutionary in the proper sense of the word (re-volution, from the Latin revolutus, revolvere: to turn over, to return) because suprahumanism wants to 'turn over' the existing system of values, 'change the world,' and return to or reproduce a moment that was. Its attitude towards our present world is similar to the one adopted by the first Christians towards the Greco-Roman world.

[105] 'Neo-pagan' because with the 'death of God,' the old gods that Christianity maintained indirectly alive as promise and nostalgia of a diverse world, also died. They metamorphosed into a mythical and exemplary return to the origins that make a new beginning possible.

[106] See Trevor Lynch, 'Christopher Nolan's Batman Movies: Weaponizing Traditionalism, Transvaluing Values,' http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/07/christopher-nolans-batman-movies-weaponizing-traditionalism-transvaluing-values/.

[107] See Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans. T. E. Hulme (New York: Dover Publications, 2004).

[108] See Alain de Benoist, Les Idées à l'Endroit (Paris: Libres-Hallier, 1978).

[109] Heraclitus, Fragments, 67.

[110] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust: A Tragedy, trans. Walter Arndt (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1976).

[111] See Sigrid Hunke, Europas andere Religion: Die Überwindung der religiösen Krise (Munich: Econ, 1969).

[112] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist.

[113] Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.

[114] See Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

[115] What most characterises Judeo-Christian monotheism is not merely belief in a unique God, but also, and especially, adherence to a dualistic conception of the world.

[116] See Manfred Kühn, Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Ein deutscher Philosoph (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2012).

[117] See Alain de Benoist, On Being a Pagan, trans. Jon Graham (Atlanta: Ultra, 2004).

[118] Heraclitus, Fragments, 62.

[119] Any utopian or Gnostic designs to achieve limitless progress, the end of history, human perfection, immortality, non-divine 'salvation,' or other variations of what Eric Voegelin called attempts to 'immanentize the eschaton' are necessarily condemned from the outset. See Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[120] See pp. 55–58.

[121] See Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and The Story of Philosophy (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2001).

[122] See Martin Heidegger, Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

[123] See the dialogue on nihilism in which Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger engaged in the 1950s — on the occasions of their respective sixtieth birthdays. Ernst Jünger, 'Über die Linie,' in Anteile: Martin Heidegger zum 60. Geburtstag (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950); and Martin Heidegger, 'Über "die Linie," ' in Freundschaftliche Begegnungen: Festschrift für Ernst Jünger zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Armin Mohler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1955).

[124] See Alain de Benoist, Les Idées à l'Endroit (Paris: Libres-Hallier, 1978).

[125] Oswald Spengler, 'Prussianism and Socialism,' in Selected Essays, trans. Donald O. White (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967).

[126] George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman (London: Constable, 1903).

[127] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2 vols., trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1967).

[128] See Dr. William L. Pierce's Cosmotheist essays 'The Path,' 'On Living Things,' and 'On Society,' and his 1976 speech 'Our Cause' for a poetic-religious rendition of these ideas. 'Our dream is a progressive dream, a dream of unlimited progress over the centuries and the millennia and the eons which lie ahead of us. It is no conservative dream of peace, no sheeplike dream of ease and consumption, but a dream of achievement of our Destiny, which is Godhood. It is the only dream fitting for men and women of our race; it is the spirit of the Life Force, it is the Universal Urge within us, expressing itself through our race-soul . . . so that we can once again become agents of the Universal Will — except this time fully conscious agents — and resume our never-ending ascent toward our ordained Destiny' ('Our Cause,' http://nationalvanguard.org/2010/09/our-cause/).

[129] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power.

[130] See 'Promethean Fire': pp. 157–169.

[131] Arthur Schopenhauer, Manuscript Remains, 4 vols., trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1988).

[132] See Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[133] See pp. 70–73.

[134] Will Durant and Ariel Durant, The Lessons of History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968).

[135] See Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (London: Penguin Books, 2003).

[136] Guillaume Faye, Sexe et Dévoiement (n.p.: Les Éditions du Lore, 2011).

[137] See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009).

[138] See Alain de Benoist, 'L'Affaire Lyssenko,' in Vu de Droite: Anthologie Critique des Idées Contemporaines (Paris: Copernic, 1977).

[139] See Yvan Blot, La Politique selon Aristote: Leçons du Passé pour le Présent (Saint Loup de Naud: Éditions Nation et Humanisme, 1997).

[140] Tatu Vanhanen, Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999).

[141] See also Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York: Doubleday, 2003), on the incompatibility of democracy, markets, and multiracialism.

[142] Samuel Francis, 'The Return of the Repressed,' in Race and the American Prospect: Essays on the Racial Realities of Our Nation and Our Time (Mount Airy, MD: The Occidental Press, 2006).

[143] Charlotte Hunt-Grubbe, 'The Elementary DNA of Dr Watson,' The Times (London), 14 October 2007.

[144] See Hans Jürgen Eysenck, Race, Intelligence and Education: Towards a New Society (London: Temple Smith, 1971); Frank Miele, Intelligence, Race, and Genetics: Conversations with Arthur R. Jensen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004); and Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen, IQ and Global Inequality (Augusta, GA: Washington Summit Publishers, 2006).

[145] See Stefano Vaj and A. Scianca, eds., Dove va la biopolitica? (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 2007).

[146] Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York: Free Press, 1994).

[147] See Theodosius Dobzhansky in Science and the Concept of Race, ed. Margaret Mead, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ethel Tobach, and Robert E. Light (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

[148] See L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi, and Alberto Piazza, The History and Geography of Human Genes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[149] See Vaj and Scianca, Dove va la biopolitica?

[150] See pp. 74–75.

[151] See Vaj and Scianca, Dove va la biopolitica?

[152] Ibid.

[153] Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).

[154] See pp. 80–82.

[155] See Nicholas Wade, Before the Dawn: Recovering the Lost History of Our Ancestors (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), and Gregory Cochran and Henry Harpending, The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution (New York: Basic Books, 2009).

[156] See J. Philippe Rushton, Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective, 3rd ed. (Port Huron, MI: Charles Darwin Research Institute, 1995).

[157] Wade, Before the Dawn.

[158] Carleton S. Coon, The Living Races of Man (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

[159] Wade, Before the Dawn.

[160] See Colin Renfrew, Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[161] See Alisdair Clarke, 'Aryan Origins,' http://aryanfuturism.blogspot.com.au/2006/03/aryan-origins.html

[162] See pp. 75–79.

[163] G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).

[164] See Derek Hawthorne, ‘Nationalism and Racialism in German Philosophy: Fichte, Hegel, and the Romantics,’ http://www.counter-currents.com/2012/08/nationalism-and-racialism-in-german-philosophy/.

[165] The concept of intelligence (as measured by IQ) does not include all mental faculties. Character must also be taken into consideration: as Gustave Le Bon observed, men do not act according to their intelligence, but according to their character.

[166] See William L. Pierce, ‘The Faustian Spirit,’ http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/06/the-faustian-spirit/.

[167] See Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, 2 vols., abr. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). For a recent expression of the same idea, see Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1997).

[168] See Richard Wagner, Opera and Drama, trans. William Ashton Ellis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).

[169] See Bryan Magee, Aspects of Wagner (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968).

[170] See Alain de Benoist, On Being a Pagan, trans. Jon Graham (Atlanta: Ultra, 2004).

[171] Jean-Joseph Goux, Les Iconoclastes (Paris: Seuil, 1978).

[172] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music.

[173] See Anthony M. Ludovici, Nietzsche and Art (London: Constable, 1911).

[174] See Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2 vols., trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1967).

[175] See Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols., trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926–28).

[176] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, The Maxims and Reflections of Goethe, trans. Bailey Saunders (New York: Macmillan, 1906).

[177] The German word for ‘ugly,’ hässlich, is derived from the same root as Hass, ‘hate.’ It may be concluded from this that what is ugly is hateful. The French word laid is itself derived from the Germanic root leid: ‘disagreeable, odious.’

[178] Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer.

[179] ‘The Relation between the Ego and the Unconscious,’ in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, 2nd ed., trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[180] See Paula Philippson, Untersuchungen über den griechischen Mythos (Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1944).

[181] Knight Dunlap, Personal Beauty and Racial Betterment (St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Company, 1920).

[182] See Kevin Alfred Strom, ‘Beauty, Art, and Race,’ American Dissident Voices broadcast of 2 October 2004, http://nationalvanguard.org/2010/10/beauty-art-and-race/.

[183] Dunlap, Personal Beauty and Racial Betterment.

[184] Strom, ‘Beauty, Art, and Race.’

[185] Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, Vom Unglück und Glück der deutschen Kunst nach dem letzten Kriege (Berlin: Matthes und Seitz, 1990).

[186] See William L. Pierce, ‘Shakespeare and Democracy,’ Free Speech, vol. 3, no. 3, March 1997.

[187] Ibid.

[188] Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Picador, 2003).

[189] See pp. 52–53.

[190] See Charles Murray, Human Accomplishment: The Pursuit of Excellence in the Arts and Sciences, 800 B.C. to 1950 (New York: HarperPerennial, 2003).

[191] See Alain de Benoist, Les Traditions d'Europe (Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1996).

[192] See Sigrid Hunke, Europas andere Religion: Die Überwindung der religiösen Krise (Munich: Econ, 1969).

[193] See pp. 218–219.

[194] 'It is self-evident that a language whose structure is most extensively suited to the intellect and which most intensively stimulates its activity must also posses the most enduring power to produce from its reservoir of linguistic materials new conformations, brought forth by the lapse of time and the destinies of peoples — if the Sanskrit tongues have for at least three millennia given proof of their productive capacity, this is simply an effect of the intensity of the creative linguistic action in the peoples to which they belonged.' Wilhelm von Humboldt, Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development, trans. George C. Buck and Frithjof A. Raven (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971).

[195] Ernest Renan, Histoire Générale et Système Comparé des Langues Sémitiques (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1855).

[196] See Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1975).

[197] In an interview with Christopher Gérard, Guillaume Faye remarked: 'Let us remember the names of the American rockets and space programs of von Braun's times: Thor, Atlas, Titan, Jupiter, Delta, Mercury, Apollo. None was called "Jesus," "Forgiveness and Love," or "Holy Bible," and this happened when Christian fundamentalism was the majority religion in the United States.' Guillaume Faye and Christopher Gérard, 'Les Titans et les Dieux,' Antaios, no. 16, spring 2001.

[198] Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932).

[199] See Louis Pauwels, Blumroch l'Admirable ou Le Déjeuner du Surhomme (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).

[200] Hervé Kempf, La Révolution Biolithique: Humains Artificiels et Machines Animées (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998).

[201] Biotronic devices, which are now mostly used to monitor neural activity during spinal and intercranial surgery, might have life-enhancing potentialities in the future. See Kempf, La Révolution Biolithique.

[202] Édouard Rix, 'Modernity, Postmodernity, Hypermodernity,' http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/06/modernity-postmodernity-hypermodernity/.

[203] Werner Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History and Psychology of the Modern Business Man, trans. M. Epstein (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1915).

[204] See Max Weber, Max Weber: Readings and Commentary on Modernity, ed. Stephen Kalberg (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).

[205] See Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols., trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926–28).

[206] Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion, trans. Oscar Burge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[207] Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

[208] Valérie Mérindol, David W. Versailles, and Patrice Cardot, La Recherche et la Technologie, Enjeux de Puissance (Paris: Economica, 2003).

[209] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist.

[210] The term ‘électrofascisme’ originated in France and refers to the idea that nuclear energy would lead to a police state. In Germany the same concept was expressed as ‘Atomstaat.’

[211] See Stefano Vaj, ‘La Voce della Reazione,’ in Biopolitica: Il Nuovo Paradigma (Milan: Società Editrice Barbarossa, 2005).

[212] See Brian Alexander, Rapture: A Raucous Tour of Cloning, Transhumanism, and the New Era of Immortality (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

[213] See Stefano Vaj and A. Scianca, eds., Dove va la biopolitica? (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 2007).

[214] Gilles Lipovetsky, Hypermodern Times, trans. Andrew Brown (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

[215] See Ernst Jünger, Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1932).

[216] Ibid.

[217] See Guillaume Faye, ‘Pour en finir avec le Nihilisme,’ Nouvelle École, no. 37, April 1982.

[218] See Spengler, Man and Technics.

[219] Vaj, Biopolitica.

[220] Stefano Vaj and A. Scianca, eds., Dove va la biopolitica? (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 2007).

[221] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2 vols., trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1967).

[222] See Richard Lynn, Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations, 2nd ed. (London: Ulster Institute for Social Research, 2011).

[223] Maximilian Mügge, ‘Eugenics and the Superman,’ Eugenics Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 1909.

[224] Francis Galton, Memories of My Life (London: Methuen, 1908).

[225] George Bernard Shaw, Back to Methuselah (London: Constable, 1921).

[226] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power.

[227] Incidentally, there are also inner techniques, those seen in the best spirituality and philosophy. Aristocracies create opportunity for the few to work on these inner techniques. Such beings then enrich the whole. In a non-aristocratic society, inner techniques are often obliterated — for example, in the accelerated modern era.

[228] Werner Jaeger summarises kalokagathia as ‘the chivalrous ideal of a complete human personality, harmonious in mind and body, foursquare in battle and speech, song and action.’ Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 3 vols., trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939–45).

[229] See Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murray, 1871).

[230] ‘Being the work of superior intelligences, culture — as a whole — is likely to demand more complex adjustments from the general population than they are genetically suited to making. This discrepancy has been called “genetic lag.” It has some correspondence to the difference between the instinctual reactions of the old brain and the adjustments made possible by the cortex. Genetic

lag is the cause of many social problems. Eugenic measures seek to reduce the genetic lag.' Raymond B. Cattell, Beyondism: Religion from Science (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987).

[231] Nevertheless, in Sweden the eugenics programme continued until 1975.

[232] Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1998).

[233] Peter Sloterdijk, Regeln für den Menschenpark: ein Antwortschreiben zum Brief uber den Humanismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1999).

[234] Stefano Vaj and A. Scianca, eds., Dove va la biopolitica? (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 2007).

[235] Gregory Stock, Redesigning Humans: Choosing Our Genes, Changing Our Future (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002).

[236] Vaj and Scianca, Dove va la biopolitica?

[237] Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (London: Chatto and Windus, 1932).

[238] Richard Lynn, Eugenics: A Reassessment (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

[239] See Francis Galton, Essays on Eugenics (London: Eugenics Society, 1909).

[240] See Stefano Vaj, 'L'Uomo e l'Ambiente,' L'Uomo Libero, no. 7, 1 July 1981, from which most of this section is adapted.

[241] Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932).

[242] See Jean-François Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[243] For the elaboration of this section, I am particularly indebted to Alain de Benoist's excellent studies, Les Idées à l'Endroit (Paris: Libres-Hallier, 1978), and On Being a Pagan, trans. Jon Graham (Atlanta: Ultra, 2004).

[244] See Tomislav Sunic, Homo americanus: Child of the Postmodern Age (Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing, 2007).

[245] Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom, trans. J. T. Swann (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

[246] See Julius Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World, trans. Guido Stucco (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1995).

[247] Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

[248] Julien Freund, L'Essence du Politique (Paris: Sirey, 1965).

[249] See Georges Dumézil, Mitra-Varuna: An Essay on Two Indo-European Representations of Sovereignty, trans. Derek Coltman (New York: Zone Books, 1988), and Les Dieux Souverains des Indo-Européens (Paris: Gallimard, 1948).

[250] Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer.

[251] Schmitt, The Concept of the Political.

[252] Heraclitus, Fragments, 80.

[253] See F. J. P. Veale, Advance to Barbarism: The Development of Total Warfare from Serajevo to Hiroshima (Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993).

[254] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, The Maxims and Reflections of Goethe, trans. Bailey Saunders (New York: Macmillan, 1906).

[255] Houston Stewart Chamberlain, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols., trans. John Lees (London: John Lane, 1913).

[256] Neologism coined by Niall Ferguson for describing the symbiotic relationship between China and the United States. See Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the

World (London: Penguin Books, 2008).

[257] On the term ‘aristocracy,’ see p. 111.

[258] See Trevor Lynch, ‘Mishima: A Life in Four Chapters,’ http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/01/mishima-a-life-in-four-chapters/.

[259] Ibid.

[260] See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1995).

[261] See Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936).

[262] See William L. Pierce, American Dissident Voices, ed. Shane Webster (Melbourne: Politically Incorrect Press, 2011).

[263] See Colin McEvedy, The New Penguin Atlas of Ancient History (London: Penguin Books, 2002), The New Penguin Atlas of Medieval History (London: Penguin Books, 1992), The Penguin Atlas of Modern History (London: Penguin Books, 1972), and The Penguin Atlas of Recent History (London: Penguin Books, 1982).

[264] See Robert Steuckers’ geopolitical analyses on his website: http://euro-synergies.hautetfort.com

[265] See Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, 2 vols., trans. Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille (London: Macmillan, 1916).

[266] See Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte: Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff für Völkerrecht in dem Sammelwerk ‘Das Reich und Europa’ (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1991), and The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans. G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2003).

[267] See Peter Sloterdijk, Falls Europa erwacht (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1994).

[268] See Francis Parker Yockey (Ulick Varange), Imperium: The Philosophy of History and Politics (Newport Beach, CA: The Noontide Press, 1969); José Ortega y Gasset, ‘Meditación de Europa,’ in Obras Completas, vol. 9 (Madrid: Editorial Alianza/Revista de Occidente, 1962); Jean Thiriart, Un Empire de Quatre Cents Millions d’Hommes, l’Europe (Paris: Avatar Éditions, 2007); Oswald Mosley, Europe: Faith and Plan. A Way Out of the Coming Crises and an Introduction to Thinking as an European (Riverside, CA: Washburn and Sons, 1958); Alain de Benoist, L’Empire Intérieur (Saint Clément: Fata Morgana, 1995); Julius Evola, ‘Idée Impériale et Nouvel Ordre Européen (1930–1951),’ in Essais Politiques, trans. Gérard Boulanger and François Maistre (Puiseaux: Pardès, 1988), and Men Among the Ruins: Post-War Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist, trans. Guido Stucco (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2002); and Guillaume Faye, Nouveau Discours à la Nation Européenne, 2nd ed. (Paris: L’Æncre, 1999).

[269] Norman Lowell, Imperium Europa: The Book That Changed the World (n.p.: Classy Pony Press, 2009).

[270] Giorgio Locchi, ‘Le Règne, l’Empire et l’Imperium,’ Nouvelle École, no. 20, 1972.

[271] ‘You, O Roman, remember to rule nations with your sway — these will be your arts — and to impose the tradition of peace, to spare the humbled and crush the proud.’ See Virgil, The Aeneid, 6.851.

[272] See Ernst Jünger, Der Weltstaat: Organismus und Organisation (Stuttgart: Klett, 1960).

[273] See Robert de Herte (Alain de Benoist) and Hans-Jürgen Nigra (Giorgio Locchi), ‘Il était une fois l’Amérique,’ Nouvelle École, nos. 27–28, 1975.

[274] See p. 52, n. 5.

[275] This section is adapted almost entirely from Stefano Vaj, 'L'Europa come Destino,' L'Uomo Libero, no. 22, 1 October 1985.

[276] See p. 39.

[277] See 'Original Origin,' pp. 103–107.

[278] See Giorgio Locchi, 'Le Règne, l'Empire et l'Imperium.'

[279] Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None.

[280] Giorgio Locchi, Nietzsche, Wagner e il Mito Sovrumanista (Rome: Akropolis, 1982).

[281] Ernst Troeltsch, Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1966).

[282] Peter Viereck, Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler, rev. ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003); György Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981).

[283] See Robert W. Gutman, Richard Wagner: The Man, His Mind, and His Music (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968); Hartmut Zelinsky, Richard Wagner — ein deutsches Thema: Eine Dokumentation zur Wirkungsgeschichte Richard Wagners 1876–1976 (Frankfurt: Zweitausendeins, 1976); Paul Lawrence Rose, Wagner: Race and Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); and Joachim Köhler, Wagner's Hitler: The Prophet and His Disciple, trans. Ronald Taylor (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).

[284] See Luca Leonello Rimbotti, Il Mito al Potere: Le Origini Pagane del Nazionalsocialismo (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 1992).

[285] On the question of 'myth,' see also pp. 23–26.

[286] 'What is now decisive against Christianity is our taste, no longer our reason.' Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science.

[287] See pp. 55–58.

[288] See 'The Revolt of the Slaves,' p. 29.

[289] Timothée Picard, Wagner, une Question Européenne: Contribution à une Étude du Wagnérisme, 1860–2004 (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006).

[290] Wagnerism already during the composer's life became a significant phenomenon. Apart from the well-known role played by Franz Liszt, the young Friedrich Nietzsche, King Ludwig II of Bavaria, Anton Bruckner, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, it is interesting to recall the Wagnerian fanaticism of Charles Baudelaire, Stéphane Mallarmé, Édouard Schuré, Édouard Dujardin, Catulle Mendès, and George Bernard Shaw.

[291] See Werner Kunz, Die Brücke von Bach zu Wagner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965).

[292] See Thrasybulos Georgiades, Music and Language: The Rise of Western Music as Exemplified in Settings of the Mass, trans. Marie Louise Gollner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[293] 'Bayreuth symbolises the regeneration and redemption of humankind through art.' Jean-Édouard Spenlé, La Pensée Allemande de Luther à Nietzsche (Paris: A. Colin, 1934).

[294] See Richard Osborne, Herbert von Karajan: A Life in Music (London: Chatto and Windus, 1998).

[295] See Alain de Benoist, 'Bayreuth et le Wagnerisme,' in Vu de Droite: Anthologie Critique des Idées Contemporaines (Paris: Copernic, 1977).

[296] See pp. 80–86.

[297] Roger Scruton, 'Desecrating Wagner,' Prospect Magazine, 20 April 2003. Also see Roger Scruton, Death-Devoted Heart: Sex and the Sacred in Wagner's Tristan and Isolde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[298] See ‘Richard Wagner 1,’ special issue, Nouvelle École, no. 30, autumn–winter 1978, and ‘Richard Wagner 2,’ special issue, Nouvelle École, nos. 31–32, spring 1979.

[299] A failed attempt to try to denigrate Wagner among suprahumanist partisans, not only because Parsifal, in its avowed intention to ‘redeem the redeemer’ (Erlösung dem Erlöser) is simply ‘scandalous’ from a Christian perspective, but also because its representation is intended to short-circuit and transfigure the Christian myth in the mind of the spectator, in order to better express values which are diametrically opposed to those advocated by all Christian denominations.

[300] See Thomas Mann, Pro and Contra Wagner, trans. Allan Blunden (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

[301] See Robert E. Norton, Secret Germany: Stefan George and His Circle (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

[302] Wagner’s music is still unofficially banned from public performance in Israel.

[303] Germans and Jews are the two most tragic peoples in history. They are the two ‘theological’ peoples of this universe — feeling endowed with a ‘cosmic mission,’ and hence its spiritual leaders and protagonists. The world may resent these two peoples — and indeed does so — but it will have to follow their lead so long as it believes in their theology, philosophy, and morality. Several authors have commented on this competition that opposes Germans and Jews for the spiritual leadership of the world. See, for instance, Oscar Levy, The Spirit of Israel (Geneva: The Review of Nations, 1924); and, more recently, Dietrich Schuler, Kreatismus als geistige Revolution (Bad Wildungen: Ahnenrad der Moderne, 2009).

[304] Armin Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932: Ein Handbuch, 4th ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994).

[305] See Giorgio Locchi, ‘Espressione politica e repressione del principio sovrumanista,’ in Definizioni, ed. Stefano Vaj (Milan: Società Editrice Barbarossa, 2006).

[306] See Ayn Rand, We the Living (London: Macmillan, 1936); The Fountainhead (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943); and Atlas Shrugged (New York: Random House, 1957).

[307] See Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, Nietzsche and Soviet Culture: Ally and Adversary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and New Myth, New World: From Nietzsche to Stalinism (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); also see Rosamund Bartlett, Wagner and Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). These political and militant (‘fascistic’) traits are already present in the Rousseauan and Jacobin premises of the French Revolution, but absent in the American counterpart. That may be the reason why the American liberal ‘left’ has followed unambiguously a continuous line of development, starting with religious Christianity and continuing along a series of different political denominations (liberalism, ‘radical democracy,’ etc.) to conclude nowadays becoming a firm supporter of ‘the end of history’ and planetary homogenisation (globalisation).

[308] See Armin Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932: Ein Handbuch, 4th ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994).

[309] In addition to Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932, see Zeev Sternhell, Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France, trans. David Maisel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1880–1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); William J. McGrath, Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in Austria (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974); Eric Bentley, A Century of Hero-Worship: A Study of the Idea of Heroism in Carlyle and Nietzsche (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1944); and Anne Dzamba Sessa, Richard Wagner and the English (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1977).

[310] Egalitarian dialectics are based on the following antitheses: Christianity/atheism, communism/capitalism, nationalism/internationalism, right/left, individualism/collectivism, reaction/progress, etc.

[311] The themes in Wagner's musical dramas are resolutely beyond good and evil: the internal tragedy (external conflicts are but its reflections), the superhuman desire, the popular genius, night's truth and the power of destiny, the beginning and end of a time summoned to return eternally, etc.

[312] Guillaume Faye, Archeofuturism: European Visions of the Post-Catastrophic Age, trans. Sergio Knipe (London: Arktos, 2010).

[313] Capitalised 'Fascism' is used here to refer to the historical phenomenon.

[314] See, on this topic, Stanley G. Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (Austin: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1966); George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964); and A. James Gregor, Interpretations of Fascism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997).

[315] See Giorgio Locchi, L'Essenza del Fascismo (La Spezia: Edizioni del Tridente, 1981), and Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich, eds., Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[316] See Jean-Pierre Faye, Langages Totalitaires (Paris: Hermann, 1972).

[317] Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews (New York: HarperPerennial, 1998).

[318] See Guillaume Faye, 'Réflexions Archéofuturistes Inspirées par la Pensée de Giorgio Locchi,' http://guillaumefayearchive.wordpress.com/2007/07/12/reflexions-archeofuturistes-inspirees-par-la-pensee-de-giorgio-locchi/.

[319] See Michael O'Meara, New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe (London: Arktos, 2013), and Tomislav Sunic, Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right (London: Arktos, 2011).

[320] Locchi markedly influenced, among others, Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, Robert Steuckers, Pierre Vial, Pierre Krebs, and Stefano Vaj.

[321] Since Heideggerian Dasein as 'being-in-the-world' is also mitdasein ('being-with-others'), destiny is always Geschick ('common destiny'). To the temporal 'regeneration of history' must correspond a spatial 'community of destiny' — a people, race, nation, etc.

[322] Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer.